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'In my youth,' said his father, 'I took to the law,
And argued each case with my wife;
And the muscular strength, which it gave to my jaw,
Has lasted the rest of my life.' **
'Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, 'if it was so, it might be;
and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's
logic.' ***
I. Introduction
In an age of burgeoning appellate caseloads and multiple ap-
peals in a single case, the right of appellate review is often routinely
invoked but seldom appraised. So many appellate opinions have been
written and read that the incantation of stock legal phrases and prin-
ciples can become commonplace and the effect can become almost
mesmerizing. The insular preoccupations of the present diminish the
value of past experience. Occasionally, however, there comes a re-
minder that invokes reflection. Chief Justice Burger, in Abney v.
United States,1 began his analysis of a seemingly routine jurisdic-
tional problem with an historical perspective on the "right" of appel-
late review. He noted:
We approach the threshold appealability question with two
principles in mind. First, it is well settled that there is no consti-
tutional right to an appeal. . . . Indeed, for a century after this
Court was established, no appeal as of right existed in criminal
cases, and, as a result, appellate review of criminal convictions
was rarely allowed. As the Court described this period in Reetz
v. Michigan...
"[T]rials under the Federal practice for even the gravest
offenses ended in the trial court, except in cases where two
judges were present and certified a question of law to this
court. . . ." The right of appeal, as we presently know it in
criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute; in order to exer-
cise that statutory right of appeal one must come within the
** L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 34 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981).
* L. CARROLL. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 141 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981).
I. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
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terms of the applicable statute ....
The constitutional right of appeal, as distinguished from the
statutory right, imports a sense of almost sacred immutability. Penn-
sylvania citizens now have both the statutory' and constitutional
right of appeal. Yet it was not until 1968 that the right of appeal in
all cases achieved constitutional status. Pennsylvania citizens now
possess the constitutional right of appeal as a result of the following
constitutional amendment:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of
record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right
of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative
agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection
of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such
other rights of appeal as may be provided by law."
The right of appeal in Pennsylvania is one that case law says the law
favors and protects from abrogation.5
The right of appeal, however, is a very specialized, complicated,
and oftentimes expensive right with enormous impact upon the
courts and the practitioners. Recent statistics and contemporary
studies, for example, verify that Pennsylvania's three appellate
courts, with their limited resources, must discharge their solemn ob-
ligation of appellate review on a staggering scale.6 The orderly and
2. Id. at 656; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684 (1894); Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J.
694 (1963); cf. infra note 70.
3. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5105 (Purdon 1981) (right to legal redress),
5 105(a) (right to appellate review from final orders of every court, district justice and govern-
ment unit); see also id. § 5105(b) (successive appeals).
4. PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. The historical note indicates, for example, that the Consti-
tution of 1874, art. V, § 3 provided in part: "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend over the State, and the judges thereof . . . shall have appellate jurisdiction by appeal,
certiorari or writ of error in all cases, as is now or may hereafter be provided by law." See also
DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, 106 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 401 (1982-1983).
Other commentators have observed that there is a strong American tradition demanding that
there be at least one right of appeal in cases. See, e.g., POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN
CIVIL CASES (1941); A. VANDERBILT. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
400-01 (1949); Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 638 (1951).
5. See Ege's Appeal, 2 Watts 283 (Pa. 1834); see also City of Philadelphia v. Gould,
497 Pa. 599, 442 A.2d 1104 (1982).
6. A study, initiated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, verified the magnitude of
the Pennsylvania appellate courts' work loads. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, PENNSYL-
VANIA'S APPELLATE COURTS - A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1978) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE AMERICAN JUDICA-
TURE SOCIETY].
Statistics concerning the three appellate courts from 1976 to 1984 are also revealing. In
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the following number of direct appeals (in parentheses) were
filed: 1976 (830), 1977 (823), 1978 (798), 1980 (758), 1981 (246), 1982 (102), 1983 (194),
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efficient administration of appellate justice would not be possible
under such onerous circumstances were it not for the intricate sys-
tem of rules and procedures known as the Pennsylvania Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure.
7
Anyone - whether seasoned appellate practitioner or novice - fa-
miliar with appellate rules and procedures can attest to the complex-
ity and intricacies of appellate practice. The codified rules of appel-
late procedure, for example, contain approximately 240 "rules"; yet
this ballpark figure is misleading because there are so many rules
within rules and so many noncodified principles incorporated by such
rules. Most practitioners and trial litigators do not have the time,
expense or luxury to specialize in appellate practice, which requires
a competent understanding of procedures and language that, to
some, may be as arcane and idiomatic as E = mc2 . Nevertheless, the
probability that a practitioner will someday - voluntarily or invol-
untarily - face a peering appellate tribunal is significant. Depend-
ing upon the practitioner's level of preparedness, the terra incognita
of the appellate courtroom may be like the Land of Oz, the Twilight
and 1984 (268). The significant change in the figures for 1980 and 1981 is attributable to
jurisdictional realignment among the three appellate courts. Also significant is the number of
"petitions for allowance of appeal" that were filed in the supreme court for the following years:
1976 (906), 1977 (844), 1978 (1126), 1979 (1052), 1980 (1016), 1981 (888), 1982 (1245),
1983 (1222), and 1984 (1537). The supreme court also filed a significant number of opinions
during this time span: 1976 (583), 1977 (740), 1978 (958), 1979 (659), 1980 (667), 1981
(832), 1982 (485), 1983 (389), and 1984 (181).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court received the following number of appeals for the indi-
vidual years: 1976 (3631), 1977 (3700), 1978 (4495), 1979 (4047), 1980 (4523), 1981 (5037),
1982 (5593), 1983 (5556), and 1984 (5793). Petitions filed in three of those years indicate the
following volumes: 1981 (4212), 1982 (6131), and 1983 (6355). In the face of such a crowded
appellate docket, opinions filed for each year totaled as follows: 1976 (1596), 1977 (1550),
1978 (2416), 1979 (2604), 1980 (1750), 1981 (2003), 1982 (3025), 1983 (2305), and 1984
(3941) The figure for 1984 includes appeals disposed of by filed decision.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court received the following appeals from the common
pleas courts: 1976 (668), 1977 (671), 1978 (696), 1979 (672), 1980 (1004), 1981 (825), 1982
(775), 1983 (838), and 1984 (815). The following direct appeals in administrative agency
matters were filed: 1977 (1166), 1978 (1414), 1979 (1260), 1980 (1300), 1981 (1321), 1982
(1334), 1983 (1647), and 1984 (1961). Appeals in fiscal code matters are represented by the
following numbers: 1977 (438), 1978 (491), 1979 (502), 1980 (584), 1981 (850), 1982 (1000),
1983 (971), and 1984 (874). Not included in these statistics are matters entertained by the
commonwealth court within its original jurisdiction.
These statistics can be found in the yearly reports for the Pennsylvania courts. See AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS (1978-1984). A compar-
ative statistical recap of the United States Supreme Court's workload during the last three
terms indicates the following "paid cases" docketed: 1983-84 (2168), 1984-85 (2036), and
1985-86 (2171). The following in forma pauperis cases were docketed: 1983-84 (2050), 1984-
85 (2007), and 1985-86 (2239). See 55 U.S.L.W. 3098 (1986); see also Kaufmann, Must
Every Appeal Run the Gamut?, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 756-57 n.6 (1986) (indicating that in fiscal
1974, there were 1,802 filings in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, of which 1,288 were
civil cases). In 1984, there were 2,914 appeals, of which 1,979 were civil. Id.
7. See PA. R. ApP. P. 101-5101 [hereinafter rules].
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Zone or Mount Olympus.
It is thus important for the appellate practitioner to realize at
the outset that appellate practice or success does not begin or end
with the writing of a legal document, euphemistically called the
"brief." The study of appellate practice is, to a large extent, the
study of procedure. There can be no factor more critical in appellate
practice than a thorough knowledge of appellate procedures, as codi-
fied in the statutes and rules, and as interpreted in and supplemented
by appellate case law. The journey of asserted rights and responsibil-
ities occurs in a severely compressed time frame - from the mo-
ment in which the lower court issues its order' to the time of appel-
late oral argument - during which the practitioner must maneuver
a procedural maze.8 Appellate practice is the distillation of litigation
to its adversarial essence. The proceedings in the lower court are but
a spectral presence when lawyer must face lawyer in the appellate
courtroom. Constrained by procedure and the written word (the
lower court record), the lawyers must rely on their own procedural
and communicative skills in convincing the appellate court of the
merits of their arguments in order to obtain the justice that often
only the appellate court can give.
A thorough exposition of appellate practice is an enormous task,
one which is clearly beyond the capabilities of this writer. It is per-
haps evident to the practitioner that discussions' about appellate
practice can usually be simplistically useless or impractically arcane.
As the Dodo aptly stated to Alice, "The best way to explain it is to
do it." 9 Nevertheless, thought must precede action. Given the una-
voidable theoretical and practical limitations of any discourse, the
following survey must serve purely expository purposes; it is intended
to be neither exhaustive nor prescriptive. The discussion is a topo-
graphical view of some fundamental, preliminary appellate concepts
that the procedural rules treat scantily. It is the first stage in the
study of appellate practice. The approach to the topic is a step-by-
step linear movement toward a progressive indoctrination of some
essential appellate principles of gradual complexity. The methodol-
ogy is eclectic and, to an extent, idiosyncratic. Cases are collated,
principles condensed, and explanatory syntheses offered. The idiosyn-
crasies concern the labeling of concepts and the compartmentaliza-
8. See, e.g., PA. R. App. P. 108 (date of entry of orders), 903 (time for appeal), 1931
(transmission of record), 1934 (filing of the record), 2111 (brief of appellant), 2312 (notice of
arguments).
9. See supra note **, at 17.
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tion of principles that are arguably distinct in theory and function.
The belief - or one should say hope - is that labeling may be a
helpful analytical tool and that the segregation or categorization of
concepts may work in tandem toward an understanding that appel-
late practice is one of method, not madness.
Notwithstanding this initial indoctrination into appellate prac-
tice, the practitioner is cautioned that interpretation is itself an idio-
syncratic process. The extensive parenthetical information in the
footnotes, including professional commentaries and comparative fed-
eral cases for the more inquisitive reader, and the analytical con-
structs can never substitute for an independent, thorough examina-
tion of appellate rules, amendments, and authoritative judicial
pronouncements. Moreover, the practitioner must be vigilant to the
reality that today's law may be merely tomorrow's history. However,
for the reader whose interests are perhaps more general or academic,
this case study of appellate practice in a particular jurisdiction of the
American legal system may be of more than parochial interest since
the concepts herein are commonplace in many other jurisdictions.
The following analysis proposes, sub silentio, that the first ma-
jor stage in the appellate process is the short interval, usually thirty
days but sometimes less, from the date of the entry of the lower
court's order to the day when a party must file a notice of appeal in
the lower court.10 During this preliminary stage, the practitioner or
litigant must confront two of the most important and difficult con-
cepts in the appellate process: jurisdiction and standing. The proce-
dural rules do not explain these concepts because the rules are pri-
marily concerned with orderly procedure once the appellate process
formally begins, that is, after the filing of a "notice of appeal."
These unavoidable concepts, however, have generated a formidable
plethora of case law and related doctrines, some of which could re-
sult in the preemption of appellate review, thereby leaving an unsus-
pecting appellant empty-handed. In a sense, then, the appellate pro-
cess begins before the beginning. After the lower court has issued its
order but before the litigant formally files a notice of appeal, three
preparatory questions must be addressed by the litigant: (1) Do I
have standing or the legal right to appeal? (2) Is the lower court's
10. See PA. R. APP. P. 902 (manner of taking appeal), 903 (time for. appeal), 905
(filing of notice of appeal) and 907 (docketing of appeal). It is important to note preliminarily
that the scope of this Article is limited to appeals of lower court orders. The discussion herein
will not consider the particular requirements of a functionally similar but procedurally distinct
mechanism of review under the appellate rules, that being the "petition for review." See PA. R.
App. P. 1511-1561.
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order presently appealable? (3) If the lower court's order is appeala-
ble, where do I go?
II. Standing and Conflict: Preliminary Requirements of Status
An appellate script, just like a novel or mystery, must possess,
in a basic and simplistic sense, a formulaic threshold: a suffering
protagonist embroiled in an active controversy or dilemma that is
amenable to resolution. The critical difference in a lawsuit, of course,
is that the script is not fictional; the controversy facing an appellate
court usually involves substantial rights of liberty and property. Nev-
ertheless, the fundamental analogy is often disguised by fancy and
arcane legal jargon. This legal jargon can create confusion and, as
an examination of multitudinous cases involving thwarted litigants
confirms, result in much wasted time and effort. Thus an under-
standing of the formula requires an understanding of legal jargon.
The suffering protagonist is nothing more than an "aggrieved party"
or an "aggrieved appellant," which, in legal shorthand, is encapsu-
lated into the concept of "standing." The active dispute or festering
dilemma means that there must be an actual "conflict," "case," or
"controversy." In order to be amenable to resolution, the dispute or
dilemma must be, in the broadest sense of the word, "justiciable."
To address these preliminary concerns is really to address methodi-
cally, in a three step fashion, the simple issue of status - status of
the party appealing and status of the controversy. These three steps
involve standing to appeal, justiciability, and abstention.
A. Standing to Appeal
The law requires that one who files an appeal, namely the ap-
pellant," must have "standing" to appeal. Justice Rehnquist once
noted that "the concept cannot be reduced to a one sentence or one
paragraph definition.' 2 In Pennsylvania, the legal requirement is
embodied in the following procedural rule and accompanying note:
Except where the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, any
party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a fiduciary
whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.
II. PA. R. App. R. 102 and 908 do not define the term "appellant." For purposes of
this discussion, the term shall mean the person or entity that initially files a "notice of appeal."
See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (1981) (definitions); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 89
(5th ed. 1979).
12. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). In
the federal context, the concept of standing is of constitutional dimension and an aspect of
Article Ill's "case or controversy" requirement. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
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Note: Whether or not a party is aggrieved by the action
below is a substantive question determined by the effect of the
action on the party, etc.'
3
As one can see, the rule itself does not use the term "standing."
Case law, however, uses this abbreviated concept and, like the terms
"consideration," "brief," or "malice," "standing" has a distinct legal
meaning for practitioners. Reduced to its essence, the procedural
rule is twofold: first, it requires that the appealable order produce
aggrievement; second, it requires, for the most part,14 that the ag-
grieved appellant be a party to the proceeding below.
1. Aggrievement: Direct, Vicarious, Representational.-For
appeal purposes aggrievement generally requires that a party have a
direct interest in the immediate consequences of the judgment from
which the appeal is taken. 15 The Supreme Court noted that a person
who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter16 is not ag-
grieved and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution. Thus, in
determining aggrievement, the court stated that one must see
whether the litigant's1 7 interest is substantial, direct, immediate, and
not a remote consequence of the lower court's action.' 8
It is perhaps commonplace to recognize at the outset that one
who loses or is about to lose freedom or property as a result of a
lower court's adverse judgment or order has the requisite interest to
satisfy the aggrievement aspect of standing. The satisfaction of this
criterion is, in fact, so commonplace that appellate cases rarely raise
the issue unless there is a substantial problem. Standing, in most
cases, exists sub silentio. Thus, in order to understand standing, a
glance at those cases that fail to satisfy the criterion of aggrievement
is advisable. Oftentimes, if a party does not possess standing to sue'9
13. PA. R. App. P. 501.
14. As to standing of fiduciaries, see infra note 26.
15. See Tripps Park Civic Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 52 Pa. Commw.
317, 415 A.2d 967 (1980) (citing Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464
Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975)).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1981) defines "matter" as an action, pro-
ceeding, or appeal. In PA. R. App. P. 102, the term also includes a petition for review, which is
similar to but distinct from the procedures governing appeals from lower courts. See PA. R.
App. P. 1511-1561; supra note 10.
17. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1981) defines "litigant" as a party or any
other person legally concerned with the results of a matter. One should ask whether this defini-
tion is synonymous with or broader than the definition of aggrieved party in PA. R. App. P.
501.
18. Wn. Penn Parking Garage, 464 Pa. at 191-202, 346 A.2d at 280-86.
19. "Standing to sue" has been defined as follows:
Standing to sue doctrine. "Standing to sue" means that party has sufficient
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as a litigant in the lower court, he or she will likely not have the
requisite standing to appeal in the appellate court.
In constitutional matters, for example, litigants do not have
standing to assail legislation on the basis of overbreadth when they
do not claim specific, subjective harm or the threat of specific future
harm or when the alleged overbreadth is not substantial.20 An appel-
lant, therefore, cannot assert aggrievement vicariously. In the recent
Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Charles, 2  for example, a physi-
cian intervened in a lower court proceeding that involved the consti-
tutionality of Illinois' abortion statute. The Court noted that only the
State had a judicially cognizable interest in defending the constitu-
tionality of its abortion statute. Since Illinois chose not to file an
appeal, the appeal was dismissed because the intervenor-physician
could not establish any individualized aggrievement or injury to
himself.
22
Likewise, in In Re Estate of Dorone,2 3 the superior court con-
cluded that although parents could appeal from the lower court's or-
der refusing to appoint them as guardians, they had no standing as
parents to contest the alleged violation of their son's constitutional
rights concerning the appointment of a temporary guardian for pur-
poses of an emergency blood transfusion. Pivotal to the no standing
conclusion was the fact that the son was not a party. Additionally, in
a similar but nonconstitutional context, plaintiffs had no standing to
challenge the lower court's refusal to permit two others to intervene
as class representatives in a class action when those who were denied
intervention did not appeal. Since two petitioners who did not appeal
were the only ones affected by the lower court's order, the plaintiffs
could not assert, in effect, vicarious aggrievement in order to chal-
lenge the denial of intervention. Their claims were not affected in
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy. . . .Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is suffi-
ciently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the
court. The requirement of "'standing" is satisfied if it can be said that the plain-
tiff has a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation ...
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which concerns power of federal courts to hear
and decide cases and does not concern ultimate merits of substantive claims in-
volved in the action . . . . (citations omitted)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (5th ed. 1979).
20. See Commonwealth v. De Francesco, 481 Pa. 595, 393 A.2d 321 (1978).
21. 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986).
22. The Court noted further that the physician could not maintain the appeal in his
capacity as a parent or as a protector of the constitutional rights of unborn fetuses. The appeal
was dismissed. Diamond, 106 S. Ct. at 1703-06.
23. - Pa. Super. -_, 502 A.2d 1271 (1985).
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any way. 24 When, however, the granting of intervention would ad-
versely affect the party-plaintiff's interest, plaintiff would have
standing to appeal.25
Can an association, representative, or person in close relation-
ship to one injured-in-fact establish standing? In certain circum-
stances the answer is yes, depending upon the proximity of the rela-
tionships and the impact of the harm. When, for example, minor
children were directly affected by a decree allowing a claim for
counsel fees against their mother's estate, the minors' father had
standing to assert the interests of the minors, even though the ad-
ministrator did not appeal the final decree.26 Standing may also be
predicated on an associational basis because harm to individual
members may, in effect, constitute harm to the association. In one
case, book distributors and trade associations had standing to litigate
the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's obscenity statute because they
alleged specific harms to their members. The court noted that an
association may have standing if it alleges that any of its members is
suffering or will suffer immediate or threatened injury because of the
challenged action. In that case, the members' loss of first amend-
ment freedoms and financial gain, causally related to the challenged
statute, demonstrated sufficient aggrievement.2 7 As one federal court
noted, however, feelings of solidarity do not confer standing to sue. 8
When there is no evidence that any of the members of an association
would suffer direct and substantial harm, there is no foundation of
24. See Miller v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. 508 A.2d
1222, 1233-34 (1986).
25. See Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 300 Pa. Super. 528, 535, 446 A.2d 1284, 1288
(1982).
26. See In re Estate of Cecchine, 336 Pa. Super. 11I, 485 A.2d 454 (1984). Note that
PA. R. App. P. 501 specifies "or a fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved." See also
Estate of Karahuta, 481 Pa. 512, 393 A.2d 22 (1978) (executors who were not aggrieved had
no standing to appeal) (citing In re Estate of Hain, 464 Pa. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 774, 776
(1975) ("Unless an executor has been surcharged or has been ordered to distribute more than
the admitted balance in the estate, the executor is not a 'party aggrieved' by the final order or
decree of the orphans' court."). But cf. In re Estate of Patrick, 487 Pa. 355, 409 A.2d 388
(1979) (executors of estate had standing given that they were aggrieved in capacity of benefi-
ciaries); Brose Estate, 423 Pa. 420, 223 A.2d 661 (1966) (order directing executor to include
moneys not yet in his hands is appealable by executor); Gramm Estate, 420 Pa. 510, 218 A.2d
342 (1966) (order directing filing of account is interlocutory but appealable when it directs
personal representatives to charge themselves with certain specific assets).
27. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Rendell, 332 Pa. Super. 537, 481 A.2d 919
(1985): see also Tripps Park v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 52 Pa. Commw. 317, 415
A.2d 967 (1980) (association had representational standing to assert rights of individual
members).
28. See Minority Police Officers Ass'n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d
197, 202 (7th Cir. 1983).
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standing upon which such an entity can lodge an appeal.29
As noted previously, one who is not adversely affected by the
lower court's order has no standing to appeal. Thus, one who was not
a "loser" in the lower court, and who ultimately received the relief
requested, cannot appeal even though one of the proffered issues or
theories of recovery was rejected below. 30 In addition, a defendant
who is, in effect, removed as a party and substituted by another de-
fendant certainly has sustained no injury for purposes of standing. 1
2. "Party" Status.-A significant aspect of the concept of
standing under Pennsylvania's procedural rule is that the aggrieved
person or entity must be a "party."3 The Judicial Code defines a
party as "a person who commences or against whom relief is sought
in a matter. The term includes counsel for such a person who is rep-
resented by counsel." '33
When the person appealing is not a party, the appeal may ar-
guably be subject to dismissal. Nevertheless, dismissal based on non-
party status appears to be rare. 4 For example, an appeal brought by
a nonparty witness from a pretrial order denying a request for a pro-
tective order was quashed on jurisdictional grounds; standing was
29. See In re Family Style Restaurant, Inc., 503 Pa. Commw. 109, 468 A.2d 1088
(1983) (association had no standing to appeal when no evidence was presented that grant of
liquor license would harm association or its members) (citing 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702
(Purdon Supp. 1986) (Administrative Agency Law)).
30. See Burchanowski v. County of Lycoming, 32 Pa. Commw. 207, 378 A.2d 1025
(1977) (housewife, who successfully challenged tax classification of "housewife" as discrimina-
tory but lost on theory that housewife was not an "occupation," had no standing). Burchanow-
ski was decided in the context of a petition for review (see supra note 10). See also Appeal of
Radio Broadcasting Co., 55 Pa. Commw. 147, 159, 423 A.2d 444, 450 (1980), cert. denied
454 U.S. 941 (1981) (party who prevailed below cannot appeal, but appellee can take issue
with lower court's conclusions or findings); De Fazio v. Labe, - Pa. Super. - , 507 A.2d
410 (1986) (appellees, who cross-appealed lower court's denial of their motion for judgment
n.o.v., did not have standing since they were not losing parties or aggrieved); Thill v. Larner,
321 Pa. Super. 62 n. 1, 467 A.2d 894 n. I (1983).
31. See Tate v. MacFarland, 303 Pa. Super. 182, 449 A.2d 639 (1982) (defendant's
appeal from order, granting plaintiff's motion to amend complaint, to name defendant's father
as defendant, and to remove defendant, was not appealable since defendant is completely out
of court and, hence, not aggrieved).
32. But see supra note 26. The limitation of the right of appeal to parties of record has
been questioned and criticized. At common law, the practice was to limit the right of review of
judgments to parties, privies to the record below, or persons prejudiced by the judgment. One
commentator has noted that, aside from a few exceptions, a majority of jurisdictions have
restricted the right to appeal to parties. See Note, Non-Parties' Right of Appeal in Civil
Actions, 48 COLUM L. REV. 1233-41 (1948). The author notes that the limitation is especially
problematic in the context of intervention.
33. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1981). One may safely assume that
"person" is used in an expansive, legal sense to include entities such as corporations. PA. R.
App. P. 102 does not define "party."
34. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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not discussed, 5 Technically, the doctor in that case was not a party
to the underlying defamation action; however, since the doctor filed a
motion for a protective order, the doctor arguably satisfied the defi-
nitional requirement of the Judicial Code.
Federal case law, for example, has defined a party to the record
as including only original parties and those who have become parties
by intervention, substitution or third party practice.36 Furthermore,
federal case law has recognized that a nonparty may appeal if the
trial court's judgment has affected that nonparty's interest.3 7 In Doe
v. United States,38 the federal court noted that a pretrial evidentiary
order, permitting introduction of evidence of the sexual behavior of
the prosecutrix-victim, was appealable by the victim, especially in
view of the immediate need of the victim to protect her privacy.
The status of "party" includes those who intervene as well as
those who timely attempt to intervene before adjudication. 39 When
the press attempts to intervene in order to challenge a trial court's
closure of a pretrial hearing, the press arguably possesses the requi-
site party status to appeal.40
What are the limits to the party aspect of standing? Can a
party's attorney appeal? Can a lower court judge challenge a higher
court's order reversing the trial court's decision? An order granting
the petition of plaintiffs to have their counsel withdraw his appear-
ance is appealable by the attorney. 41 Additionally, in one extraordi-
35. See Steel v. Weisberg, - Pa. Super. - , 500 A.2d 428 (1985).
36. See United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
37. See Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380 (2nd Cir. 1983); see also Diamond v.
Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986), which recognizes that status as a .party" below does not
automatically equate with status as an "appellant." To be a party for purposes of appeal, for
example, the party below must file a notice of appeal.
38. 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981). The discussion was essentially jurisdictional with
the focus placed on whether the order was appealable and not whether the victim had stand-
ing. For situations in which the victim's standing is not qua victim but qua complainant or
"private prosecutor," however, see infra note 46, and accompanying text.
39. As to the importance of a timely attempt to intervene, see infra note 45 and accom-
panying text. In Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. at 1707 n. 21, Justice Blackmun noted the
conceptually difficult relationship of intervention to standing. The federal courts have not
agreed whether parties seeking to intervene as of right must themselves possess standing. See
Annot., 15 A.L.R. 2d 336 (1951): Note, Non-Parties' Right of Appeal, supra note 32, at
1240-41.
40. See Commonwealth v. Genovese, 337 Pa. Super. 485, 487 A.2d 364 (1985) (news
media was aggrieved by pretrial restraining order in criminal case and therefore was entitled
to appeal); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa. Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316 (1983).
41. See Seifert v. Dumatic Indus., 413 Pa. 395, 197 A.2d 454 (1964); Woolard v. Bur-
ton, 345 Pa. Super. 366, 498 A.2d 445 (1985). Note, however, that the issue is phrased in
terms of jurisdiction, (namely, was the attorney "out of court" and appealing a "final order"),
not standing. Note also that 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 specifically includes counsel as a
"party." As to the jurisdictional propriety of appeals filed by parties, other than counsel, when
the lower court grants or refuses to grant a motion to disqualify counsel, see infra notes 261-62
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nary case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court peripherally questioned
whether a lower court judge had standing to challenge an appellate
court's order remanding the criminal case to a different judge.42
When the nonparty's status rises no higher than that of an ami-
cus curiae or "friend of the court," the requirement of standing to
appeal is not satisfied. From a technical view, an amicus is not a
party; the term merely reflects the status of a spectator rather than
an actual participant. It implicates academic interest rather than ac-
tual, personal aggrievement. Although an appellate court may hear
an amicus if it is "interested" in the questions presented,43 an amicus
is neither entitled to independently file a notice of appeal nor permit-
ted to request the appellate court to extend relief." Recognizing that
the appellate procedural rules do not define "party," the superior
court concluded that an amicus curiae had no standing to appeal a
final decree, especially when it belatedly sought to intervene after
the lower court's adjudication. 5
and accompanying text.
42. See Commonwealth v. Chimenti, - Pa. n.4, 507 A.2d 79, 81 n. 4
(1986). The supreme court's exercise of plenary jurisdiction in effect preempted any potential
problem of standing. Even if the lower court judge were considered a "party," there would be
a serious question whether such a party was "aggrieved" as that term is commonly understood.
43. PA. R. App. P. 531(a) provides as follows:
Participation by Amicus Curiae
(a) Briefs. Anyone interested in the questions involved in any matter pend-
ing in an appellate court, although not a party, may, without applying for leave
to do so, file a brief amicus curiae in regard to those questions. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, any amicus curiae shall file and serve its brief in the man-
ner and number required and within the time allowed by these rules with respect
to the party whose position as to aflirmance or reversal the amicus brief will
support, or with respect to the appellant, if the amicus brief does not support the
position of any party.
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979), which defines amicus curiae as follows:
Means, literally, friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or views on
the subject matter of an action may petition the court for permission to file a
brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale consis-
tent with its own views. Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals
concerning matters of a broad public interest; e.g., civil rights cases. Such may
be filed by private persons or the government. In appeals to the U.S. courts of
appeals, such brief may be filed only if accompanied by written consent of all
parties, or by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the court,
except that consent or leave shall not be required when the brief is presented by
the United States or an officer or agency thereof...
And see S. Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief.- From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694 (1963).
44. See, e.g., In re Petition for Referendum to Amend Home Rule Charter of Pitts-
burgh, 69 Pa. Commw. 292, 450 A.2d 802 (1982); see also Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insula-
tion, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 154 n. 16, 471 A.2d 493, 509 n. 16 (1984) (anyone interested can file
a brief).
45. See Newberg by Newberg v. Board of Pub. Educ., 330 Pa. Super. 65, 478 A.2d
1352 (1984). In Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa. Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316 (1983), for
example, the press sought timely intervention before the decision.
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Finally, party status presents a particularly bothersome proce-
dural dilemma in those criminal cases in which a private citizen at-
tempts to litigate as a prosecutor and then appeals an adverse deci-
sion which precludes such prosecution. In a criminal case, the state
and defendant are clearly parties to the proceeding. Nevertheless, in
some circumstances, a private citizen-complainant has standing as a
"party" to appeal the lower court's order sustaining a district attor-
ney's disapproval of a private criminal complaint. 46 The line of per-
missibility, however, is not easy to ascertain.
B. Justiciable Controversy: Actual, Present Conflict
An essential counterpart to the requirement of standing is the
existence of an actual conflict. Appellate courts have neither the lux-
ury nor the resources to consider "how many angels can dance on
the head of a pin"-type controversies. Judges cannot be academic
arbiters of hypothetical dilemmas or controversies. Effective appel-
late litigation, like trial litigation, is predicated on adversarial, parti-
san advocacy so that the competing interests are, with some degree
of assurance, vigorously pursued and the issues carefully framed. In
Valley Forge Christian College, the Supreme Court considered the
case or controversy aspect of standing and noted, "Were the federal
courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilating of public
grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the
concept of standing would be quite unnecessary.
47
An appellate court, therefore, will generally not consider an ap-
peal unless there is a subsisting, actual conflict between parties who
have a tangible interest in contesting the conflict. 46 A shorthand le-
gal translation of such a requirement is that there must be a "justici-
able controversy. 49 Conversely paraphrased in legal jargon, when
46. See Commonwealth v. Muroski, - Pa. Super. -, 506 A.2d 1312 (1986). The
distinguishing factor in support of such standing seems to be the absence of an actual judicial
determination regarding the alleged insufficiency of the complainant's case. Muroski distin-
guished, for example, Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super, 297, 450 A.2d 689 (1982), in
which the complainant had no standing to appeal a judicial determination dismissing a com-
plaint based on insullicient evidence. See also Commonwealth v. Eiseman, 276 Pa. Super. 543,
419 A.2d 591 (1980) (standing not analyzed); Note, Prosecutors Discretion, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 1057 (1955).
47. 454 U.S. at 473; see also De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. See Camiel v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 337, 489 A.2d 1360 (1985), in which the su-
preme court denied a petition for review because there was no actual, present conflict.
49. "Justiciable controversy" has been defined as follows:
A controversy in which the claim of right is asserted against one who has an
interest in contesting it. A question as may properly come before a tribunal for
decision. . . .Courts will only consider a "justiciable" controversy, as distin-
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the controversy reaches the appellate stage it must not be moot.5 0 A
case will be considered moot if the issues presented are no longer
"live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the resolu-
tion and outcome of the controversy.5 1 Appellate procedural rules
provide that if there is no actual, present conflict, the appeal will be
dismissed. Furthermore, if pending an appeal an event occurs that
renders appellate relief impossible, the appellate court will dismiss
the appeal. 2 An appellate court will not expend its time or energy if
relief is impractical or impossible.
A controversy may be moot when the parties have complied
with the appealed order. In Easton Theatres, Inc. v. Wells Fargo,
Inc.,53 the appellant-defendant was given an opportunity to file a
bond pending appeal in order to suspend implementation of the
lower court's order. The appellant chose not to file a bond and in-
stead complied with the order requiring it to construct the building.
guished from a hypothetical difference or dispute or one that is academic or
moot. . . . Term refers to real and substantial controversy which is appropriate
for judicial determination, as distinguished from dispute or difference of contin-
gent, hypothetical or abstract character.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 777 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). Compare this definition
with the concept of "abatement" in Hall v. Hall, 333 Pa. Super. 483, 482 A.2d 974 (1984)
(death of one party during direct appeal from the entry of a divorce decree did not cause
divorce action to be abated). But see Reese v. Reese, Pa. Super. -' 506 A.2d 471
(1986); ef infra note 59; Drumhiller v. Drumhiller, - Pa. Super. -, 505 A.2d 305
(1986) (general rule is that pending divorce action abates upon death of one spouse).
50. The following is a typical definition of "moot:"
A case is "moot" when a determination is sought on a matter which, when
rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy ...
Question is "moot" when it presents no actual controversy or where the issues
have ceased to exist ....
Generally, an action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a jus-
ticiable controversy because issues involved have become academic or dead ...
Case in which the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is a recurring one and likely
to be raised again between the parties ...
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 909 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). A related but distinct con-
cept on the other end of the temporal spectrum is that an appellate court will review only
"ripe" controversies. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974); Young J. Lee, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 504 Pa. 367, 380, 474 A.2d 266,
272 (1983) (constitutional question not ripe given case's procedural posture); see also Note,
Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 867 (1965)
(takes a critical look at such procedural barriers in the context of constitutional challenges);
Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772 (1955).
51. See In re Establish Insp. of Metal Bank of America, 700 F.2d 910, 913 (3d Cir.
1983).
52. See PA. R. App. P. 1972 (4); see also Commonwealth v. Caffrey, - Pa. Super.
- 508 A.2d 322 (1986) (defendant's appeal from denial of writ of habeas corpus to pre-
vent extradition quashed since defendant already had been extradited); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 336 Pa. Super. 636, 486 A.2d 445 (1984) (appeal from denial of habeas corpus petition
dismissed because appellant was no longer in custody and relief sought was already achieved).
53. 498 Pa. 577, 449 A.2d 1372 (1982). Justices Flaherty and McDermott dissented in
the case.
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The supreme court dismissed the case as moot. Likewise, payment of
a fine imposed by a contempt order resulted in an appellate court
quashing the appeal from the order of contempt as moot.
54
There are two major exceptions to the general rule that appel-
late courts will not review moot issues. First, when the issue is capa-
ble of repetition and likely to evade future review as a result of a
strict application of mootness, the appellate court will review the is-
sue. This exception is often applied in cases involving substantial
questions of importance or constitutionality, such as are presented in
press closure55 or blood transfusion cases. 56 Second, in criminal cases
appellate review of sentences served will be reviewed under the doc-
trine of "collateral criminal consequences." A defendant, thus, will
be allowed to attack a sentence already served or mooted when there
is a possibility that the challenged sentence may or will affect the
defendant in the future. 57 This exception has been extended to in-
clude the possibility of adverse social58 and civil 59 consequences.
C. Judicial Abstention60
Sometimes the better part of judicial discretion is abstention,
that is, the decision - or some would say the courage - not to
54. See Phoenix Glass Co. v. Local Union No. 8381, United Steel Workers of Am.,
244 Pa. Super. 16, 366 A.2d 293 (1976); see also McDonald's Corp. v. Victory Investments,
727 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the contemner, who complied with the order, was not
challenging the underlying validity of the order to pay fees).
55. See Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa. Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316 (1983).
56. See In re Estate of Dorone, - Pa. Super. 508 A.2d 1271, 1274-75
(1985).
57. See Johnson v. Commonwealth Bd. of Probation & Parole, 505 Pa. 569, 482 A.2d
235 (1984) (some possible adverse consequence sufficient to permit right to review by paroled
defendant); Commonwealth v. Adams, 350 Pa. Super. 506,.., 504 A.2d 1264, 1270 (1986)
(legality of expired sentence reviewable where sentence may affect defendant's entitlement to
credit for time served).
58. See Commonwealth v. Markley, Pa. Super. __, 501 A.2d 1137 (1985) (dis-
cussing relevant cases): see also Commonwealth v. Berthesi, Pa. Super. -, 504 A.2d
891 (1986).
59. See Commonwealth v. Rohde, 485 Pa. 404, 402 A.2d 1025 (1979); Commonwealth
v. Doria. 468 Pa. 534. 364 A.2d 322 (1976); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d
465 (1971). As for death, while it may moot a criminal defendant's life, it does not necessarily
moot his appeal. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 147-48, 208 A.2d 741, 742
(1972) (court refuses to dismiss appeal or vacate conviction because of appellant's death; court
reviews case in interests of both defendant's estate and society). Henszey v. Henszey, 195 Pa.
Super. 377, 382-83, 171 A.2d 837, 840 (1961) (death of appellee during appeal from divorce
decree did not abate appeal). (f. supra note 49.
60. The term "abstention" is used in this discussion in a broad, generalized sense to
simply indicate a withholding of appellate relief. The "abstention" doctrine is defined, in the
context of federal law, as follows: "Doctrine of 'absention' permits a federal court, in the
exercise of' its discretion, to relinquish jurisdiction where necessary to avoid needless conflict
with the important administration by a state of its own affairs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9
(5th ed. 1979).
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decide. There is no discernible uniform principle. Generic illustra-
tions that highlight when principle, comity or policy influence an ap-
pellate court in withholding the hand of relief must guide the
practitioner.
1. Bankruptcy Matters-One of the fundamental protections
for debtors who have filed petitions for bankruptcy in federal courts
is the automatic stay provision of the federal laws. The purpose is to
give the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.61 A bankruptcy
petition operates as a stay of the commencement or continuation of a
judicial proceeding as well as the enforcement of a judgment. Whbn
the stay provision applies, an appellate court will abstain from the
controversy;6 2 if the stay provision does not apply, the merits of the
controversy will be considered.6
2. Political Questions-When an appellate controversy has a
sensitive relationship to a legislative or executive matter, the appel-
late court may refuse to interject itself into such a controversy." The
political question doctrine is arguably political in nature since it con-
cerns the democratic principle of separation of powers. Whether ju-
dicial abstention in such matters is rooted in principle or prudence is
unclear.
3. Case Stated-When parties in the lower court agree to pre-
sent their dispute to the lower court judge on a "case stated" basis,
61. See II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
62. See, e.g., Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 707 F.2d 1310 (11th Cir. 1983); cf. Asso-
ciation of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446 (3d Cir.
1982); Acie v. Braunstein, - Pa. Super. - , 509 A.2d 405 (1986) (appellate court affirms
lower court's dismissal of action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Acie referred to
28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West 1976) (district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
having a significant connection with pending bankruptcy proceedings).
63. See Foulke v. Lavelle, 308 Pa. Super. 131, 454 A.2d 56 (1982) (automatic stay
does not apply to acts against property which is neither the property of the debtor or the
estate, nor property in which debtor does not have an interest).
64. See, e.g., In re Jones, 505 Pa. 50, 476 A.2d 1287 (1984) (appellate refusal to con-
sider qualifications of members of state legislature); but cf. Thornburgh v. Lewis, 504 Pa. 206,
470 A.2d 952 (1983) (decision that governor was required to supply requested information to
minority chairman of the senate appropriations committee); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); Zemprelli v. Davis, 496 Pa. 247, 436 A.2d 1165 (1981); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473
Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (5th ed. 1979) ("A matter
which can be handled more appropriately by another branch of the government is not a 'justi-
ciable' matter for the courts.").
For insightful commentaries, see Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreward:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question'
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. 517 (1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I, 7-8, 9 (1959). Constitutional transgressions, however,
are neither political nor nonjusticiable even though they may implicate governmental author-
ity. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
PA APPELLATE PRACTICE
they must carefully and explicitly reserve their right to subsequent
appellate review; otherwise, the appellate court will deem the right
forfeited.66 Generally, a case stated is different from a case tried by
a court without a jury on a stipulation of facts because, in a case
stated, the parties request the court to enter judgment6" on an
agreed statement of facts. In a nonjury trial, based on a stipulation
of facts, the lower court first renders a verdict or decision, from
which the parties can file a motion for post-trial relief and then
appeal.
4. Criminal (Acquittal of Defendant)-As a matter of consti-
tutional principle, an appellate court will not entertain a state's ap-
peal from an order acquitting the defendant. The basis of the princi-
ple is the defendant's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy (that
is, retried) after a final determination of insufficient evidence. 67 For
example, the Supreme Court firmly decided that a Pennsylvania trial
judge's granting of a defendant's demurrer68 to the Commonwealth's
case was an acquittal under the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution, and the Commonwealth's appeal was barred.69
The important distinction to be made in this category is that, unlike
65. See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 153 Pa. 625, 25 A.2d 100 (1893) (appeal
quashed); Clearfield Bank v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 588, 497 A.2d 247
(1985) (appeal dismissed because appellant failed to reserve right to appeal) (distinguishing
Sweeney v. Lakeland School Dist., 13 Pa. Commw. 485, 319 A.2d 207 (1974)); County of
Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison, 53 Pa. Commw. 350, 417 A.2d 864 (1980) (appeal
dismissed for failure to reserve right of appeal); Wertz v. Anderson - Pa. Super. - , 508
A.2d 1218 (1986) (appeal from lower court's order of support was not a case stated, despite
appellant's characterization, when parties proceeded with a nonjury trial on stipulation of facts
but did not request an entry of judgment; lower court's decision was in the form of an adjudi-
cation and decree nisi to which appellant correctly filed post trial motions; appeal from denial
of post trial motions proper); ef. Wedgewood Assocs. v. Cain Township, 54 Pa. Commw. 557,
422 A.2d 1190 (1980) (nonjury adjudication was not procedurally a "case stated" case).
66. A judgment is linal and, ordinarily, immediately appealable; a "decision" or adjudi-
cation is not. See. e.g., PA. R. App. P. 301(c). See also East Coast Properties v. The Hartford
Mut. Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. -, - A.2d - (1986) (past-verdict motions improper
and cannot extend time to appeal).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1124(a)(1).
69. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 1745 (1986), rev'g Commonwealth v.
Zoller, 507 Pa. 344, 490 A.2d 394 (1985), on remand, - Pa. -. , 512 A.2d 634 (1986);
but cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, - Pa. -, - A.2d - (1986) (defendant's ap-
peal from order denying his motion for acquittal proper under PA. R.C.P. 311 (a)(5) where
order results in new trial and defendant claims right to absolute discharge); Commonwealth v.
Parker, 305 Pa. Super. 516, 451 A.2d 767 (1982) (Commonwealth could appeal lower court's
sua sponte post-verdict order changing verdict of guilty to not guilty since an appellate reversal
would result only in the reinstatement of the original verdict); see also Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 282 n. 3, 309 A.2d 714, 717 n. 3 (1973) (Commonwealth can appeal an
arrest of judgment based on a pure question of law); Commonwealth v. Trader, - Pa.
Super. , 512 A.2d 693 (1986) (appeal quashed); Commonwealth v. Baker, - Pa.
Super. , 507 A.2d 872 (1986).
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the other categories discussed, the principle of abstaining is
mandatory, not discretionary. The appellate rules provide that the
Commonwealth may file an appeal in criminal matters "only in the




5. Criminal (Fugitive Defendant)-Somewhat similar to the
forfeiture of the right to appeal in a "case stated" situation is the
forfeiture imposed upon a criminal defendant when he illegally ab-
sconds the jurisdiction. The essential difference between the two,
however, is that the forfeiture by the criminal defendant is arguably
not attributable to his inadvertence but to a voluntary decision to be
beyond the reach of those from whom he seeks relief. In such cir-
cumstances, the appellate court will not give that which the defend-
ant avoids. In short, the defendant suffers the consequences of his
illicit venture.7 1 The appellate rules, in fact, authorize dismissal
when the appellant is a fugitive.
6. Discretionary Sentencing-When the Commonwealth files
an appeal challenging the lower court's imposition of sentence, the
appellate court may decide that review is not appropriate. In a sense,
the Commonwealth possesses a defeasible right of appeal; review of
the merits will occur only if the appellate court initially permits the
Commonwealth to proceed with the appeal. 73 The notice of appeal
acts as a petition to appeal a final order. Technically, one may argue
that standing or abstention is not implicated. Although such a con-
70. See PA. R. App. P. 341(c). In a few states, the prosecution is denied any right of
appeal. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1527 (5th
ed. 1980); Kronenberg, Right of State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 49 J. CRIM. L., CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sc,. 473 (1959).
71. See Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 476 A.2d 346 (1984) (stating that the
constitutional right of appeal is conditioned upon compliance with procedural requirements).
In Passaro, the defendant's prior appeal was quashed and the supreme court refused to grant
defendant's petition to reinstate his appeal. See also Commonwealth v. Ciotti, 496 Pa. 232,
436 A.2d 983 (1981), on remand, 318 Pa. Super. 549, 465 A.2d 690 (1983), vacated, 506 Pa.
10, 483 A.2d 852 (1984); but cf. Commonwealth v. Milligan, 307 Pa. Super. 129, 452 A.2d
1072 (1982) (appellate permission granted so that defendant, previously a fugitive, could refile
post trial motions nunc pro tunc).
72. See PA. R. App. P. 1972 (6).
73. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(b) (Purdon 1982); PA. R. App. P. 341 and
note thereto, which states that such an appeal will be entertained by the appellate court only if
it appears to the court that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not
appropriate under the applicable sentencing guidelines; PA. R. App. P. 902 and note thereto;
see also Commonwealth v. Days, - Pa. Super. -_, 502 A.2d 13339 (1986); Common-
wealth v. Fluellen, 345 Pa. Super. 167, 497 A.2d 1357 (1985); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 344
Pa. Super. 293, 496 A.2d 802 (1985); Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa. Super. 468, 491
A.2d 1352 (1985); cf. Commonwealth v. Becker, No. 386 Pitts. 1985 (Pa. Super. July 23,
1986) (available Sept. 17, 1986, on WESTLAW, Allstates library) (applying 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986)); Commonwealth v. Easterling, - Pa.
Super. -, 509 A.2d 345 (1986) (identifying three circumstances which may establish a
substantial question).
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clusion may be accurate, the major point is that this category of case
is another example of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in decid-
ing not to decide.
III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Final and Collateral Order
Doctrines
A. Jurisdiction and the Appealable Order
The concepts of standing and justiciability are essential steps in
the appellate process. Nevertheless, they are only a prologue to per-
haps the most important and difficult question in the appellate
process: Is the lower court's order appealable? If there is an ag-
grieved protagonist (the appellant) with an actual conflict amenable
to judicial resolution (justiciable controversy), appellate jurisdiction
does not necessarily exist. One must switch the focus from the gen-
eral status of the party appealing the case to the most fundamental
question in appellate practice: the subject matter jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Without subject matter jurisdiction, an appellate
court cannot entertain a dispute or grant relief.
Jurisdiction is one of those labyrinthine concepts of law ex-
pressed repeatedly in varying degrees that range from almost plati-
tude to talismanic maxims."' Yet the issue of jurisdiction in an ap-
peal can never be ignored or superficially assumed. Subject matter
jurisdiction is essentially a political concept that circumscribes and
allocates the political and adjudicatory power of the courts. In Ex
parte Bollman,6 Chief Justice Marshall noted in principle, "Courts
which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must
be regulated by the common law . . .; but courts which are created
by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, can-
not transcend that jurisdiction. 176 Transcending that jurisdiction
would effectively be an invitation to anarchy. The power of the
Pennsylvania courts rests on written law, includingthe constitution,
74. "Jurisdiction" has been defined as follows:
The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind
of judicial action. . . . It is the authority by which courts and judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide cases. . . .The legal right by which judges exer-
cise their authority. . . .It exists when court has cognizance of class of cases
involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of
court. . . .Power and authority of a court to hear and determine a judicial
proceeding. . . .The right and power of a court to adjudicate concerning the
subject matter in a given case ...
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 766 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
75. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), cited in Commonwealth ex rel. Burton v. Baldi, 147
Pa. Super. 193, 201, 214 A.2d 76, 80-81 (1942).
76. Id. at 93.
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statutes and implementing rules of court.7 One can glean the para-
mount importance of subject matter jurisdiction in the following lit-
any of fundamental principles often cited in appellate cases: (1) ju-
risdiction cannot be acquired by consent of the parties or by
silence; 78 (2) the issue of jurisdiction can be raised by the appellate
court on its own motion (sua sponte) at any time;79 (3) the question
of whether an order is appealable goes to the jurisdiction of the ap-
pellate court;80 (4) subject matter jurisdiction is the power and com-
petence of the court to determine controversies of the general class to
which the case belongs;8 (5) jurisdiction must be kept within strict
limits;82 (6) neither the parties nor the appellate court can waive the
lack of subject matter jurisdiction;83 and (7) the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court is the final arbiter of appellate jurisdictional issues. 8
Four procedural corollaries pivotal to these general principles are:
(1) the question of appellate jurisdiction is determined at the time an
appeal is filed;85 (2) the failure to file exceptions or post-trial motions
77. See infra notes 373-97 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g,. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 483 Pa. 29, 394 A.2d 522 (1978); T.C.R.
Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977); In re Petitions of Bell, 396 Pa. 592,
152 A.2d 731 (1959); Stadler v. Mt. Olive Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953): Tun-
stall v. Penn Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 287 Pa. Super. 511, 430 A.2d 1007 (1981).
79. Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985); Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa.
163, 314 A.2d 270 (1974); Givens v. Givens, 304 Pa. Super. 571, 450 A.2d 1386 (1982);
Suburban East Tires v. Duquesne Light Co., 302 Pa. Super. 204, 448 A.2d 638 (1982);
Bracken v. Bracken, 294 Pa. Super. 371, 439 A.2d 1247 (1982).
80. See Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985).
81. Strank v. Mercy Hosp. of Johnstown, 376 Pa. 305, 102 A.2d 170 (1954); see also
Nagle v. American Casualty Co., 317 Pa. Super. 164, 463 A.2d 1136 (1983); Kaiser v. 191
Presidential Corp., 308 Pa. Super. 301, 454 A.2d 141 (1982).
82. Commonwealth ex rel. Burton v. Baldi, 147 Pa. Super. 193, 24 A.2d 76 (1942); see
also Toll v. Toll, 293 Pa. Super. 549, 439 A.2d 712 (1981).
83. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, § 704(b) (Purdon 1981); PA. R. App. P. 741(b)
(absence of appellate jurisdiction not subject to waiver); see also supra note 76. Prior case law
had suggested that jurisdictional defects were subject to waiver. See McConnell v. Schmidt,
234 Pa. Super. 400, 339 A.2d 574 (1975), vacated and quashed, 463 Pa. 118, 344 A.2d 277
(1975). The appellate rules now clearly provide otherwise.
84. See Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985). The right to
appellate review of final orders, for example, includes those final orders as defined by "general
rule." See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5105(a) (Purdon 1981). A "general rule" is one
promulgated by the "governing authority," which includes the supreme court. Id. § 102
(definitions).
85. See Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa. Super. 332, 343-44 n.4, 459 A.2d 1255, 1261 n.4
(1983); Rosen v. Rosen, - Pa. Super. -, n.2, 510 A.2d 732, 734 n.2 (1986)
(juridiction implicitly viewed at time appeal is taken); but see PA. R. App. P. 905(a) ("A
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an
appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof."). See
Minick v. City of Sharon, 325 Pa. Super. 178, 472 A.2d 706 (1984) (absent entry of judg-
ment, verdict is not final or appealable but jurisdiction is perfected upon entry of judgment;
legal fiction makes premature appeal relate forward); cf. Aloi v. Aloi, 290 Pa. Super. 125, 434
A.2d 161 (1981) (premature appeal quashed and subsequent divorce decree, entered during
appeal, vacated). Aloi preceded the amendment to PA. R. App. P. 905(a). As to the effect of
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does not implicate appellate jurisdictional power but only relates to
the parties' preservation of issues for appellate review;8s (3) the mere
filing of a notice of appeal does not, in itself, confer jurisdiction
when none specifically exists; 87 and (4) the absence of a lower court's
jurisdiction is not synonymous with the existence or absence of ap-
pellate jurisdiction.88
The exposition of these broad jurisdictional principles brings one
full circle to the focal point of such principles, namely, the appellate
court's subject matter. The subject matter of appellate jurisdiction is
the lower court's order.a9 It may sound tautological, but if the lower
court's order is not appealable by statute or specific rule, then appel-
late jurisdiction cannot be obtained no matter how severe the ag-
grievement. The lower court's order is essentially the nucleus or
building block of an appeal. Neither the lower court's opinion90 nor
the gravity of aggrievement attending a prior nonfinal order can
the premature filing of a notice of appeal in the federal courts, see F.R.A.P. 4(a)(4); Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982); but cf. Cape May Greene, Inc. v.
Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3rd Cir. 1983); Tibbs v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370
(9th Cir. 1985).
86. See. e.g., Estate of Kotz, 486 Pa. 444, 406 A.2d 524 (1979); Estate of McGrorey,
474 Pa. 402, 404 n.3, 378 A.2d 855, 856 n.3 (1977) (appellant's failure to file exceptions not
grounds for quashing appeal because, pursuant to local rule, adjudication became final as of
course when no exceptions were filed); cf. Paul v. Paul, 281 Pa. Super. 202, 211, 421 A.2d
1219, 1224 (1980) (appeal before disposition of exceptions is premature); see also PA. R. App.
P. 302(a) (requisites for reviewable issue),
87. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Di Massa, 296 Pa. Super.
529, 442 A.2d 1177 (1982); cf. Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986) (mere status as a
,party" or filing notice of appeal did not guarantee that intervening defendant was entitled to
seek appellate review). One cannot assume that an order is appealable simply because, in
another case, an appellate court reviewed an order without a jurisdictional analysis. See Stad-
ler v. Mt. Olive Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953).
88. One may appeal a lower court's order on the basis that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction. For cases in which appellate jurisdiction existed in matters in which the lower
court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction, see, for example, Love v. Temple Univ., 422 Pa.
30, 220 A.2d 838 (1966); Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 350 Pa. Super, 239, 504 A.2d 335
(1986); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 341 Pa. Super. 305, 491 A.2d 276 (1985); Commonwealth v.
Zuder, 322 Pa. Super. 411, 469 A.2d 687 ('1983); Kaiser v. 191 Presidential Corp., 308 Pa.
Super. 301. 454 A.2d 141 (1982); Commonwealth v. Lynch, 304 Pa. Super. 248, 450 A.2d 664
(1982); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5505 (time within which a lower court can modify
its order).
89. There have been times, however, when the appealable order was examined or con-
strued in light of the lower court's opinion. See Conaway v. 20th Century Corp., 491 Pa. 189,
420 A.2d 405 (1980) (opinion examined to determine whether the final order is actually final
and puts appellant out of court); Rappaport v. Stein, 351 Pa. Super. 370, 506 A.2d 393 (1985)
(review of lower court's opinion to determine finality); Independence Hall Parking Inc. v.
Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 86 Pa. Commw. 573, 486 A.2d 534 (1984) (on remand,
appellate court considers issue which was not in order appealed but was discussed in accompa-
nying opinion of the lower court); Rodgers v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 311,
315 n.2, 496 A.2d 811, 813 n.2 (1985) (vague order read in light of lower court's opinion).
90. See PA. R. App. P. 1921 (composition of record on appeal); supra note 87; see also
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 300 Pa. Super. 528, 538 n. 8, 446 A.2d 1284, 1289 n. 8 (1982)
(citing Lengyel v. Black, 293 Pa. Super. 297, 438 A.2d 1003 (1981)).
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serve to establish or circumvent the essential jurisdictional compo-
nent, that being a final appealable order upon which an appellate
case can be built and reviewed.
Appealability of an order, therefore, is really a question whether
there is a route of access to an hospitable appellate forum in which
that nucleus or building block, the appealed order, can be received.
One of the most egregious errors that a litigant can commit is to
ignore or fail to appreciate the specific jurisdictional base that will
provide access to the appellate forum. The appellate rules, in fact,
highlight the importance of this access route by requiring the appel-
lant to separately and prominently identify in her brief both the ju-
risdictional basis of the appeal and the specific lower court order
forming the basis of the appeal."
The initial discussion adverted to the fact that jurisdiction is a
labyrinthine concept in the law. This description applies because
there are many and varied access routes to the appellate forum. An
appellant must recognize and distinguish among the different and
conceptually complicated jurisdictional bases for an appeal. For pur-
poses of simplicity, this discussion must now examine in a step-by-
step fashion the following, prevalent routes that a litigant might se-
lect in trying to reach an appellate forum: (1) the final order doc-
trine (denominated herein as the classical or technical version); (2)
the final order doctrine (labeled herein as the constructive or prag-
matic version); (3) the collateral order doctrine; (4) interlocutory ap-
pellate review of nonfinal orders specifically authorized by law; (5)
permissive appellate review of nonfinal orders; (6) exceptional cir-
cumstances jurisdiction; and (7)piggyback appellate jurisdiction.
Case law occasionally will delineate or emphasize the importance of
the different jurisdictional foundations. 2
B. The Final Order Doctrine: Technical, Classical Finality (The
End of Litigation)
As a general rule, subject to significant exceptions and qualifica-
tions discussed later, the entrance requirement to the appellate fo-
rum is a final order. If a litigant timely presents the court with a
final order, the appellate court will ordinarily permit access. Yet the
skeletal simplicity of the term "final order," which is not defined by
91. See PA. R. App. P. 2111(a).
92. See, for example, the helpful jurisdictional delineations in Commonwealth v. Wills,
328 Pa. Super. 342, 476 A.2d 1362 (1984); Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa. Super. 332, 459 A.2d
1255 (1983); Commonwealth Dept. of Transp. v. Rollins Outdoor Ad. Co., Inc., 76 Pa.
Commw. 554, 557 n. I, 464 A.2d 653, 655 n. I (1983).
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statute or procedural rules, is dangerously deceptive.9" An examina-
tion of the myriad cases on the subject will quickly reveal how holo-
phrastic and conceptually troublesome the two words can be, not
only to Pennsylvania courts but to other courts in general. In Dickin-
son v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.,4 Justice Jackson remarked:
Half a century ago this Court lamented, "Probably no question
of equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discus-
sion in this court than the finality of decrees. . . . The cases, it
must be conceded, are not altogether harmonious." This lamen-
tation is equally fitting to describe the intervening struggle of
the courts; sometimes to devise a formula that will encompass
all situations and at other times to take hardship cases out from
under the rigidity of previous declarations; sometimes choosing
one and sometimes another of the considerations that always
compete in the question of appealability, the most important of
which are the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on
the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other.9 5
The final order doctrine, whose historical origins can be found in
93. The following are definitional excerpts on the simple theme of "finality":
Final. Last; conclusive; decisive; definitive; terminated; completed. In its use in
reference to legal actions, this word is generally contrasted with "interlocu-
tory".... Final appealable order. To constitute a "final, appealable order" the
order must terminate the litigation and finally determine, fix and dispose of the
parties' rights as to the issues in the suit. . . . Final decision. One which leaves
nothing open to further dispute and which sets at rest cause of action between
parties. Judgment or decree which terminates action in court which renders it.
One which settles rights of parties respecting the subject-matter of the suit and
which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. The filing of signed find-
ings and conclusions and order for judgment. Synonymous with final judgment
or decree. Also, a decision from which no appeal or writ of error can be
taken .... "Final decision" which may be appealed is one that ends litigation
on merits and leaves nothing for courts to do but execute judgment.Final deci-
sion rule. Appeals to federal courts of appeals from U.S. district courts must be
from "final decisions" of district courts. 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 1291. In other words,
the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction over nonfinal judgments. The object of this
restriction is to prevent piecemeal litigation which would otherwise result from
the use of interlocutory appeals.Final judgment. One which finally disposes of
rights of parties, either upon entire controversy or upon some definite and sepa-
rate branch thereof . . . Judgment is considered "final" only if it determines the
rights of the parties and disposes of all of the issues involved so that no future
action by the court will be necessary in order to settle and determine the entire
controversy.Final order. One which terminates the litigation between the parties
and the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execu-
tion what has been determined.
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 567 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
94. 338 U.S. 507 (1950); see also Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal,
41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
95. 338 U.S. at 511 (citation omitted).
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common law,"6 is, in a sense, the categorical imperative of appellate
jurisdiction. Exposed in its most pristine, strict form, the final order
doctrine authorizes an appeal only when litigation is terminated in
the lower court97 or, to state the requirement in a different fashion,
when the lower court disposes of the entire case. Thus, the terminal
point of litigation in the lower court is, at the same time, the point of
embarkation to the appellate court for an aggrieved party. For ease
of analysis, this aspect of finality shall be termed classical or techni-
calfinality, denoting that a litigant is actually and completely out of
court and that litigation in the lower court is completed.
One might ask what is the rationale for such an arbitrary rule
of thumb. The reasons are many, varied and sensible. The final order
doctrine is a compound of legal requirement, policy, fairness and effi-
ciency. Of paramount importance is the fact that most of the juris-
dictional statutes invest the courts with jurisdiction (political, judi-
cial power) only over "final orders" of the lower courts. 8 The
doctrine also represents a prudential standard by which to best allo-
cate and maximize limited judicial resources. The process of lower
court litigation, for example, involves a sequential, on-going process
of multiple decision-making. If an appellate court were to open its
doors to every person aggrieved by a decision that occurred in the
course of litigation, the appellate courts - financed by the citizenry
would be quickly overwhelmed and become bankrupt. 99 Aside
from avoiding the potentially debilitating effects upon the judiciary
of a carte blanche rule of access to the appellate courts, the final
order doctrine offers fairness and a comforting assurance to the liti-
gants. The rule attempts to reasonably assure that the parties will
economically have their "day in court" and that the risks of expen-
sive, piecemeal, and perhaps strategically dilatory appeals will be
avoided. In a related but different context, the American Judicature
Society to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observed:
Double appeals are seldom necessary. It is almost axiomatic that
96. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 (1891); Commonwealth v.
Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421, 423 n. I, 435 A.2d 1298, 1299 n.1 (1981).
97. See, e.g., St. Louis Iron Mountain and S. Ry. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108
U.S. 24, 28-29 (1883).
98. See infra notes 373-97 and accompanying text; see also PA. R. App. P. 341(a)
(final orders generally appealable). See particularly the specific jurisdictional statutes that
specify final orders as the basis for the respective appellate court's jurisdiction. 42 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. §§ 722-725 (supreme court), 742 (superior court), 762 (commonwealth court),
5105(a) (right of appellate review as to final orders) (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1986).
99. As to the difficulties in identifying the economic equation and balancing economic
with non-economic interest, however, see infra note 174.
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every losing litigant in a one-judge court ought to have a right to
appeal to a multijudge court. It is almost equally axiomatic that
one appeal is enough to insure justice between parties. A second
appeal carries with it no assurance that justice will be more
nearly achieved by mere repetition .... 100
1. Final Orders Illustrated-The classic formulation of final-
ity in terms of termination or disposition of the entire case is ubiqui-
tous in Pennsylvania case law. 101 In application, however, how is a
case "terminated" in the lower court? The following is merely an
illustrative list of final orders that literally dispose of a case and put
an aggrieved party out of court. In criminal cases, final appealable
orders include the imposition and docketing of a sentence (e.g. im-
prisonment or fine) after consideration and denial of post-trial mo-
tions;10 2 the denial of post-conviction relief;103 and the discharge of a
defendant or the dismissal of the Commonwealth's case or informa-
tion filed against a defendant, 10 4 provided that such a discharge is
not tantamount to an acquittal. 0 5 The opportunity for review of non-
final orders in criminal cases is severely limited. As a general rule,
100. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 2. As to the
economical underpinnings of the final order doctrine, see also Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501
A.2d 211 (1985); Sanderbeck v. Sanderbeck, 327 Pa. Super, 461, 476 A.2d 44 (1984); Gordon
v. Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981).
101. See Adoption of G.M., 484 Pa. 24, 398 A.2d 642 (1979); T.C.R. Realty Inc. v.
Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977); Pilzer v. Independence Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 456 Pa. 402, 404, 319 A.2d 677, 678 (1974); Banda Inc. v. Virginia Manor Apart-
ments, Inc., 451 Pa. 408, 409, 303 A.2d 925, 926 (1973); Bracken v. Bracken, 294 Pa. Super.
371, 439 A.2d 1247 (1982).
102. See Commonwealth v. Sites, 430 Pa. 115, 242 A.2d 220 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954); Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421,
435 A.2d 1298 (1981). The principle of finality is said to be more strict in criminal cases. See
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982); cf. Korematsu v. United
States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943) (order placing defendant on probation, without first imposing and
suspending sentence, considered as final appealable judgment); cf. United States v. Wilson,
440 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971) (when court imposed sentence as fine on three counts of six-
count conviction, withholding sentence on the other counts, there was no final judgment from
which an appeal could be taken).
103. If the lower court denies post-conviction relief, the defendant is, of course, out of
court and the action is terminated. Thus, he may appeal. Also, the Commonwealth may appeal
the lower court's grant of post-conviction relief when it results in a discharge. See Common-
wealth v. Scott, Pa. Super. - , 509 A.2d 1301 (1986); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9541-9551 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986) (Post Conviction Hearing Act).
104. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 338 Pa. Super. 368, 487 A.2d 1010 (1985); Commonwealth v.
Gemelli, 326 Pa. Super. 388, 474 A.2d 294 (1984); Commonwealth v. Smerechenski, 321 Pa.
Super. 549, 468 A.2d 1129 (1983); Commonwealth v. Murray, 217 Pa. Super. 307, 272 A.2d
201 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Burton v. Baldi, 147 Pa. Super. 193, 24 A.2d 76 (1942).
For federal courts, see 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982); cf. Commonwealth v. Scott, - Pa. Super.
- 509 A.2d 1301 (1986).
105. As to when principles of double jeopardy bar a state's right of appeal, see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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therefore, an appellate court will not review a case until sentence has
been imposed. 1' 0 Appeals improperly filed before judgment of sen-
tence will thus be quashed by the appellate court because they are
prematurely presented before the final, formal termination of
litigation.
There are so many various appealable final orders in non-crimi-
nal matters that one can only offer an illustrative, but lengthier, list
of those orders that literally and finally terminate a case. In non-
criminal cases (for example, trespass, assumpsit, equity, support,
probate, divorce, etc.), the following orders are generally appeala-
ble:107 (1) final judgment following a decision or verdict on liability,
damages and dismissal of post-trial motions; 08 (2) final decree in
equity after the denial of post-trial relief;0" (3) judgment on the
pleadings;" 0 (4) summary judgment;"' (5) judgment in a "case
stated" in which the parties have reserved the right to appeal;" 2 (6)
default judgment as to both liability and damages;"' (7) non pros or
the refusal to remove a non pros;" ' (8) dismissal of a complaint;" 5
106. See Commonwealth v. Pollick, 420 Pa. 61, 215 A.2d 904 (1966); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 383 Pa. 532, 119 A.2d 492 (1956); Commonwealth v. Reagan, 330 Pa. Super. 417,
479 A.2d 621 (1984); Commonwealth v. Wills, 328 Pa. Super. 342, 476 A.2d 1362 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421, 435 A.2d 1298 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Bennett, 236 Pa. Super. 509, 345 A.2d 754 (1975).
107. But see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
108. See PA. R. Civ. P. 227.1 and note thereto (post-trial relief), 227.4 (entry of judg-
ment upon praecipe of party); PA. R. App. P. 301(c), 301(d).
109. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1501 (conformity to civil action), 1520 (form of decree in eq-
uity); see also Stotsenburg v. Frost, 465 Pa. 187, 348 A.2d 418 (1975) (final decree, not
judgment, determines appealability), mentioned in note following PA. R. App. P. 301(a).
110. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1034 (judgment on the pleadings); see also Indiana County
Hosp. v. McCarl's Plumbing, 344 Pa. Super. 226, 496 A.2d 767 (1985) (exceptions to judg-
ment on pleadings not proper); Dudash v. Palmyra Borough Auth., 335 Pa. Super. I, 483 A.2d
924 (1984).
Ill. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1035 (summary judgment).
112. See, e.g., Wertz v. Anderson, - Pa. Super. - , 508 A.2d 1218 (1986); supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
113. See PA. R. Civ. P. 237.1 (notice requirement), 4019(c)(3) (default as sanction),
1037 (civil action, default judgment), 1511 (equity action, default judgment); see also Livolsi
v. Crosby, 344 Pa. Super. 34, 495 A.2d 1384 (1985); Miller Oral Surgery v. Dinello, 342 Pa.
Super. 577, 493 A.2d 741 (1985); Sims v. Feingold, 329 Pa. Super. 437, 478 A.2d 868 (1984).
The appealability of such judgments is problematic and deserves careful attention. See. e.g.,
Wills Equip. Co. v. Goldman Enter., 325 Pa. Super. 116, 472 A.2d 674 (1984) (appeal from
order entering default judgment as sanction entertained without discussion of jurisdiction);
Marshall v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 76 Pa. Commw. 205, 463 A.2d 1215 (1983)
(sanction order precluding defense is appealable notwithstanding absence of assessment of
damages). See also infra notes 196, 204-1I; cf. PA. R. App. P. 311 (appealability of order
striking/opening or refusing to strike/open judgments) (discussed infra notes 272-82 and ac-
companying text.
114. See PA. R. Civ. P. 218 (non pros or nonsuit if plaintiff is not ready), 1037 (entry of
non pros for failure to file complaint), 4019(c)(3) (entry of non pros as discovery sanction); see
also Salladino v. Patrolman Brooks No. 4035, 324"Pa. Super. 172, 471 A.2d 518 (1984); Erie
Human Rel. Comm'n ex rel. Dunson v. Erie Ins. Exch., 304 Pa. Super. 172, 450 A.2d 157
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(9) refusal to remove a nonsuit; 116 (10) grant or denial of support,
including the grant or refusal to modify a support order;" 7 (11) en-
try of a divorce decree;"18 (12) order of equitable distribution;" 9
(13) determinations of custody; 20 (14) imposition of fine or sentence
after a finding of civil contempt; 2' and (15) order confirming a last
will following the dismissal of exceptions or post-trial motions.1 2 In
(1982) (direct appeal from entry of non pros suggested); Hatalowich v. Bednarski, 315 Pa.
Super. 303, 461 A.2d 1292 (1983); cf. lole v. Western Auto Supply, - Pa. Super. ,
- n.3, 508 A.2d 600, 602 n.3 (1986) (plaintiffs appeal from order refusing to open or
strike non pros is proper; Erie distinguished); Walker v. Pugliese, 317 Pa. Super. 595, 464
A.2d 482 (1983) (appeal from order denying petition to open non pros); see also PA. R. App.
P. 311.
115. See Boden v. Tompkins, 306 Pa. Super. 494, 452 A.2d 833 (1982) (order dis-
missing complaint ends litigation and is appealable); cf United States Nat'l Bank in Johns-
town v. Johnson, 506 Pa. 622, 487 A.2d 809 (1985) (dismissal of appellee has same effect as
dismissal of complaint and was immediately appealable without need to reduce order to judg-
ment); but see Leach v. Hough, - Pa. Super. - , 507 A.2d 848 (1986) (noting general
rule that sustaining preliminary objections without dismissal lacks requisite finality); Sullivan
v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954) (sustaining preliminary objections without
dismissing complaint is not final order).
116. See PA. R. Civ. P. 230 (voluntary nonsuit), 230.1 (compulsory nonsuit at trial),
227.1(a)(3) (removal of nonsuit), 218 (non pros or nonsuit if party is not ready for trial), 1512
(equity, nonsuit), 224 (nonsuit on question of liability before receipt of testimony), 2231(g),
(h) (nonsuit when parties have been joined), 2232(d) (nonsuit in case in which defendants
have been joined), 2035, 2057 (nonsuit in cases involving unrepresented minors or incompe-
tents); see also Steiner v. Lurie, 308 Pa. Super. 295, 454 A.2d 138 (1982) (appeal from re-
fusal to remove nonsuit not from the entry of a nonsuit); Miller v. Hurst, 302 Pa. Super. 235,
448 A.2d 614 (1982) (en banc); accord, Panepinto v. Dummy's Delightful Saloonery, 304 Pa.
Super. 256, 450 A.2d 668 (1982). Arguably, the jurisdictional principle goes one step beyond
the classical finality rule but the reason for the additional requirement is a necessary and
reasonable one, especially in terms of meaningful appellate review. Cf. Butler v. Emreson, 76
Pa. Commw. 156, 463 A.2d 109 (1983) (appeal from partial peremptory judgment in manda-
mus was premature; appellant must first file a petition to open judgment; appeal quashed).
117. See Fortune/Forsythe v. Fortune, - Pa. Super. - , 508 A.2d 1205 (1986)
(appeal from order in nature of denial of petition for modification of support); PA. R. Civ. P.
1910.1-1910.31 (procedures governing support actions); see also PA. R. Civ. P. 1910.11(k),
1910.12(g) (motion for post-trial relief not permitted).
118. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.55, 1920.76; see also Hall v. Hall, 333 Pa. Super. 483, 482
A.2d 974 (1984); Wolf v. Wolf, 318 Pa. Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1983).
119. See Semasek v. Semasek, 509 Pa. 282, 502 A.2d 109 (1985); Braderman v.
Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 101-801
(Purdon 1986).
120. See Hartman v. Hartman, 328 Pa. Super. 154, 476 A.2d 938 (1984) (modification
of prior custody order); Shaffer v. Goal, 312 Pa. Super. 399, 458 A.2d 1020 (1983) (custody);
PA. R. Civ. P. 1915.1-1915.25.
121. See Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 337 Pa. Super. 410, 487 A.2d 11 (1985); but
cf. Johnston v. Johnston, 346 Pa. Super. 427, 499 A.2d 1074 (1985) (order threatening con-
tempt and directing defendants to execute agreement characterized as in nature of mandatory
injunction and reviewed); Rulli v. Dunn, 337 Pa. Super. 613, 487 A.2d 430 (1985) (citing
defendants in contempt and directing compliance with order of expunction not appealable until
sanctions imposed; defendants not yet found in contempt for appeal purposes); Lehigh Town-
ship v. Tahos, 91 Pa. Commw. 568, 498 A.2d 30 (1985) (appeal from order finding defendants
in contempt, after they refused to obey order to raze or sell property, quashed as interlocutory
until lower court complied with necessary procedural steps for contempt).
122. See, e.g., Estate of Younger, - Pa. Super. - , 508 A.2d 327 (1986) (appeal
from order denying exceptions and confirming last will of decedent).
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all of these generic examples, if the order disposes of the entire case
and terminates litigation, the party aggrieved by the order may ap-
peal from such final orders. In all of these examples, however, it is
imperative that the aggrieved party ascertain the proper procedural
requirements1 28 that may be required in the lower or appellate
courts. The aggrieved party must continually examine the appeala-
bility of such orders by keeping informed of any new cases or proce-
dural rules that may modify the right to appeal.
2. Interlocutory Orders Distinguished-As a general rule,
therefore, an order which does not terminate the case is not final and
is not immediately appealable. Such nonfinal orders are termed in-
terlocutory.1 2 4 They are subject to immediate appellate review only
in those infrequent circumstances in which an interlocutory appeal is
specifically authorized by statute or rule of court. Thus, interlocutory
decisions, which naturally occur throughout the course of a proceed-
ing below, cannot be reviewed until the bag and baggage of the en-
tire terminated lower court case arrives in the appellate court. At
that time, all the interlocutory orders or decisions that preceded the
final order appealed are then eligible for appellate review.
As with the discussion of classically final orders, a selective list
of interlocutory orders may promote some understanding of the lim-
its of appellate jurisdiction. In all of the following examples, a ;Case is
neither disposed of nor terminated. The episodic decisions in a case
are only steps toward its ultimate, final disposition, although some
decisions may recognizably be temporally closer to the case's defini-
tive terminal point. In civil matters, for example, the following re-
123. For example, a litigant may have to file exceptions or post-trial motions in order to
preserve issues for appellate review. See PA. R. ApP. P. 302; PA. R. Civ. P. 227.1. The filing of
an appeal after the entry of a final order may be sufficient for jurisdictional purposes, but such
an important procedural step, in itself, does not necessarily preserve issues for appellate review.
See supra note 86; cf. supra note 117.
124. "Interlocutory" has been defined as follows: "Provisional; interim; temporary; not
final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides
some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 731 (5th ed. 1979). Consider also the following definition of an "appealable
order":
A decree or order which is sufficiently final to be entitled to appellate review, as
contrasted with an interlocutory order which generally is not appealable until
the case has been tried and judgment entered, e.g., a denial of motion for sum-
mary judgment is not appealable but the allowance of such motion is a final
judgment and hence appealable . . .
Id. at 89. See also Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders - A Struc-
tural Reform Toward Redefinition, 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1037 (1973); Cochran v. M & M




(I) dismissal of preliminary objections; 25
(2) entry of verdict or dismissal of post-trial motion without for-
mal entry of final judgment;
12 6
(3) granting the right to intervene;' 27
(4) adjudication of contempt without imposition of sanctions; 29
(5) entry of default judgment on liability only, without determi-
nation of damages; 2 9
(6) granting a petition to proceed on a class action basis; 30
(7) granting or denying discovery requests,' including the im-
position of costs;
32
(8) ordering consolidation or severance; 133
(9) denying or granting motion to disqualify counsel;1 34
125. United Erectors v. Pratt & Lambert Corp., 338 Pa. Super. 577, 488 A.2d 43
(1985): Foulke v. Lavelle, 308 Pa. Super. 131, 454 A.2d 56 (1982).
126. See Slagter v. Thrifty Clean, Inc., 441 Pa. 272, 272 A.2d 885 (1971); Straw v.
Sands, 426 Pa. 81, 231 A.2d 144 (1967); Minich v. City of Sharon, 325 Pa. Super. 178, 472
A.2d 706 (1984). And see Murphy v. Brong. 321 Pa. Super. 340, 468 A.2d 509 (1983) (dis-
missal of exceptions without entry of judgment is interlocutory and not appealable); Litt v.
Rolling Hill Hospital, 293 Pa. Super. 97, 437 A.2d 1008 (1981) (post verdict appeal prema-
ture before disposition of post trial motions). Note, however, that PA. R. App. P. 905(a) at-
tempts to address the problem of premature appeals, i.e., those filed before entry of an appeal-
able order, by providing for, in a sense, retroactive appealability, which operates to perfect an
otherwise premature or defective appeal. See supra note 85.
127. See In re Manley, 305 Pa. Super. 332, 451 A.2d 557 (1982) (order permitting
intervention not appealable); Sailor Planing Mill & Lumber Co. v. Moyer, 35 Pa. Super. 503
(1908); but (f. Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg Say., 300 Pa. Super. 279, 446 A.2d
614 (1982); infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (appealability of orders denying
intervention).
128. See Hester v. Bagnato, 292 Pa. Super. 322, 437 A.2d 66 (1981); supra note 121.
129. See supra note 113; infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
130. See Piltzer v. Independence Say. & Loan Ass'n, 456 Pa. 402, 319 A.2d 677 (1974);
Canulli v. Allstate Ins. Co., 315 Pa. Super. 460, 462 A.2d 286 (1983); but see infra notes 239-
241 (orders denying class action certification).
131. See Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 483
Pa. 35, 394 A.2d 525 (1978); Kine v. Forman, 412 Pa. 163, 194 A.2d 175 (1963); Quinn v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 219 Pa. 24, 67 A. 949 (1907); In re McGovern, 291 Pa. Super. 222, 435
A.2d 878 (1981).
132. See McManus v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 342 Pa. Super. 405, 493 A.2d 84
(1985), distinguishing and perhaps overruling sub silentio Pitell Co., Inc. v. Penn State Con-
str., 277 Pa. Super. 575, 419 A.2d 1299 (1980) (pretrial discovery sanction "reduced to judg-
ment" appealable): ef. Garris v. McClain, 399 Pa. 261, 160 A.2d 398 (1960) (order imposing
costs appealable when issued in conjunction with order withdrawing juror and declaring mis-
trial; appeal from order granting continuance); see also Hall v. Lee, 285 Pa. Super. 542, 428
A.2d 178 (1981) (costs order not appealable); Glisson v. Carlin, 204 Pa. Super. 335, 204 A.2d
285 (1964) (pretrial order imposing costs not appealable); PA. R. Civ. P. 4019; but cf. Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531 (1882) (collateral orders allowing attorney's fees or costs
appealable); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus. Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975). For a
discussion of the "collateral order doctrine," see infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
133. See Matthews v. Johns-Manville Corp., 307 Pa. Super. 300, 453 A.2d 362 (1982).
134. See Pittsburgh & New England v. Reserve Ins., 277 Pa. Super. 215, 419 A.2d 738
(1980) (citing Middleberg v. Middleberg, 427 Pa. 114, 233 A.2d 889 (1967)); cf. Slater v.
Rimar, 462 Pa. 138, 152 n. 15, 338 A.2d 584, 591 n. 15 (1975) (where court characterized an
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(10) denial of a motion for reconsideration;13
(11) denial of a motion for a non pros;
3
1
(12) denial of summary judgment 137 or the grant of partial sum-
mary judgment, for example, with respect to liability only;
1 38
(13) refusal to grant a protective order;1
3 9
(14) order imposing or striking a lis pendens;4 °
(15) remand of a case to the worker's compensation referee;'"
(16) sustaining preliminary objections without dismissal or con-
temporaneously granting the plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint;
142
(17) refusing a request for permission to amend a complaint or
order disqualifying counsel as final when it also dismissed action); Seiffert v. Dumatic Indus.,
413 Pa. 395, 197 A.2d 454 (1964); Woolard v. Burton, 345 Pa. Super. 366, 498 A.2d 445
(1985) (appeal by counsel from order directing his withdrawal from case was proper); see also
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1981) ("party" includes counsel); Annot., 5 A.L.R.
4th 1251 (1981); infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text (discussion of collateral order
doctrine).
135. See PA. R. App. P. 1701; see also Indiana County Hosp. v. McCarl's Plumbing,
344 Pa. Super. 226, 496 A.2d 767 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 329 Pa. Super. 42, 477
A.2d 1342 (1984); Boden v. Tompkins, 306 Pa. Super. 494, 452 A.2d 833 (1982).
136. See Goldfine v. Zatz, 422 Pa. 27, 221 A.2d 126 (1966); Cathcart v. Keene Indus.
Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 153, 471 A.2d 493, 509 (1984); see also supra note 114.
137. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 394 A.2d
491 (1978); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984);
Nordmann v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. Commw. 187, 468 A.2d 1173 (1983). Note, however,
that in Pennsylvania Turnpike, the court reviewed an appealed order that granted summary
judgment on less than all the claims. The concurring and dissenting opinions by Justices Pome-
roy and Nix (now Chief Justice) are noteworthy on the jurisdictional issue. See Pennsylvania
Turnpike, 482 Pa. at 621, 624, 394 A.2d at 495, 496 (Pomeroy and Nix, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
138. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Bodge, - Pa. Super. -, 507 A.2d 837
(1986); Robson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 365, 484 A.2d 177 (1984);
Szwecki v. Travelers Ins. Co., 324 Pa. Super. 32, 471 A.2d 109 (1984); Canulli v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 315 Pa. Super. 460, 462 A.2d 286 (1983); but see Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 394 A.2d 491 (1978) (discussed supra note 137).
139. See Steel v. Weisberg, 347 Pa. Super. 106, 500 A.2d 428 (1985).
140. See United States Nat'l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 506 Pa. 622, 487 A.2d 809
(1985); 6 & 8 Builders Supply, Inc. v. Buell, 292 Pa. Super. 307, 437 A.2d 58 (1981); but cf.
McCahill v. Roberts, 421 Pa. 233, 219 A.2d 306 (1966) (order, in effect, striking lis pendens,
was final and appealable since it effectively denied plaintiffs their ownership rights); see also
infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text (concerning interlocutory appeals involving property
rights under PA. R. App. P. 311).
141. See Croll v. Workmens Compensation App. Bd., 50 Pa. Commw. 483, 413 A.2d
439 (1980) (involving appeal in the nature of a petition for review); Murhon v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 214, 414 A.2d 161 (1980) (reverting to prior
practice that remand orders of Board to referee are unappealable without exception), prospec-
tively applied in Brennan & Sons Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 72 Pa.
Commw. 243, 457 A.2d 135 (1983).
142. See Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954); Leach v. Hough,
- Pa. Super. -, 507 A.2d 948 (1986); Jones v. Nissenbaum, Rudolph & Seidner, 244
Pa. Super. 377, 368 A.2d 770 (1976); Graybill v. Fricke, 53 Pa. Commw. 8, 416 A.2d 626
(1980). However, if the plaintiff is so restricted in his pleadings as to be effectively put out of
court, the order will be deemed final. See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
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pleading; 4 3
(18) directing that a specified judgment, sentence, or order be
entered without actual entry of the specified order on the lower
court's docket;"
4
(19) denying a motion for a new trial."
5
In criminal matters, in which the concept of finality or policy
against protracted litigation is more rigid, the following orders are
noticeably interlocutory in nature:
(I) conviction without imposition of sentence;"
6
(2) denial of defendant's request for habeas corpus relief;
147
(3) order permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea;
148
(4) revocation of bail;
149
(5) refusal to quash a subpoena;1 50
(6) denial of defendant's pretrial speedy trial claim;151
(7) denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence; 52
(8) refusal to consolidate;1
53
(9) certification of a juvenile as an adult for trial.' 54
143. See Stadler v. Mt. Olive Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953); Marks v.
Marks, 30) Pa. Super. 288, 446 A.2d 618 (1982) (order denying plaintiff wife's petition to
proceed under new divorce code was not final) (distinguishing Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa.
Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981) afj'd, 498 Pa. 570, 449 A.2d 1378 (1982) (order denying
defendant's petition appealable)).
144. See PA. R. App. P. 301(c).
145. Id.
146. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421, 435 A.2d 1298 (1981).
147. See Commonwealth v. Ballard, 501 Pa. 230, 460 A.2d 1091 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 414 A.2d 1043 (1980); Commonwealth v. Burkett, __ Pa.
Super. -, 507 A.2d 1266 (1986); see also infra notes 352-64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion concerning "exceptional circumstances" jurisdiction).
148. See Commonwealth v. Wise, 328 Pa. Super. 491, 477 A.2d 552 (1984).
149. See Commonwealth v. Colleran, 323 Pa. Super. I, 469 A.2d 1130 (1983). The
proper procedure in bail matters is to file a "petition for review." See Commonwealth v.
Cabeza, 489 Pa. 142, 145 n. 2, 413 A.2d 1054, 1055 n. 2 (1980); Commonwealth v. Heiser,
330 Pa. Super. 70, 71 n. I, 478 A.2d 1355, 1356 n.] (1984); see also PA. R. App. P. 1762,
1503 supra notes 10 and 16.
150. See Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 317 A.2d 286 (1974); cf. In re January, 1974
Special Grand Jury, 238 Pa. Super. 479, 357 A.2d 628 (1976) (order denying motion to quash
subpoena certified for review); see also infra notes 315-51 and accompanying text regarding
appellate review of certified orders.
151. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Bennett, 236 Pa. Super. 509, 345 A.2d 754 (1975).
152. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968); but cf.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa. Super. 143, 452 A.2d 1355 (1982) (defendant's cross-ap-
peal from order denying suppression was reviewable) (citing Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432
Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968)). As to the Commonwealth's right to appeal orders granting
motions to suppress, see infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
153. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 483 Pa. 29, 394 A.2d 522 (1978).
154. See Commonwealth v. Madden, 342 Pa. Super. 120, 492 A.2d 420 (1985) (appeal
from order decertifying defendant from adult to juvenile court was entertained; note, however,
Judge Beck's jurisdictional analysis in her dissent).
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In addition to those theoretically applicable jurisdictional cir-
cumstances discussed with regard to civil actions, in matters relating
to family and probate law, the following orders do not terminate liti-
gation and would not traditionally be considered final for appeal
purposes:
(1) granting or denying interim support, costs, or counsel fees in
a divorce action;
155
(2) finding of paternity without a determination of amount of
support; 5 1
(3) bifurcation of a divorce action from equitable distribution or
dismissal of exceptions without entry of divorce decree;
57
(4) denial of a motion for blood tests;
58
(5) directing executors to pay funds or directing the filing of an
accounting before final distribution. 59
C. Constructive Finality: The Pragmatic Approach
The classical aspect of the final order doctrine is relatively sim-
ple to apply because the focal point is an easily identifiable criterion,
namely, the termination or complete disposition of a case. At that
point, the parties are literally "out of court" and there is no need for
further action by the lower court. This aspect of the final order doc-
trine is, one might say, technical or mechanical in nature. Its rigidity
suggests a per se rule. 60 As with many such rules, however, rigid
application may produce draconian consequences upon the litigants.
155. The major pronouncement in this area is Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211
(1985), which referred to Judge Beck's dissent in Sutliff v. Sutliff, 326 Pa. Super. 496, 504,
474 A.2d 599, 603 (1984). Note the variable appealability of such support orders under prior
caselaw in Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 100 n.5, 327 A.2d 60, 61-62 n.5 (1974)
(allowance of interim alimony and fees is appealable); Morelli v. Morelli, 316 Pa. Super. 54,
462 A.2d 789 (1983); Brady v. Brady, 168 Pa. Super. 538, 79 A.2d 803 (1951); Rutherford v.
Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 32 A.2d 921 (1943) (denial of such interim relief is not
appealable).
156. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1910.15; see also Gainer v. Jones, 347 Pa. Super. 462, 500 A.2d
1148 (1984).
157. See Beasley v. Beasley, 348 Pa. Super. 124, 501 A.2d 679 (1985); see also Mandia
v. Mandia, 341 Pa. Super. 116, 491 A.2d 177 (1985), which presented a clearly unusual and
difficult jurisdictional dilemma: Hammond v. Hammond, 301 Pa. Super. 439, 447 A.2d 1047
(1982) (appeal from dismissal of exceptions to Master's Report quashed).
158. See Sanderbeck v. Sanderbeck, 327 Pa. Super. 461, 476 A.2d 44 (1984).
159. See Stewart Estate, 423 Pa. 189, 223 A.2d 685 (1966); Gramm's Estate, 420 Pa.
510, 218 A.2d 342 (1966); but cf. Brose's Estate, 423 Pa. 420, 223 A.2d 661 (1966) (order
directing executor to account and include moneys not yet in his hands is appealable); In re
Williams' Estate, 338 Pa. 98, 12 A.2d 103 (1940) (appealable order surcharging fiduciary);
see also supra note 26 (discussion concerning an executor's standing to appeal).
160. The term "per se" has been defined as meaning "by itself' and referring to "in its
own nature without reference to its relations." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed.
1979).
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A litigant may, metaphorically speaking, be bound and gagged by a
lower court's order, yet he is still in court for purposes of technical
finality until the case is finally over. Literally, it's not over until it's
over. In contrast to the federal courts, the Pennsylvania courts have
produced a body of case law that signifies a sympathetic shift in val-
ues favoring the aggrieved, but not technically out-of-court, liti-
gant. ' 1 The Pennsylvania courts, not facing the specific statutory
obstacles imposed upon the federal courts, 62 have assuaged the po-
tential hardship of the classical finality rule by adding a component
of pragmatism. To borrow antitrust phraseology, one might say that
the classical aspect of the final order doctrine represents a per se
rule; the pragmatic aspect represents a "rule of reason." For conve-
nience purposes, this pragmatic version of the final order doctrine
shall be referred to as constructive finality.163
The pragmatic aspect of the final order doctrine, therefore, goes
beyond the frontiers of classical finality into a jurisdictional terrain
that is rocky. Constructive finality reveals the holophrastic and capa-
cious quality of the disingenuously simple term, final order. The
principle of constructive finality is really a distinct procedural con-
cept, distinguishable, for example, from technical finality or the col-
lateral order doctrine, although there is some consanguinity with the
latter doctrine."' In essence, pragmatic or constructive finality ar-
guably applies to those causes of action or claims for relief that are
integral to final disposition. In application, constructive finality may
categorize an order as final when it effectively places a litigant "out
of court" as to her cause of action or claim.16 The conclusion of
161. (f. infra note 174.
162. In the federal courts, appealability of orders disposing of less than all claims is
controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1984) and FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See infra notes 212-21 and
accompanying text.
163. "Constructive" has been defined, in part, as follows: "That which has not the char-
acter assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of
the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law; hence, inferred, implied, or made out
by legal interpretation. ... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (5th ed. 1979).
164. Perhaps the most significant relationship between constructive finality and the final
order doctrine is the underlying policy judgment that the rights involved are too important to
be denied review, which is sometimes the second prong of the "collateral order doctrine." Cer-
tainly, constructive finality does not concern matters collateral to the main cause of action or
claims for relief; and rarely would constructive finality concern rights that would be irrepara-
bly lost unless immediate appellate review was granted. Despite those considerations, one often
sees opinions interchangeably citing cases involving constructive finality, the collateral order,
and final order doctrines in support of discussions on finality.
165. See generally, T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Orsatti, 448 Pa. 72, 292 A.2d 313 (1972); Marino Estate, 440 Pa. 492, 269
A.2d 645 (1970) (order is final if it precludes one from presenting merits of claim); Ventura v.
Skylark Motel, Inc., 431 Pa. 459, 246 A.2d 353 (1968); Foulke v. Lavelle, 308 Pa. Super. 131,
454 A.2d 56 (1982); Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981), aft'd, 498
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finality applies notwithstanding the fact that litigation is not actually
terminated. In such circumstances, the order, which effectively
places a litigant out of court, will be considered the functional
equivalent of a final order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 6
The principle of finality, considered in the context of construc-
tive finality or the rule of reason, is an especially nettlesome one. As
the commonwealth court once remarked, "Although the .. .stan-
dard [of finality] is rhetorically clear, its application is often diffi-
cult.' 6 7 Pennsylvania case law has emphasized that finality is a judi-
cial conclusion achievable only after the individual facts of a case
have been carefully examined. 68 Although an examination of the
particular facts of a case is always necessary, one can safely identify
some examples that are beyond the pale of the rule and some broad
categories that are clearly within it.
For example, constructive finality must, by definition, import
some meaning of finality or completion. Therefore, orders that in
form or function involve inactivity or temporariness cannot come
within the spirit or definitional rubric of constructive finality. Thus,
an order that either postpones decision-making'6 9 or specifically im-
poses an interim' 70 or conditional aspect 17 ' upon the lower court's
Pa. 570, 449 A.2d 1378 (1982).
166. The note to PA. R. App. P. 341 (citing, inter alia, Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Dis-
count Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975)) indicates that the rules are not meant to change
prior practice as to the appealability of orders which have a "final aspect."
167. See Weiss v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa. Commw. 260, 266, 442 A.2d 378, 381
(1982).
168. See Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978) (appeal quashed). Note,
however, that the doctrinal foundation of this case is really the "collateral order doctrine." See
infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
169. See Cribb v. United Health Clubs, Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 479, 485 A.2d 1182 (1984)
(refusal to review lower court's inaction on collateral petition to intervene); Lasco v. Lasco,
300 Pa. Super. 494, 446 A.2d 963 (1982) (order postponing decision on defendant's petition to
modify alimony pendente lite did not constitute final determination on merits of the petition;
appeal quashed as premature); cf. supra note 155 as to subsequent nonappealability of interim
alimony orders; see also Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 642-643, 241
A.2d 81, 89 (1968) (orders deferring decision on preliminary objections not appealable; two
appeals quashed); but see Carpenter v. Carpenter, 326 Pa. Super. 570, 574 n.2, 474 A.2d
1124, 1126-27 n.2 (1984) (stay of custody order tantamount to denial of relief); PA. R. App. P.
301(e) and note thereto (emergency appeals when party is unable to secure entry of an appeal-
able order).
170. Rodgers v. Yodock, 309 Pa. Super. 154, 454 A.2d 1129 (1983) (temporary stay of
writ of execution for 30 days not final) (noting and distinguishing Cherry v. Empire Mutual
Ins. Co., 417 Pa. 7, II, 208 A.2d 470, 471 (1965); and National Council of Junior Order v.
Roberson, 214 Pa. Super. 9, 248 A.2d 861 (1969)); West v. West, 301 Pa. Super. 75, 446
A.2d 1342 (1982) (interim order compelling payment of support "until further notice" not
final since litigant not precluded from presentation of merits); but see Laczkowski v. Laczkow-
ski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985) (appellate review of order granting temporary
possession of marital residence to wife pending divorce). Note Judge Beck's dissent in
Laczkowski and the fact that the appellate issue actually involved the collateral order doctrine
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action is not constructively or pragmatically final. The litigant is cer-
tainly not "out of court" and relief is not necessarily precluded.
Nevertheless, the court must look to the substance and practical
effect of the appealed order. An important consideration, although
not dispositive of finality, is the possibility of irreparable harm. This
factor may be considered in conjunction with the primary concern,
that is, whether the appellant is effectively deprived of the ability to
present a claim.17 2 When the denial of relief does not effectively or in
practical terms put the litigant out of court, then the order is not
constructively final and an appeal will be quashed as interlocutory. 17
With these broad guidelines as a backdrop, specific types of
cases that concern applications of the principle of constructive final-
ity deserve attention.
1. Multiple Claims and Parties-Partial Dismissal
(a) The plaintiffs case: one foot in and one foot out of the
courtroom-One of the most difficult jurisdictional dilemmas is de-
termining the existence of appellate jurisdiction when the lower
court has truncated a plaintiff's case. Often, a lower court will de-
cide that a plaintiff can only proceed on part of his complaint or that
in the context of a decision affecting the welfare of a child. Cf. Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501
A.2d 211 (1985) (interim support orders not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine).
171. See Harasym v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., 321 Pa. Super. 492, 468 A.2d 817
(1983) (expressly conditional sanction order finding additional defendant liable to defendant
on defendant's cross-claim not appealable since there was no determination as to defendant's
liability to the plaintiff); but cf. Carrollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 252 Pa. Super. 422,
381 A.2d 990 (1970) (defendant or additional defendant may appeal order letting one or the
other out of the case); see also Brandywine Area Joint School Auth. v. VanCor, Inc., 426 Pa.
448, 451, 233 A.2d 240, 241 (1967). One could argue that in these cases, unlike Harasym, one
party is out of court vis-a-vis another party.
172. See Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981), aff'd, 498 Pa.
570, 449 A.2d 1378 (1982) ("out of court" not to be interpreted literally or synonymously
with finality; order which prevented wife-defendant from proceeding under new divorce law
put her out of court insofar as her own claims were concerned and deprived her of her day in
court); cf. Marks v. Marks, 300 Pa. Super. 288, 446 A.2d 618 (1982) (order denying wife-
plaintiff's petition to proceed under new divorce code not appealable since she is not "out of
court" in her cause of action for divorce).
173. See Stadler v. Mt. Olive Borough, 373 Pa. 316, 95 A.2d 776 (1953) (mid-trial
denial of motion to amend complaint is interlocutory since order does not prevent plaintiff
from presenting case to jury); Wilkes-Barre Clay Prods. v. Koroneos, 342 Pa. Super. 582, 493
A.2d 744 (1985) (lower court's order reinstating defendant's appeal from decision of district
magistrate not appealable since appellant is still in lower court for a de novo trial); Tsioukas v.
Penn Nat'l Mut. Casualty, 339 Pa. Super. 78, 488 A.2d 317 (1985) (lower court's denial of
motion to quash appeal to lower court from an arbitration award not appealable since appealed
order did not end litigation or put parties out of court). As a number of these cases indicate, if
a party is forced to litigate in court, he cannot claim that he is constructively "out of court"
for appeal purposes. Marks v. Marks, 300 Pa. Super. 288, 446 A.2d 618 (1982) (order deny-
ing wife-plaintiff's petition to proceed under new divorce code not appealable since she is not
"out of court" in her cause of action for divorce).
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the plaintiff does not have a cause of action as to some of the defend-
ants. In either situation, from the perspective of "classical" or "tech-
nical" finality, the litigation is not completely terminated and plainly
the plaintiff is not "out of court." Must the plaintiff proceed with
trial or can she appeal the piecemeal erosion of her case? Notwith-
standing the inherent problem of balancing competing policies or as-
certaining whether one alternative would be more cost efficient from
the courts' (appellate or lower) or parties' point of view,'174 in limited
circumstances piecemeal appellate review is indeed permissible. The
caveat here, however, is that there are no easy answers, and appel-
late practice could conceivably be subject to dramatic changes given
the aggressive aspects of the burgeoning case law in this area.
In assessing the appealability of an order 17 5 that does not termi-
nate litigation in a multiple claims/parties situation, one perhaps
should focus on four distinct aspects: (1) placing the plaintiff out of
court by effectively foreclosing any avenue of relief; (2) restraining
the plaintiff in his pleadings so as to practically place the plaintiff
out of court; (3) dismissing some but not all of the plaintiffs' claims;
and (4) dismissing a cause of action as to less than all of the defend-
ants. The constructive finality concept would suggest the following
174. The "notwithstanding" caveat could be the subject of a separate specialized study
or article as to the economic ramifications of the various principles of finality. There are a
number of difficult economic questions which cannot be answered with assumptions or impres-
sions. For example, do the various principles of finality actually discourage duplicative litiga-
tion'? What is Pennsylvania's experience with piecemeal or duplicative appellate review? What
is the statistical likelihood that a case, which has already received pretermination appellate
review, will re-enter the appellate court system for further review? And from whose vantage
point does one determine economic impact - the appellate court, the lower court, or both? Is
the "problem" of piecemeal appellate review more expensive in the long run for the appellate
or the lower court?
Assessment of the impact of piecemeal appellate review arguably should be done in the
context of balancing the interests of the courts and parties. Impinging upon this balance-of-
interest analysis would be the plain fact that appellate caseloads have soared nationally. See,
e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN. THE GROWTH OF APPEALS, 1973-1983
TRENDS, (U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 1985); Marvell, Appellate Court Caseloads: Historical
Trends, APPELLATE COURT CT. AD. REV. 3 (1983). Note also Judge Posner's economic analy-
sis in Minority Police Officers Ass'n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197 (7th
Cir. 1983). See also supra note 6 (statistics). Another significant factor is the value or policy
judgment disfavoring the protraction of litigation.
In Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 232, 348 A.2d 734, 738
(1975), Justice Roberts stated as follows: "We do not perceive our appellate responsibilities as
a variable function of our caseload. Appellate review at this juncture [pre-trial denial of class
action certification] is a judicial duty which we may not abdicate by simply saying that we do
so to avoid 'congestion, delay and expense.'"
175. This discussion is limited primarily to the appealability of such orders in the civil
context. The problem of appealability of such interlocutory orders is neither novel or indige-
nous to Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Comment, Partial Appeals, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 277-89 (1953);




In 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with a sit-
uation in which the lower court dismissed a plaintiff's action with
prejudice. The order, however, did not terminate the litigation be-
cause the defendant's counter-claim remained to be tried. Emphasiz-
ing the importance of focusing on the practical ramifications of the
lower court's order, the court in T.C.R. Realty Inc., v. Cox1'" con-
cluded that the appealed order effectively and completely denied the
plaintiff any opportunity for relief. For practical purposes, the order
was final and appealable since it precluded the plaintiff from
presenting the merits of its claim 1 7' to the lower court. In contrast,
an order which strikes some damage portions of a plaintiff's com-
plaint would not be constructively final since the order does not ter-
minate litigation or deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity for
relief.
7 8
The next variation of constructive, pragmatic finality, from the
aggrieved plaintiff's point of view, is when the lower court severely
restricts the plaintiff's ability to plead so as to effectively put the
plaintiff out of court. For example, a plaintiff may be pragmatically
"out of court" when preliminary objections are sustained to the
plaintiff's complaint, even though the lower court has extended what
turns out to be a meaningless or inadequate opportunity to amend
the complaint 7 9 or present the case in another forum. 8 ' In such cir-
cumstances, appellate jurisdiction may exist because there is con-
176. 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977).
177. Id. at 337, 372 A.2d at 724. The court, for example, cited Marino Estate, 440 Pa.
492, 494, 269 A.2d 645, 646 (1970) (order granting petition of an administrator for leave to
retain additional counsel for estate in condemnation proceeding not appealable). The terminol-
ogy (claim, cause of action) may be important when one considers later the dismissal of some
counts of a plaintiff's complaint, supra notes 182-94.
178. See Safety T. Corp. v. Hoffman T. Co., Inc., 458 Pa. 102, 329 A.2d 834 (1974).
179. See Freeze v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 504 Pa. 218, 221 n.5, 470 A.2d 958, 960 n.5
(1983) (sustaining of preliminary objections on no-fault work loss claim, with leave to amend
to assert funeral and survival benefits, drastically altered plaintiffs cause of action so as to put
plaintiff out of court); Ciletti v. City of Washington, 378 Pa. 641, 107 A.2d 871 (1954) (leave
to amend so limited in scope that order was definitive and appealable); Jones v. Nissenbaum,
Rudolf & Seidner, 244 Pa. Super. 377, 368 A.2d 770 (1976) (order sustaining preliminary
objections with leave to amend was appealable); c.f. Capanna v. Travelers Ins. Co., -. Pa.
Super. -, 513 A.2d 397 (1986) (discussion infra text accompanying note 193).
180. See Goldman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61, 247 A.2d 455 (1968) (in plaintiff's action
for specific performance, certification of case to law side, in effect, dismissed complaint and
denied relief, and was therefore appealable); but see D'Aloiso v. Chung, 347 Pa. Super. 392,
500 A.2d 891 (1985); Pittsburgh Airport Motel v. Airport Asphalt, 322 Pa. Super. 149, 469
A.2d 226 (1983) (order certifying case to law side of court not appealable because order did
not put plaintiffs out of court on request for accounting); Husted v. Bd. of Directors of Well-
sboro Area, 57 Pa. Commw. 520, 427 A.2d 272 (1981) (appeal from order dismissing com-
plaint in equity but granting leave to file on law side quashed since plaintiffs still had opportu-
nity to litigate and to be made whole).
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structive finality. However, when the lower court sustains prelimi-
nary objections or enters an adverse judgment, but gives the plaintiff
a meaningful alternative to amend the complaint, such an order will
not be immediately appealable.'81
The third aspect is perhaps the most difficult and elusive to
grasp from a practical or conceptual approach. The seminal case in
this area is Praisner v. Stocker,182 in which the superior court held
that the dismissal of less than all separate and distinct causes of
action, joined under the permissive joinder standards, 183 is a final,
immediately appealable order. Decisions to the contrary were specifi-
cally overruled. In Praisner, the lower court dismissed two counts
(false arrest and malicious abuse of process) with the remaining
cause of action (assault and battery) relegated to compulsory arbi-
tration. Interestingly, subsequent to the filing of the appeal, the en-
tire case was terminated because no appeal had been filed from the
award on the remaining count. 84 The superior court pronounced
that an aggrieved party can immediately appeal the partial dismissal
of a case that represents a distinct cause of action. Thus, the judg-
ment entered on Praisner's separate causes of action was "final" and
jurisdictionally appealable at the time Praisner filed his notice of
appeal.
After Praisner came Cloverleaf Development v. Horizon Finan-
cial, 8 5 involving an appeal from an order that sustained preliminary
181. See Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 438 Pa. 272, 264 A.2d 668 (1970); Sullivan
v. City and County of Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A.2d 854 (1954); Commonwealth, Dept.
of Transp. v. Rollins Outdoor Ad. Co., Inc., 76 Pa. Commw. 554, 464 A.2d 653 (1983).
182. 313 Pa. Super. 332, 459 A.2d 1255 (1983) (en bane).
183. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1020(a), which states that "[tlhe plaintiff may state in the com-
plaint more than one cause of action against the same defendant heretofore asserted in as-
sumpsit or trespass. Each cause of action and any special damage related thereto shall be
stated in a separate count containing a demand for relief." Praisner was based on the prior
rule, PA. R. Civ. P. 1044(a) (rescinded July I, 1984).
184. See Praisner, 313 Pa. Super. at 340, 459 A.2d at 1260. Prior cases oftentimes
stated as a general rule that the partial dismissal of a complaint was interlocutory and not
appealable. See, e.g. James Banda, Inc. v. Virginia Manor Apts., Inc., 451 Pa. 408, 303 A.2d
925 (1973) (order sustaining preliminary objections to part of plaintiff's complaint in equity,
concerning constructive trust of real estate, without prejudice to assumpsit claim, and dis-
missing preliminary objection as to claim for constructive trust over funds held was not appeal-
able); McAnany v. Moeller, 304 Pa. Super. 81, 450 A.2d 110 (1982) (quashed); Suburban
East Tires v. Duquesne Light Co., 302 Pa. Super. 284, 448 A.2d 638 (1982) (quashed);
Bracken v. Bracken, 294 Pa. Super. 371, 439 A.2d 1247 (1982) (dismissal of five of six counts
with leave to amend did not put plaintiff out of court and was not appealable); but see Turn-
pike Comm'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 394 A.2d 491 (1978) (order granting
summary judgment for defendant as to less than all of plaintiff's claim was final and appeala-
ble, despite views expressed in concurring and dissenting opinions); see also Praisner 313 Pa.
Super. at 345-46, 459 A.2d at 1262 (Cavanaugh, J., concurring) concerning the complete
termination of the case below during appeal.
185. 347 Pa. Super. 75, 500 A.2d 163 (1985).
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objections to five of six counts of the plaintiff's complaint. The supe-
rior court, noting that there was one viable count (breach of con-
tract), concluded that the dismissal of four counts (one count in
damages for wrongful interference in negotiation and three counts
for intentional infliction of emotional distress) was reviewable since
the plaintiff was effectively out-of-court on these distinct causes of
action. Cloverleaf, however, relied on Praisner in refusing to review
the second count (wrongful withholding of funds alleged in the first
count and punitive damages) because it represented nothing more
than a rejection of an alternate theory of the first count. 188 In this
regard, one should note that Praisner offered examples that might
delineate the scope of the "alternAtive theory" exception to the "par-
tial dismissal rule" of appellate jurisdiction. The court stated:
Thus, the dismissal of a count alleging damages for breach of an
express contract is not appealable if an alternate count seeking
to recover the same damages based on quantum meruit remains
undecided. J. A. & W. A. Hess, Inc. v. Hale Township, supra.
Similarly, there is no final order where a count averring negli-
gence has been dismissed but there remains undetermined a
count alleging liability for a defective product under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. For similar reasons,
where one of several counts seeks to recover punitive damages in
a complaint alleging breach of contract, a dismissal of that
count does not put the plaintiff out of court on his underlying
cause of action. Only if he is successful in his cause of action for
breach of contract does the measure of damages become
relevant.
187
186. Id. at 80-82, 500 A.2d at 166-67.
187. Praisner, 313 Pa. Super. at 341, 459 A.2d at 1260; see also General Mach. Corp.
v. Feldman, - Pa. Super. -, 507 A.2d 831 (1986), which involved a complaint for
attorney malpractice stated in six counts (count I for breach of contract; count il, which incor-
porated facts of count I, for damages resulting from defendant's tortious conduct; count 111,
alleging an additional breach of contract claim; count IV, which incorporated Count 111, re-
quested damages as a result of tortious conduct; count V, alleging conversion; and count VI for
assault and robbery of documents). The lower court sustained demurrers to counts I1, IV, and
VI. Noting that counts I to IV stated alternative theories of recovery, the superior court
quashed that part of the appeal relating to counts 11 and IV. See also, Vogel v. Berkley,
Pa. Super. -, 511 A.2d 878 (1986). The complaint therein contained five counts: (1) fraud-
ulent inducement to enter into a lease agreement; (2) fraudulent inducement to enter the land;
(3) failure to pay royalties; (4) failure to reclaim the site; and (5) conspiracy to defraud and
breach of the lease. All counts except the fourth were dismissed. The superior court stated that
the appeal was proper. But see Freeze v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 504 Pa. 218, 470 A.2d 958
(1983) (order sustaining preliminary objections as to no-fault work loss claim, with leave to
amend to assert claim for funeral and survival benefits, drastically altered plaintiff's cause of
action and was appealable); Pullium v. Laurel School Dist., 316 Pa. Super. 339, 462 A.2d
1380 (1983) (in no-fault action in which plaintiff requested damages for injuries to person and
property in single complaint, order dismissing personal injury claim was not appealable;
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In summary, pretrial appellate review will exist in civil cases' 88
when the lower court dismisses less than all of plaintiffis counts of a
complaint provided (1) the dismissed counts represent separate and
distinct causes of action and (2) the dismissed counts are not alter-
native theories to or a restatement of the remaining, viable count(s).
Despite the surface simplicity of this summary, the relative youth of
the Praisner rule suggests a need for caution in two particular re-
spects. First, the application of Praisner's jurisdictional principle is
not clear when the dismissed counts were joined under the compul-
sory joinder provisions of the procedural rules. 189 Is such a distinc-
tion important for purposes of pretrial appellate review? Second,
what is the scope or meaning of Praisner's "separate and distinct
causes of action"? This second issue raises the perennial legal di-
lemma of the meaning of a "cause of action." Does it have a distinct
meaning under our newly revised procedural rules for appellate juris-
diction purposes? 190 Is it synonymous with "claims for relief'? 19'
Praisner distinguished): Capanna v. Travelers Ins. Co., Pa. Super. - , 513 A.2d 397
(1986).
188. For partial dismissal of the Commonwealth's case against a criminal defendant,
see, for example, Commonwealth v. Gemelli, 326 Pa. Super. 386, 474 A.2d 294 (1984) (Com-
monwealth's appeal from order quashing 27 counts of a criminal complaint when effect was to
terminate prosecution).
189. PA. R. Civ. P. 1020 and note thereto provides in part as follows:
(c) Causes of action and defenses may be pleaded in the alternative.
(d) (I) If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more than one cause of
action against the same person, including causes of action in the alternative, they
shall be joined in separate counts in the action against any such person.
Note: Subdivision (d) (I) requires the joinder of related causes of action.
The joinder of unrelated causes of action is permissive. See subdivision (a):
see supra note 183.
190. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1001, which uses the term "action" as follows:
(a) As used in this chapter, "action" means a civil action brought in or
appealed to any court which is subject to these rules.
(b)(1) All claims heretofore asserted in assumpsit or trespass shall be as-
serted in one form of action to be known as "civil action."
Note: The procedural distinctions between the forms of action in assumpsit
and trespass are abolished.
(2) Other forms of action which incorporate these rules by reference shall
be known as "civil action - [type of action]".
Note: For example, the action of mandamus shall be known as "civil action
mandamus".
Consider also the explanatory note preceding PA. R. Civ. P. 1001. See also Junk v. East End
Fire Dept., 262 Pa. Super. 473, 490-91, 396 A.2d 1269, 1277 (1978) (stating that a new cause
of action does arise if an amendment proposes a different theory or a different kind of negli-
gence than the one previously raised or if the operative facts supporting the claim are
changed); cf. Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 481, 243 A.2d 425, 427 (1968) (cause of
action equated with wrongful act) (citing Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa.
282, 286, 117 A.2d 59, 60 (1922); Emert v. Larami, 414 Pa. 396, 400 n.4, 200 A.2d 901, 903
n.4 (1964) (noting term's multiple meanings); Derry Township School Dist. v. Day & Zim-
merman, 345 Pa. Super. 487, 496 A.2d 928 (1985) (stating that plaintiff's cause of action is
not to be equated with plaintiff's theory of recovery; case law defines cause of action to mean
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What is the determinative factor in analyzing a "cause of action"; is
it the legal theory proposed or relief sought?' 92 Whether these ques-
tions are relevant to a determination of Praisner's scope must await
future exploration. In the recent en banc case of Capanna v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co.,' the superior court dismissed that part of an appeal
from an order that dismissed two counts of a complaint in a no fault
automobile accident case. The two counts sought work loss benefits.
When the plaintiff sought to raise the propriety of the earlier dismis-
sal of the two counts in her subsequent appeal from the order dis-
missing the final count of the complaint, which asserted a claim for
survivor's benefits, the court refused to address the merits. The ap-
pellate court reasoned that since work loss and survivors benefits
were separate and distinct, the failure to immediately appeal the
prior dismissal of the first two counts was fatal; the untimely appeal
of the first order was therefore quashed.
Finally, the remaining scenario in the context of partial dismis-
sal is when the lower court dismisses a plaintiff's cause of action or
case as to less than all of the defendants. Clearly, in such a situation,
the plaintiff is effectively "out of court" vis-a-vis that particular de-
fendant. The supreme court has stated that the dismissal of a plain-
tiff's complaint as to one defendant in a multiparty suit is immedi-
ately appealable and that the failure to timely appeal renders the
prior order res judicata.' As with the other scenarios, plaintiff is
not literally "out of court" and the litigation is not completely termi-
nated. The order, however, is constructively final because, from a
practical viewpoint, litigation is effectively terminated as to one of
damages or injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery); Staub v. Southwest Butler County
School Dist., 263 Pa. Super. 413, 421, 398 A.2d 204, 207 (1979), aff'd, 489 Pa. 196, 413 A.2d
1082 (1980) (joinder context).
191. See. e.g., T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 337, 372 A.2d 721, 724 (1977)
(citing Marino's Estate, 440 Pa. 492, 494, 269 A.2d 645, 646 (1969)).
192. Under the new civil rules, the procedural distinctions between trespass and assump-
sit are abolished. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1001. As to that aspect of Praisner, 313 Pa. Super. 332,
459 A.2d 1255 (1983), which precludes appeals in cases involving alternative trespass/assump-
sit theories of recovery, such a rule retains prior practice. See Epstein v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
308 Pa. Super. 33, 453 A.2d 1054 (1982) (trespass and assumpsit alternatives); cf. R. B.
Equip. Co. v. Williams, Shields, Snyder & Goas, 304 Pa. Super. 31, 450 A.2d 85 (1982)
(strict liability and breach of contract alternatives).
193. - Pa. Super. - , 513 A.2d 397 (1986) (citing Smiley v. Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co., 309 Pa. Super. 247, 455 A.2d 142 (1983).
194. See Love v. Temple Univ., 422 Pa. 30, 220 A.2d 838 (1966); see also United
States Nat'l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 506 Pa. 622, 487 A.2d 809 (1985); Hudock v.
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 438 Pa. 272, 264 A.2d 668 (1970); Dash v. Wilap Corp., 343 Pa.
Super. 584, 495 A.2d 950 (1985) (order affecting plaintiff's rights against additional defend-
ant was appealable); Preto v. Travelers Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 593, 488 A.2d 51 (1985);
Temtex Products, Inc. v. Kramer, 330 Pa. Super. 183, 479 A.2d 500 (1984); Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984) (non pros).
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the parties.
(b) Defendant's case: down but not out?-In contrast to the par-
tial dismissal of a plaintiff's cause of action, one needs to focus upon
those orders that effectively put a defendant "out of court"1 95 before
the technical termination of a case. Again, there are certain well-
defined categories of situations that are identifiable in order to deter-
mine whether a specific order against an aggrieved defendant is con-
structively appealable. The four major categories include orders that:
(1) restrict the defendant in pleading affirmative defenses; (2) pre-
clude the defendant from asserting an independent claim or a coun-
terclaim; (3) prevent the defendant from asserting any claims
against other defendants; and (4) preclude the defendant from either
entering any defense or challenging the plaintiff's claims. As one can
see, there are analytical parallels to the principle of constructive fi-
nality regarding the partial dismissal of a plaintiff's cause of action.
When the lower court order precludes a defendant from assert-
ing an affirmative defense, 196 the question of appealability has tradi-
tionally turned on whether the defense involves issues of fact or law.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that if an order pre-
cludes the defendant from asserting affirmative defenses involving
the presentation of proof at trial that might be a complete defense,
then such an order is constructively final and immediately appeala-
ble. 197 When, however, the proposed affirmative defense or new mat-
ter constitutes only a denial or does not involve the presentation of
facts, an order restricting the defendant will not be deemed construc-
195. Recognizably, the "out of court" expression is, at first glance, paradoxical when
applied to the defendant.
196. PA. R. Civ. P. 1030, which concerns affirmative defenses, provides as follows:
All affirmative defenses including but not limited to the defenses of accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of the risk, consent, contrib-
utory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of considera-
tion, fair comment, fraud, illegality, immunity from suit, impossibility of per-
formance, justification, laches, license, payment, privilege, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth and waiver shall be pleaded in a
responsive pleading under the heading "New Matter". A party may set forth as
new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the aver-
ments of the preceding pleading.
197. See Commonwealth v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 473 Pa. 432, 375 A.2d
320 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) (affirmative defense involving the validity of an
administrative order- factual predicate for the appellate jurisdiction issue is not clear): Grota v.
La Boccetta, 425 Pa. 620, 230 A.2d 206 (1967) (affirmative defense of release): Posternack v.
American Casualty Co. of Reading, 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966) (affirmative defense of
res judicata and collateral estoppel); Urban v. Urban, 332 Pa. Super. 373, 481 A.2d 662
(1984) (order effectively precluded defendant-wife from denying validity of agreement and
asserting affirmative defense): Pellegrine v. Home Ins. Co., 200 Pa. Super. 48, 186 A.2d 662
(1962) (statute of limitations).
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tively final or immediately appealable.198
Second, when the lower court has prevented the defendant from
asserting a counterclaim, 199 the lower court has, in effect, placed the
defendant "out of court" on an independent claim. This situation is
thus analogous to the one in which a plaintiff is out of court in as-
serting a separate and distinct cause of action or claim for relief. In
Commonwealth v. Orsatti,0 0 the supreme court stated that an order,
which sustained plaintiff's preliminary objections to defendant's
counterclaim, in effect, put the defendant out of court. Such an order
was immediately appealable. 01
Whereas the second example involved a defendant's claim
against the plaintiff, the third example concerns a defendant's claim
against other defendants. The relationship thus is analogous to a
plaintiff versus a defendant. Cases have stated and applied the gen-
eral rule that an order is immediately appealable if it lets a defend-
ant or additional defendant out of the case entirely as to that defend-
ant. In Brandywine Joint Area School Authority v. Van Corp., Inc.,
the supreme court permitted an appeal from an order sustaining pre-
liminary objections, resulting in the dismissal of a third party com-
198. See Ventura v. Skylark Motel, Inc., 431 Pa. 459, 246 A.2d 353 (1968) (order
sustaining objections to defendant's new matter, concerning worker's compensation, involved a
pure legal question and was not appealable); Adcox v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Casualty Ins.
Co., 419 Pa. 170, 213 A.2d 366 (1965) (immunity from suit based on worker's compensation
defense); Weiss v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa. Commw. 260, 442 A.2d 378 (1982) (striking
new matter which was purely legal). For a discussion of the concept of new matter and cita-
tions to relevant cases, see Scchler v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 322 Pa. Super. 162, 469 A.2d 233
(1983) (alirmative defenses, concerning the existence of warnings and disclaimer of warran-
ties, were only denials of plaintiffs averments). In Leflar v. Gulf Creek Industrial Park,
Pa. - , - A.2d - (1986) the supreme court concluded that an allegation, based on
the Workmen's Compensation Act, is not an affirmative defense which may be waived if not
timely pleaded. Such a claim, the court stated, involves a jurisdictional bar. Prior appellate
cases to the contrary were overruled.
199. PA. R. Civ. P. 1031, concerning counterclaims, states as follows:
(a) The defendant may set forth in the answer under the heading "counter-
claim" any cause of action heretofore asserted in assumpsit or trespass which he
has against the plaintiff at the time of filing the answer.
(b) A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the relief demanded by the
plaintiff. It may demand relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from
that demanded by the plaintiff.
200. 448 Pa. 72, 292 A.2d 313 (1972).
201. See also Broido v. Kinneman, 375 Pa. 568, 101 A.2d 647 (1954); Rittenhouse Re-
gency Affiliates v. Passen, 333 Pa. Super. 613, 482 A.2d 1042 (1984); see also Gordon v.
Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981) (order, in divorce action, which prevented
defendant-wife from proceeding under new divorce law, put her out of court as to her pur-
ported claims and was immediately appealable); cf. Marks v. Marks, 300 Pa. Super. 288, 446
A.2d 618 (1982) (order denying wife-plaintiff's petition to proceed under new divorce law not
appealable since plaintiff is not out of court and can still present her case).
Note, however, that at the time of publication, the superior court had decided to recon-
sider en bane the proper analytical framework of appeals from orders dismissing a counter-
claim in Fidelity Bank v. Duder (unreported opinion).
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plaint. The supreme court stated:
We conclude that while an order overruling preliminary objec-
tions to an additional party complaint is interlocutory, an order
granting such objections and dismissing the complaint is final
and appealable. Although the plaintiff in the additional party
complaint may have a further cause of action against the de-
fendant in the additional party complaint subsequent to the res-
olution of the basic litigation, he is precluded in the basic litiga-
tion from determining his rights vis-a-vis the additional
defendant in the litigation.2 02
In addition, an order that precludes a defendant from joining an ad-
ditional defendant is also an interlocutory order reviewable before
the entry of final judgment.0 3
The last category is a problematic one. Often, as a result of a
defendant's dilatoriness or noncompliance in pretrial discovery mat-
ters, 20" the lower court will impose a sanction upon the defendant.
The available sanctions may vary from (1) precluding proof at trial
on a particular issue; (2) precluding the defendant from entering a
defense; (3) imposing a judgment on liability only; 05 (4) precluding
the defendant from introducing any evidence and/or cross-examining
witnesses; and (5) imposing a judgment on liability and damages. 20 6
Metaphorically speaking, one could say that these sanctions bound
and gag a defendant. The traditional analytical framework in such
situations considers whether the order resulted in a constructive ter-
mination of the case against the defendant. Some cases have held
that an order that prevents a defendant from entering a defense or
from cross-examining witnesses is sufficiently final to permit an im-
mediate appeal.
207
202. 426 Pa. 448, 451, 233 A.2d 240, 241 (1967). Joinder of additional defendants is
governed by PA. R. Civ. P. 2251 - 2275. See also Dudash v. Palmyra Borough Auth., 335 Pa.
Super. I, 483 A.2d 924 (1984); English v. Lehigh County Auth., 286 Pa. Super. 312, 428
A.2d 1343 (1981); Carrollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 252 Pa. Super. 422, 381 A.2d 990
(1977); but see Harasym v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., 321 Pa. Super. 492, 468 A.2d 817
(1983) (expressly conditional sanction order finding additional defendant liable to the defend-
ant on defendant's cross-claim not final or immediately appealable since there was no determi-
nation yet as to defendant's liability to the plaintiff); cf. Guarino v. DiBiase, 310 Pa. Super.
211, 456 A.2d 575 (1983) (summary judgment in favor of additional defendant and against
plaintiffs only is not properly appealable by the defendant when defendant's cross-claim
against additional defendant is still in the case and court did not enter judgment against de-
fendant on his cross-claim).
203. See Riccobono v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., - Pa. Super. -- , 507 A.2d 834
(1986); PA. R. Civ. P. 2253 (joinder).
204. See PA. R. Civ. P. 4019 (sanctions in discovery matters).
205. See supra notes 126, 129, 138.
206. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 129.
207. See Roman v. Pearlstein, 329 Pa. Super. 392, 478 A.2d 845 (1984); Marshall v.
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Caution is imperative as to the fourth category, however, be-
cause there is recent case law that has limited appellate jurisdiction
in such matters. For example, in Elderkin v. Sedney, 0 8 a superior
court panel analyzed a defense sanction order from the perspective
of the "collateral order doctrine."2 09 Elderkin quashed an appeal
from a pretrial order that precluded the defendants from opposing
the plaintiff's claims or from entering their own defense. The court
noted, however, that the order would not prohibit the defendants
from cross-examining and impeaching the plaintiff's witnesses and
objecting to the admission of evidence; thus, a judgment for the de-
fendant was still possible. This comment, although offered in the
context of the collateral order doctrine, might also suggest that the
order did not constructively deny the defendant an opportunity for
relief. Whether Elderkin requires a new analysis for all such defense
sanction orders is uncertain. The application of the "collateral order
doctrine" to orders that preclude a defense signifies perhaps an im-
portant new analytical development in appellate jurisprudence. In
addition, the superior court has declined to follow the commonwealth
court210 and has concluded that a denial of a petition to open a de-
fault judgment, entered on liability as a sanction, was not appealable
until after damages were determined.
2 1
1
(c) Counterpoint: the federal approach-As a prominent trea-
tise on federal practice and procedure has noted, "[t]he line between
deciding one of several claims and deciding only part of a single
claim is sometimes very obscure."2"2 The cases and principles previ-
ously discussed should suggest the dangers of obscurity and igno-
rance of Pennsylvania law. The definitional dilemma of "cause of
action" and the attempt to place traditional problems in new analyti-
cal frameworks are not peculiar to Pennsylvania. It may be helpful,
therefore, to pause, take a step back, and look in the direction of the
federal forum to see how others have grappled with the capacious
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 76 Pa. Commw. 205, 463 A.2d 1215 (1983).
208. - Pa. Super. -, 511 A.2d 858 (1986).
209. For a discussion of the collateral order doctrine as a'distinct and limited basis for
appellate jurisdiction, see infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 207; see also Scharfman v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 234 Pa.
Super. 563, 340 A.2d 539 (1975) (under prior PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § I100 (Purdon 1969)
(repealed), an order denying petition to open default judgment on liability is constructively
final and, immediately appealable).
211. See Miller Oral Surgery, Inc. v. Dinello, 342 Pa. Super. 577, 493 A.2d 741 (1985).
212. See 10 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & M. KANE. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 2657 (2d ed. Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE 2D1 (citing Tolson v.
United States, 732 F.2d 998, 1001 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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and confusing concept of jurisdiction in multiple claims situations.
The federal courts, unlike the Pennsylvania courts, are re-
strained by a particular procedural rule governing decisions or judg-
ments in cases involving multiple claims and parties. Rule 54(b)2 13
specifically provides:
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may di-
rect the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such de-
termination and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Since the federal appellate courts are also statutorily constrained by
the principle of finality,214 piecemeal appellate review is the very lim-
ited exception rather than the rule. Rule 54(b), however, permits ap-
pellate review of interlocutory decisions, involving fewer than all
claims, only upon an express determination by the lower court of "no
just reason for delay" and an express, contemporaneous direction for
entry of judgment.2" Thus, in the federal courts, litigants generally
do not have carte blanche to appeal decisions disposing of only part
of a case. Arguably, underlying policy or values are weighted more
heavily for the federal courts rather than the aggrieved litigants.
Therefore, in the absence of such an express determination
under Rule 54(b), the federal courts have concluded, for example,
that there is no automatic right to appeal the following interlocutory
orders: (1) dismissal of a plaintiffs claim(s) or parties as to less than
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 54.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1984).
215. In I.L.T.A., Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 739 F.2d 82, 84 (2nd Cir. 1984), the
court stated that there are two prerequisites that must be satisfied by the lower court; (I)
finality and (2) no just reason for delay. As to the former, the court stated that a judgment is
final if it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim among multiple claims. As to the
latter, the court identified judicial administration, economy, and separability of claims as im-
portant factors.
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all of the defendants;21 (2) dismissal of a defendant's counter-
claim;217 and (3) denial of an affirmative defense.2 18 Some commen-
tators, furthermore, have suggested that, although Rule 54(b) has a
problematic relationship with the final order doctrine, Rule 54(b)
should be the distinct jurisdictional test that applies to orders which
dispose of fewer than all the claims of a case.21 In addition, as to
the inherently troublesome nature of a "cause of action," some fed-
eral courts have stated that Rule 54's "claim" contemplates one le-
gal right growing out of a single transaction or series of related
transactions and that a complaint, which seeks to vindicate a single
right through multiple remedies, states but a single claim for re-
lief.220 Judge Posner has noted that there is a presumption against
characterizing a pleading as containing multiple claims for relief and
that claims cannot be separate if they constitute a single cause of
action for res judicata purposes.221
2. Intervention.-When the lower court has denied a non-
party's motion to permit intervention2 22 into a pending case, the ef-
fect of that order is certainly not to dispose of or terminate litigation
as to those parties presently before the court. As to the aggrieved
person seeking intervention, it is theoretically difficult to conclude
216. See. e.g., Matthews v. Ashland Chemical Co., 703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983); Alley
v. Dodge Hotel, 551 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977), reh'g
denied, 433 U.S. 916 (1977); Hodgson v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 370 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1967)
(dismissing one of two defendants).
217. See United States v. Walter Nugent Enterprises, 506 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 982 (1975).
218. See Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982);
Hennepin County v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 587 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1978); but see Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (denial of absolute immunity defense is immediately ap-
pealable); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985) (Nixon was extended to the
defense of qualified governmental immunity).
In Hennepin County the court noted that the striking of two of the defendant's affirmative
defenses (real party in interest and privity of contract) was more in the nature of an "interloc-
utory summary adjudication," not a partial summary judgment, and was "interlocutory as any
pleading ruling can be," for it simply removed two roadblocks to the plaintiff's recovery. 587
F.2d at 946.
219. See 1O FEDERAL PRACTICE 2D supra note 212 at 91.
220. See Oyster v. Johns-Manville Co., 568 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Hooks
v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
221. See Minority Police Officers Ass'n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d
197 (7th Cir. 1983), noting, however, that claims can be "separate" even if they have a factual
overlap. Judge Posner's economic analysis stated that a rule precluding review if the claims
arise out of the same factual setting would be personally preferable, although it would not be
in accord with prevailing precedent. Id. at 200-01. See also Smith v. Benedict, 279 F.2d 211
(7th Cir. 1960) (Rule 54's "claim" refers to cause of action); cf. supra note 190 regarding
"cause of action."
222. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2326-50. Also, consider the status of intervenor as appellant in
Note, Non-Parties' Right of Appeal in Civil Action, supra note 32.
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that such an order places him "out of court" since he really was not
in court in the first place. Nevertheless, denial of intervention may
be constructively final for jurisdictional purposes because such orders
may, in fact, result in effectively denying the relief that the proposed
intervenor seeks. The appellate courts have stated, as a general rule,
that the denial of intervention is interlocutory and not immediately
appealable.2 23 Review of such orders must be on an ad hoc basis and,
if the order effectively denies the proposed intervenor a remedy that
can be obtained in no other way, such an order will be considered
constructively final and immediately appealable. 2 In such circum-
stances, the appellate court will examine the potential merits of the
proposed claim as it tries to maneuver the jurisdictional hurdle.
On the other hand, when the lower court grants a request for
intervention, there usually is no satisfaction of technical or construc-
tive finality. The litigation is not terminated and no one is effectively
put out of court. The general rule, therefore, is that orders granting
intervention are not immediately appealable for they are not final.22'
3. Denial of I.F.P. relief.-When litigants are unable to ex-
pend the necessary funds in the course of litigation, they may ask for
financial relief in the form of a petition to proceed in forma
pauperis, that is, as indigents. When the lower court refuses such a
request, a litigant may be unable to proceed with litigation. For ex-
ample, the litigant may not have the funds to have the trial court's
notes of testimony transcribed. In such circumstances, cases have
stated that an order denying such financial requests may effectively
put the litigant "out of court. ' 2   Hence, such interlocutory orders
223. See Frey's Estate, 237 Pa. 269, 271, 85 A. 147, 148 (1912); see also Shapiro,
Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV.
721, 748-51 (1968).
224. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg Say. Ass'n, 300 Pa. Super. 27, 446
A.2d 614 (1982) (appeal quashed); Richard Held Builders v. A.G. Allebach, Inc., 266 Pa.
Super. 101, 403 A.2d 113 (1979) (appeal quashed); but see Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 339 Pa. Super. 576, 582 n.8, 489 A.2d 791, 794 n. 8 (1985) (denial of petition to inter-
vene in class action, in which petitioner's alleged status as representative of certain class fore-
closed only means by which he could assert his claims, was appealable).
225. See Sailor Planing Mill & Lumber Co. v. Moyer, 35 Pa. Super. 503 (1908); In re
Manley, 305 Pa. Super. 332, 451 A.2d 557 (1982); but cf. Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 300
Pa. Super. 528, 446 A.2d 1284 (1982) (plaintiffs could appeal order granting intervention
when effect of order was to reduce amount of interest plaintiffs would be able to collect). The
discussion in Cohen was brief and focused on standing, not jurisdiction.
226. See Thompson v. Garden Court, Inc., 277 Pa. Super. 460, 419 A.2d 1238 (1980)
(order denying petition to file complaint in forma pauperis had practical consequences of put-
ting litigant out of court); Selby v. Brown, 292 Pa. Super. 463, 437 A.2d 787 (1981) (denial of
relief at post-verdict stage); Griffin v. Tedesco, 336 Pa. Super. 586, 486 A.2d 419 (1984)
(summary denial of petition to proceed in forma pauperis on motion to remove a nonsuit).
PA APPELLATE PRACTICE
may be final when they have such a practical, final effect. One
should recognize, however, that the jurisdictional basis for the appeal
might also be expressed in terms of the collateral order doctrine.2 '
The grant of such relief is an unappealable interlocutory order.22
4. Disguised Final Orders: Stays, Conditional Orders,
etc.-Since finality is a matter of judicial interpretation requiring an
appellate court to ascertain the substance and effect of an order, or-
ders that appear temporary or nonfinal on the surface may neverthe-
less be constructively final and immediately appealable. For exam-
ple, the vacating and staying of a prior, temporary custody order,
until another state decided the custody issue, effectively amounted to
a denial of relief and precluded the parties from litigating in Penn-
sylvania. The superior court treated such an order as pragmatically
final. 22 9 Similarly, in another case, the supreme court held that an
order staying proceedings, in order to await termination of proceed-
ings in another court, was tantamount to a dismissal and denial of
relief. In practical terms, the order was final for the aggrieved
litigant. 80
In Parker v. McDonald, 31 the superior court concluded that an
order, awarding shared custody to the parties which was "subject to
further review," was final and immediately appealable since the
lower court did not specifically establish a timetable or schedule for
further review. In this regard, the appellate court noted that custody
orders are inherently temporary. Furthermore, in another case, the
lower court's order refusing to act on a defendant's motion to amend
its answer to assert an affirmative defense was treated sub silentio as
a constructively final order denying the requested relief.
232
5. Orders Granting Suppression of Evidence.-In a criminal
case, a statement or a tangible shred of evidence may provide the
critical link between the defendant and a crime. When the lower
227. See. e.g., Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1979) (interlocutory appeal
from order denying motion to appeal arbitration award to common pleas court without first
having to pay the costs of arbitration as required by local rule; quashing of appeal affirmed).
228. See Cameron v. Escofil, 321 Pa. Super. 347, 468 A.2d 513 (1983) (appeal from
order granting in forma pauperis relief quashed).
229. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 326 Pa. Super. 570, 574 n.2, 474 A.2d 1124, 1126-27
n.2 (1984).
230. See Philco Corp. v. Sunstein, 429 Pa. 606, 241 A.2d 108 (1968). As to an order
involving conditional liability, see Harasym v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp., 321 Pa. Super.
492, 468 A.2d 817 (1983) (appeal from expressly conditional sanction order finding additional
defendant liable to defendant quashed); see supra notes 202-203.
231. 344 Pa. Super. 552. 496 A.2d 1244 (1985).
232. See Pellegrine v. Home Ins. Co., 200 Pa. Super. 48, 186 A.2d 662 (1962).
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court has suppressed23 3 vital evidence at the pretrial stage, the Com-
monwealth may feel that, for all practical purposes, it has already
lost its case. In recognition of such extraordinary situations, the ap-
pellate courts have recognized the Commonwealth's right to appeal
an order of suppression if such an order, in effect, terminates the
Commonwealth's prosecution or substantially handicaps its case
against the defendant. 4 The supreme court has stated that the
Commonwealth has an absolute right to appeal such a pretrial order
of suppression when the Commonwealth certifies in good faith that
the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.
23 5
The defendant, however, does not have a reciprocal right to appeal a
pretrial order denying his motion to suppress.
2 36
6. Double Jeopardy.-Another extraordinary example of the
exception to the strict finality rule in criminal cases is when the
lower court denies a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss based on
a violation of his constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeop-
ardy.2 37 The denial of such a meritorious motion effectively consti-
tutes an irreparable denial of relief and is immediately appealable.
However, since the constitutional right is collateral to the prosecu-
tion of the case, the jurisdictional analysis more properly belongs to
the later discussion of the collateral order doctrine.
7. Denial of Class Action Certification-When the lower
court denies a motion for class action certification or dismisses the
class action aspects of a suit, the class members are effectively put
out of court.23 9 The supreme court has stated that such orders termi-
233. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 323 (suppression of evidence).
234. See Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 910 (1963).
235. See Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985); Commonwealth
v. Miller, 334 Pa. Super. 374, 483 A.2d 498 (1984) (appeal in which the Commonwealth also
had other evidence, that being the victim's identification, against the defendant). Dugger noted
that such suppression orders are final by general rule pursuant to the supreme court's statutory
authority. 506 Pa. at 544 n.5, 486 A.2d at 385 n. 5 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701,
1722, 5105(a)). See also PA. R. App. P. 341(c) (final criminal orders; Commonwealth's right
of appeal); supra note 84.
Must the order suppress all of the Commonwealth's evidence for appealability purposes?
Dugger emphasized the importance of a piece or shred of evidence in a case but preliminarily
observed that "[w]e granted the Commonwealth an appeal, and defined it a substantial handi-
cap whenever the Commonwealth is denied the use of all their evidence." Dugger, 506 Pa. at
545, 486 A.2d at 386 (emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth v. Bruening, - Pa.
Super. -, 512 A.2d 704 (1986) (emphasizing "all").
236. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968).
237. See supra notes 67-70.
238. See infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
239. One could argue that, as in intervention situations, the "out of court" analysis may
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nate the ousted members' participation in the case and are, there-
fore, immediately appealable. 40 Whether the proper jurisdictional
framework, however, is the collateral order doctrine or constructive
finality is not clear. In any event, one should note that the federal
courts have held that an order denying class action certification is
not immediately appealable either as a final order or under the col-
lateral order doctrine.41
D. Collateral Finality - The Collateral Order Doctrine
From the technical, wholesale termination of a case to the prac-
tical, and sometimes piecemeal, disposition of a cause of action or
claim, we must proceed to the limits of the concept of finality - the
collateral order doctrine. When the strictures of a rule of law, such
as the final order doctrine, are unable to accommodate circum-
stances of hardship or necessity, judicial construction or legislative
rule-making may offer a solution compatible with the spirit or pur-
pose of the constraining rule of law. The collateral order doctrine is
a judicial, interpretative compromise that affords an aggrieved liti-
gant a narrow avenue of pretrial appellate review in circumstances of
arguable hardship or necessity.
Preliminarily, it is important to recognize the fundamental na-
ture of the collateral order doctrine. The doctrine has two distinct
characteristics. First, as one commentator has noted, the collateral
order doctrine is premised on equitable considerations. 2  It repre-
sents, in a sense, the final order doctrine's equitable safety valve.
(Admittedly, one could plausibly argue that the constructive ap-
proach to the final order doctrine, with its emphasis on practicality
and the plight of the aggrieved litigant, likewise exhibits equitable
concerns within the formalistic structure of that doctrine.) Second,
as to the formalistic structure of the final order doctrine, it is clear
that although decisions concerning the application of the final order
doctrine sometimes speak of the reviewed orders as interlocutory, the
be theoretically troublesome. See supra note 32.
240. See Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975); Janicik v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 305 Pa. Super. 120, 126 n.I, 451 A.2d 451, 454 n.1 (1982).
Justice Roberts in Bell considered and rejected the contrary theories and practice of other
jurisdictions.
241. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), specifically refusing to
judicially extend the federal concept of finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and holding that the
collateral order doctrine is not applicable. See also Demasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114 (3d Cir.
1982); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 551 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1977); but see Pettivay v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259 (11 th Cir. 1982); Bowe v. First of Denver Mort-
gage Investors, 562 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1977).
242. See 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE 2D, supra note 212, at 89.
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raison d'etre of the collateral order doctrine is, in fact, the concept of
finality, albeit finality of a special sort.243 There must be, for pur-
poses of theoretical congruency, a final determination of the collat-
eral matter.
From theory, we now proceed to the genesis and substance of
the collateral order doctrine. In 1949, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reviewed Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., a minority shareholder's derivative action suit against a
corporation for alleged mismanagement and fraud.24 Since the
plaintiff's shares represented only 0.0125 percent of the outstanding
stock owned by 16,000 stockholders, an applicable New Jersey stat-
ute required such minority shareholder - litigants to post adequate
security for future indemnification purposes in the event that the cor-
poration were to prevail. The corporate defendant in Cohen de-
manded that the minority shareholder, whose stock had a market
value of only $9,000, post a bond in the amount of $125,000. The
district court concluded that the statute was not applicable. On ap-
peal by the corporation in order to secure the estimated interim costs
of litigation, the court of appeals reversed. Having granted the writ
of certiorari, the Supreme Court had to first maneuver the jurisdic-
tional hurdle regarding the appealability of the district court's order
refusing the corporation's request for interim security. For example,
there was no final decision whatsoever; the lower court's decision did
not even concern the merits of the derivative suit; and the parties
were not "out of court." Distinguishing the limits of appellate review
of decisions that are "but steps toward final judgment," the Supreme
Court succinctly concluded that appellate jurisdiction over the collat-
eral pretrial matter existed within the practical confines of the final-
ity principle. The Court stated:
We conclude that the matters embraced in the decision appealed
from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be
affected by, decision of the merits of this case.
This decision appears to fall in that small class which fi-
nally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
243. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
3911 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE]. In federal practice, the collateral order
doctrine is related to 28 U.S.C. § 1291's requirement of finality.
244. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The civil action in federal court was based on diversity of
citizenship.
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The Court has long given this provision of the statute this prac-
tical rather than a technical construction.
2 4 5
The Supreme Court's acknowledgment of this jurisdictional
principle is often cited interchangeably with the jurisdictional con-
cept previously identified as constructive or practical finality.246
From a jurisprudential point of view, however, it is important to note
that the collateral order doctrine is now a very specialized concept.
As Cohen indicates, the doctrine applies only to a small class of
claims that are collateral to rights asserted in the action and that are
too important to be denied immediate, effective appellate review. In
the course of the doctrine's growth, formulation has been refined to
specifically include the requirement that if appellate review is post-
poned, the claimed right will probably be "irreparably lost."'2 47 Two
245. Id. at 546 (citations omitted). Justice Jackson's opinion did not label the excerpted
portion of the opinion as a doctrine or jurisdictional test; subsequent cases have. Likewise, the
opinion does not elaborate specifically how the now traditional formula was satisfied. Argua-
bly, one could say that the significance of the Cohen formula was its emphasis on a practical
approach to the dilemma of jurisdiction. Such an emphasis would therefore make Cohen but a
restatement of the principle identified herein as "constructive finality." The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in fact, in Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975),
focused on the practicality aspects of Cohen, not the doctrine's specific criteria. Cases subse-
quent to Bell have suggested, however, that the adoption of Bell imported the attending for-
mulaic criteria of Cohen. See Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1979); see also Fried
v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, -- , 501 A.2d 211, 214 (1985), which specifically identified the tripartite
version of the doctrine in Cohen and affirmed the adoption of Cohen.
Nevertheless, one must come back to the basic observation that Cohen did not explain
how the collateral order rule applied to the facts. If viewed from the constructive finality prac-
ticality approach, Cohen's rationale would be based arguably on the fact that a denial of im-
mediate pretrial review of the district court's order refusing to require interim costs and secur-
ity would not necessarily place an onerous burden on the corporation.. In effect, however, it
would likely foreclose the opportunity for the corporation to obtain reimbursement for costs
that it would incur to the individual defendants and shareholders in successfully defending the
suit. From the perspective of the collateral order doctrine, however, the order was clearly col-
lateral and, to the court at least, involved an important "right" of the litigant.
The federal court of appeals below had utilized a practical and liberal approach to the
jurisdictional problem, noting that there was precedent for reviewing interlocutory appeals in-
volving counsel fees and expenses. See Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d
Cir. 1948) (citing Sprague v. Ticonic, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527, 531 (1881)). See also infra note 249 concerning the historical context of the collateral
order doctrine.
246. As to the interpretation and categorization of Bell, see supra note 245. One treatise
has noted that the collateral order doctrine is invoked and its criteria glossed over because an
appellate court may conclude sub silentio that the threat of significant injury is enough to tip
the scales in favor of immediate review. See 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 243 at 480.
Thus, the common denominators in the constructive finality and collateral order doctrines may
be the importance of the right involved and simply the value judgment or policy in favor of
immediate appellate review. The points of departure, however, between the two concepts are
necessarily the collateral nature of the right involved in the order and the potential for irrepa-
rable loss of the claimed right, factors that are not necessarily implicated in the final order
doctrine.
247. See, e.g., Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545. The irreparable loss
criterion is the third factor mentioned in Pugar. Although the quoted portion of Cohen does
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necessary corollaries arise: (1) the lower court's determination on the
collateral matter must be final and (2) deferred appellate review of
the lower court's determination would be either ineffective or
impossible.24 8
Both federal and Pennsylvania cases have adopted the collateral
order doctrine, although pronouncements by both jurisdictions as to
the specific requirements of the rule are not uniform. One may plau-
sibly argue that under the original formulation of the rule in Cohen,
finality and potential unreviewability are necessarily implicated in
the collateral order doctrine. Pennsylvania's formulation of the col-
lateral order doctrine was stated in Pugar v. Greco in the following
manner:
In Cohen, the Supreme Court of the United States carved
out an exception to the final judgment rule for situations where
postponement of appeal until after final judgment might result
in irreparable loss of the right asserted. Under Cohen, an order
is considered final and appealable if (1) it is separable from and
collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is
too important to be denied review; and (3) the question
presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment
in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost."49
The recapitulation of the Cohen doctrine highlights those ingre-
dients that are considered to be essential by the Pennsylvania courts.
not mention irreparable loss, the Court's preceding discussion had mentioned the danger of
probable irreparable loss. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. Irreparable loss certainly may be also im-
plied when the Court spoke of the need for effective appellate review.
248. Cases vary in the selection and stress of the collateral order doctrine's require-
ments. The two corollaries mentioned may be found, for example, in Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co.
(America), Inc. 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1984); Ohio-Scaly Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 714
F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Richardson, 702 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds 468 U.S. 317 (1984). See particularly the Supreme Court's formulation in
Flanagan v. U.S., 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) (emphasizing the factors of a conclusive determi-
nation of a disputed question, collaterally, and effective unreviewability).
249. Pugar, 483 Pa. 241 at 73, 394 A.2d at 545; see also Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501
A.2d 211 (1985).
It is interesting to place Cohen in an historical perspective. Most practitioners and schol-
ars today would agree that Cohen is a significant case. But how significant and for what pur-
pose? If one examines, for example, some of the major law reviews that followed the birth of
Cohen, one will note that the appellate jurisdictional issue received no prominence or extended
discussion. The featured issue in such reviews was the application of the state statute in a
federal suit involving corporations. See Note, Federal Applicability of State Statutes Requir-
ing Security of Shareholder-Plaintiffs, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1948); Note, Federal Proce-
dure: The "Outcome" Test Applied in Actions Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 35 CORNELL
L. Q. 420 (1950); 62 HARv. L. REV. 309-11 (1948); 35 VA. L. REV. 789 (1949). Consistent
with this historical fact is one commentator's observation that Cohen had little impact prior to
1970. In fact, of the 463 cases citing Cohen and the 183 cases mentioning the collateral order
doctrine from 1945 to 1981, only 145 and 19 respectively came before 1970. See Note, Tight-
ening the Collateral Order Doctrine, 50 UMKC L. REV. 99, 106 nn.65-66 (1981).
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The difficulty with the collateral order doctrine, however, goes be-
yond the comparative identification of its specific requirements under
either Cohen itself or its state and federal progeny. Even if there is
some consensus as to Cohen's explicit or implicit components, there
is the problem of definition or semantics. One commentary has noted
that the inherent problem of definition is due, in part, to the ambigu-
ous nature of "collateral" and its uneasy jurisdictional relationship
to the piecemeal determination of a case under Rule 54(b), that is,
when the lower court enters judgment on fewer than all the
claims. 260 The commentary discusses the "separateness" quality of
the collateral criterion and suggests that
[t]he Cohen opinion suggests two different aspects of separabil-
ity: the question should be capable of decision without reference
to the merits of the main claims that are the subject of litiga-
tion, and it should be something that will not 'merge' in a judg-
ment on the merits so as to be subject to effective review on
appeal from a conventionally final judgment.
215
The "separateness" quality of the collateral component implicates
the problematic jurisdictional relationship to pretrial elimination of
causes of action or claims for relief under the theory of "constructive
finality", 52 which is specifically controlled in the federal courts by
Rule 54(b). The same treatise quoted earlier suggests that these con-
cepts - collateral order doctrine and appealable claims under Rule
54(b) - are conceptually and functionally distinct. As the commen-
tator notes: "Without question the better view is that Rule 54(b)
applies only when there are multiple claims and the collateral order
doctrine applies only to the determination of a matter that really is
not an ingredient of any identifiable claim. 2 " Thus, in the federal
view, decisions that are but steps toward final judgment (as Cohen
noted) would not be within the definitional ambit of the collateral
order doctrine. Such decisions, for example, might include a dismis-
sal of a claim as to less than all the defendants,2 5' denial of an af-
250. See 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE 2D, supra note 212, at 91; 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 243 at 470-71.
251. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 243, at 480 (emphasis added). This observation
would be in conformity with Cohen's reluctance to review decisions that are "but steps toward
final judgment." Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
252. See supra note 219, and text accompanying note 219.
253. See 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE 2D, supra note 212, at 91. Judge Wieand in Praisner v.
Stocker, 313 Pa. Super. 332, 459 A.2d 1255 (1983), in fact, noted that the collateral order
doctrine does not apply to noncollateral matters. See also Swanson v. American Consumer
Indus. Inc., 517 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1975).
254. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983).
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firmative defense, 5  or denial of claims concerning third parties. 56
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that, in federal courts, the
denial of the legal defense of absolute or qualified immunity is im-
mediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.5 7
The observations and practice concerning the collateral order
doctrine are offered as a backdr6p to the comparatively few Pennsyl-
vania cases on the subject. Perhaps the clearest example of the appli-
cation and satisfaction of the collateral order doctrine is in the area
of double jeopardy. A pretrial motion to dismiss, based on double
jeopardy, is purely collateral to the merits of a criminal case. Fur-
thermore, postponing appellate relief may effectively result in the ir-
reparable loss of that right.2"8 Thus, federal and Pennsylvania cases,
which apply the collateral order doctrine to civil and criminal
cases,259 hold that denial of such pretrial claims are immediately ap-
pealable as a general rule.260
Other examples can only suggest the contours of the doctrine.
Pretrial orders disqualifying counsel are not immediately appealable
by the party in Pennsylvania"' or in the federal courts262 under the
255. See Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982);
Hennepin County v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 587 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1978); but see
Elderkin v. Sedney, - Pa. Super. - 511 A.2d 858 (1986) and supra text accompanying
note 208.
256. See Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1116-17 (3rd Cir. 1986) (appeal from inter-
locutory discovery order did not satisfy collateral order doctrine since claims touched on merits
of underlying action; court of appeals, however, could review claims pursuant to its mandamus
jurisdiction).
257. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982). The Court noted that the defenses were purely legal in nature, did not involve the
merits of the action, and were subject to irreparable loss if not reviewed before trial.
258. The supreme court in Pennsylvania, however, has recently qualified the right of
immediate appeal in double jeopardy matters. If a hearing court has made written findings
that the appeal involves a frivolous double jeopardy claim, there is no automatic right of im-
mediate appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Brady, - Pa. -, 508 A.2d 286 (1986);
see also supra note 243; Learn and Commonwealth v. Learn, - Pa. Super. -,
A.2d - (1986) (where superior court remanded case to trial court for specific finding as to
frivolousness).
259. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 n.4 (1977). The rationale, of
course, is that the underlying concept of finality has similar impact in civil and criminal
actions.
260. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); United States v. Barket, 530 F.2d
181 (8th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Brady, - Pa. -, 508 A.2d 286 (1986); Com-
monwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977) (plurality opinion, later adopted in
Commonwealth v. Haefner, 473 Pa. 154, 373 A.2d 1084 (1971)).
Also, in federal courts in criminal cases, orders denying pretrial bail or infringing upon
the speech and debate clause have been found appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
See, e.g., Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I (1951). As to
jurisdiction over a government's appeal in matters concerning grand jury secrecy, see United
States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (11 th Cir. 1983).
261. See Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 277 Pa. Super.
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collateral order doctrine because they fail to satisfy one or more of
the doctrine's criteria. Orders denying class action certification are
appealable immediately in the Pennsylvania courts26  but they are
not immediately appealable in federal courts under the collateral or-
der doctrine.2 64 The denial of appointment of counsel for plaintiff in
an employment discrimination case was deemed appealable by a fed-
eral court; 2 6 such an order is somewhat similar to prefinal orders
denying in forma pauperis relief, which are appealable in Pennsylva-
nia, although the specific jurisdictional basis is unclear. a6
In such circumstances, the collateral requirement is clear but
the requirement of potential irreparable loss or unreviewability is
difficult to ascertain if one views it, for example, from the paradigm
illustration of double jeopardy claims. One can also point to various,
nebulous situations in which the jurisdictional basis for permitting
pretrial appeals may concern either constructive finality or the col-
lateral order doctrine, depending upon how one construes and em-
phasizes the collateral and irreparable loss (final? unreviewable?)
factors.2 67 It is clear, however, that notwithstanding the definitional
problems of the collateral order doctrine and its kinship with the
principle of constructive or practical finality, the supreme court has
clearly articulated that the collateral order doctrine in Pennsylvania
does not provide immediate appellate jurisdiction for interim orders
215, 419 A.2d 738 (1980) (noting at that time the contrary practice in some of the federal
circuit courts); see also supra note 134; but see Seiffert v. Dumati Indus., 413 Pa. 395, 197
A.2d 454 (1964) (appeal by counsel from order of disqualification).
262. The United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine in criminal and civil
disqualification cases. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (criminal); Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (civil).
263. See Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975).
264. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974).
265. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1984).
266. See cases cited in supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text. One may question
whether such orders result in an irreparable loss or are effectively unreviewable for purposes of
applying the collateral order doctrine.
267. These cases are merely offered for reflection. See In re Estate of Georgione, 312
Pa. Super. 339, 458 A.2d 989 (1983), affd, 504 Pa. 510, 475 A.2d 764 (1984) (collateral
order doctrine applied to orders removing executor); accord Collins v. Miller, 198 F.2d 948
(D.C. Cir. 1952) (dismissal of petition to remove executor appealable under collateral order
doctrine); see also In re Estate of Croessant, 482 Pa. 188, 393 A.2d 443 (1978) (appeal from
order removing appellant as trustee); Senseman's Appeal, 21 Pa. 331 (1853) (refusal to ap-
point testamentary guardian is appealable); but see Givens v. Givens, 304 Pa. Super. 571, 450
A.2d 1386 (1982) (denial of petition to appoint guardian ad litem not appealable) (distin-
guishing Senseman's Appeal); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764 (1985)
(wife's appeal from order denying petition to remove husband and business associate as guard-
ian for children's funds considered on the merits); In re White, 321 Pa. Super. 102, 467 A.2d
1148 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 506 Pa. 218, 484 A.2d 763 (1984) (appeal by trust
beneficiaries from order denying, inter alia, petition to remove trustee considered without dis-
cussion of jurisdictional basis).
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that will not result in the irreparable loss of a claimed right.26 8
In summary, the distinctive jurisdictional feature of the collat-
eral order doctrine is that it expands the traditional concepts of final-
ity to permit an immediate appeal from a final, determinative deci-
sion regarding an important right purely collateral to the main
action. If deferral of appellate review may (or will) result in the ir-
reparable loss of the important right, or if subsequent appellate re-
view may be unavailable or practically ineffective, then review of the
interlocutory, collateral order may be appropriate under that rare
exception to the finality principle known as the collateral order doc-
trine. Caution, however, is advised, especially with respect to de-
lineating what is "collateral" in Pennsylvania law. Recently, a Penn-
sylvania appellate court panel considered the appealability of an
order precluding the defendants from asserting a defense, previously
analyzed in case law in the context of constructive finality, from the
perspective of the collateral order doctrine. 69 Whether this case
portends a refinement of the collateral order doctrine or a viable doc-
trinal alternative to or substitute for what has been termed herein as
"constructive finality" remains to be seen. 70 Such a change would
268. See Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985), which involved an appeal in a
pending divorce action concerning alimony pendente lite, interim counsel fees, and costs. The
supreme court found that there would be no irreparable loss if review were deferred. One
should ask whether all three items are "collateral" or separable from the main action if ac-
commodation can be made at the time of final judgment.
Other collateral orders relating to discovery sanctions, expenses, costs, or temporary mea-
sures would not satisfy the collateral doctrine's criteria. See, e.g., Sanderbeck v. Sanderbeck,
372 Pa. Super. 461, 476 A.2d 44 (1984) (order denying blood tests in support cause of action
not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine); Steel v. Weisberg, 347 Pa. Super.
106, 500 A.2d 428 (1985) (order denying protective relief not appealable under collateral
order doctrine); but cf McManus v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 342 Pa. Super. 405, 493 A.2d
84 (1985) (expenses, discovery sanctions; appeal quashed); Gray v. State Farm Ins. Co., 328
Pa. Super. 532, 477 A.2d 868 (1984) (counsel fees); Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1981) (pretrial order as to admissability of victim's sexual behavior appealable).
269. See Elderkin v. Sedney, - Pa. Super. - 511 A.2d 858 (1986). See also
supra cases cited in notes 196-98. Query: For purposes of applying the collateral order doc-
trine to affirmative defenses, is the prior distinction of precluding facts at trial important in
determining the criterion of separability or collaterallity? It is also essential to note that
Elderkin's limitation of jurisdiction over orders concerning affirmative defenses may rest upon
the case's procedural context, namely, precluding an affirmative defense as a discovery
sanction.
270. The discussion about finality and its limits shall not go beyond the traditional con-
fines of the collateral order doctrine. For those interested in the darker recesses of the concept
and jurisprudential gymnastics, attention is directed to the idea of the existence of a "reverse
collateral order doctrine." The concept applies to a collateral order entered after final judg-
ment. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus. Inc., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975); cf.
Crossman v. Maccoccio, 792 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1986); see also Redish, The Pragmatic Ap-
proach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COL. L. REv. 89 (1975); Comment, Collat-




IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Interlocutory Orders Immediately
Appealable by Statute or Rule
A nonfinal order is not necessarily a nonappealable order. Al-
though finality - classic (technical), constructive (practical) or collat-
eral - represents the major access route to the appellate courts, inter-
locutory appeals will be reviewed if they are specifically authorized
by statute or rule of court. The exceptions, however, are limited.
There are various statutes or procedural rules of court that con-
stitute exceptions to the final order doctrine. It is difficult to extract
from these exceptions any particular rationale or policy supporting
appellate review. Thus, in the absence of such legislative or judicial
information, the task of explaining must yield to that of describing.
Most of the following exceptions are contained in an appellate rule,
hereinafter referred to as Rule 31 1.271
271. PA. R. APP. P. 311 reads in part as follows:
Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of right
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by general rule, an appeal may
be taken as of right from:
(I) Afjecting judgments. An order opening, vacating or striking off a
judgment, or refusing to open, vacate or strike off a judgment. If orders
opening, vacating or striking off a judgment are sought in the alternative,
no appeal may be filed until the court has disposed of each claim for
relief. (2) Attachments, etc. An order confirming, modifying or dissolving
or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship,
receivership or similar matter affecting the possession or control of prop-
erty. (3) Change of criminal venue or venire. An order changing venue or
venire in a criminal proceeding. (4) Injunctions. An order granting, con-
tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-
solve or modify injunctions. (5) New trials. An order in a civil action or
proceeding awarding a new trial, or an order in a criminal proceeding
awarding a new trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposi-
tion of the matter would be an absolute discharge or where the Common-
wealth claims that the lower court committed an error of law. (6) Parti-
tion. An order directing partition. (7) Other cases. An order which is
made appealable by statute or general rule.
(b) Order sustaining venue or personal or in rem jurisdiction. An appeal may be
taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding sustaining the
venue of the matter of jurisdiction over the person or over real or personal prop-
erty if:
(I) the plaintiff, petitioner or other party benefiting from the order files
of record within ten days after the entry of the order an election that the
order shall be deemed final: or (2) the court states in the order that a
substantial issue of jurisdiction is presented.
(c) Changes of venue, etc. An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a
civil action or proceeding changing venue, transferring the matter to another
court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed in the matter on the
basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles.
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A. Orders Affecting Judgments
The appellate rules272 provide generally that an order opening,
vacating or striking off a judgment is appealable; further, an order
refusing to open, vacate or strike off a judgment is also appealable.
In the latter situation, the result is arguably akin to a reinforced
termination of a case; in the former, the termination of the case has
been, in effect, rescinded so as to put the parties back into court. The
procedural rule has been applied to various types of judgments. In
Dole v. Western Auto Supply Co., 273 the superior court stated that
an appeal from an order refusing to open or strike a non pros, issued
upon praecipe by defendant because plaintiff failed to file a com-
plaint, was proper under Rule 311.274
An order which reactivates a previously dismissed case has also
been considered appealable under the same procedural rule since it is
an order affecting a judgment.1 Such orders are immediately ap-
pealable. 276 Appeals have also been entertained from orders vacating
a prior summary judgment. In addition, the partial opening of a
confessed judgment for the purpose of determining damages was
held to be an immediately appealable order.278 In another case, al-
though the procedural basis was not discussed, an appeal from an
order opening a divorce decree was entertained. 79
It should be carefully noted, however, that sanction orders im-
posing judgment for noncompliance with discovery may likely be be-
yond the ambit of the procedural rule and are not immediately ap-
pealable. One case has stated that the proper procedure is not to file
272. See PA. R. App. P. 311(a) (see supra note 271 for text).
273. - Pa. Super. -, - n.3, 508 A.2d 600, 602 n.3 (1986); see also Buxbaum
v. Peguero, 355 Pa. Super. 289, 484 A.2d 137 (1984); Storm v. Golden, 388 Pa. Super. 570,
488 A.2d 39 (1985) (appeal from order opening judgment of non pros).
274. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1037. Note, however, that a federal court has questioned the
constitutionality of the rule in Hines v. Pettit, Jr., 638 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1986). In
addition, one should distinguish appeals involving a non pros entered as a discovery order. See
infra notes 281-82; supra notes 204-11; cf. supra note II.
275. See. e.g., Sporkin v. Affinito, 326 Pa. Super. 481, 474 A.2d 343 (1984); Stawiarski
v. Hall, 300 Pa. Super. 67, 445 A.2d 1303 (1982).
276. See Scoumiou v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Pa. Super. 254, 438 A.2d 981
(1981) (order vacating prior dismissal and reactivating case was in nature of order opening
judgments and was immediately appealable; no exceptions permitted; untimely appeal
quashed).
277. See Hunter v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 347 Pa. Super. 227, 500 A.2d 490
(1985); see also supra notes I II, 137, 138 (summary judgments); Nordmann v. Common-
wealth, 79 Pa. Commw. 187, 468 A.2d 1173 (1983).
278. See Haggerty v. Fetner, 332 Pa. Super. 333, 481 A.2d 641 (1984); see also Pitts-
burgh Nat. Bank v. Larson, - Pa. Super. -, 507 A.2d 867 (1986) (opening of confessed
judgment).
279. See Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 337 Pa. Super. 410, 502 A.2d 185 (1985).
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a petition to open or strike the judgment on liability or damages but
to file an appeal from the entry of a final judgment. 8 0 In Simpson v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,281 however, the superior court distinguished
default judgments entered pursuant to a party's praecipe and ruled
that the lower court's opening of a judgment, which was not in the
nature of a default judgment, was an appealable order under the
procedural rule. The court noted that the prior default judgment,
which nevertheless was a sanction order necessitated because of non-
compliance with discovery, was entered by the court in a contested
proceeding. Thus, as to orders concerning a request to open or strike
a judgment under the procedural rule, the litigator should be careful
in determining the following: whether the prior judgment (non pros,
default judgment) was entered as a discovery sanction; whether the
sanction order was entered by the court or through a party's prae-
cipe; whether a petition to open or strike is procedurally proper; and
whether the particular appellate court recognizes an immediate ap-
peal in such circumstances.282
B. Orders Affecting Possession/Control of Property
An order that affects one's possession or control of property may
be immediately appealable.2 8 These appealable orders may concern,
for example, the dissolution or modification of attachments, custodi-
anships, or receiverships, as well as the refusal to dissolve or modify
such similar interests in property.2 8' Nevertheless, when the lower
court's order does not tangibly affect the control or possession of
property, such as in situations involving a lis pendens, the rule of
appealability would seem to be inapplicable.28  The few cases that
280. See Livolsi v. Crosby, 344 Pa. Super. 34, 493 A.2d 1384 (1985) (appeal from de-
nial of petition to open default judgment on liability and damages, entered as a sanction, was
quashed); Miller Oral Surgery v. Dinello, 342 Pa. Super. 577, 493 A.2d 741 (1985) (appeal
from denial of petition to open default judgment entered as a sanction on liability only was
quashed) (refusing to follow Marshall v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 76 Pa. Commw. 205,
463 A.2d 1215 (1985)). For prior caselaw on immediately appealing order that refused to open
judgment on liability, entered as a sanction, see Scharfman v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 234
Pa. Super. 564, 340 A.2d 539 (1975) (interpreting and applying the predecessor of PA. R. App.
P. 311 (a)(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1100 (Purdon 1969) (repealed)); see also PA. R. App.
P. 311(a) comments.
281. 350 Pa. Super. 239, 504 A.2d 335 (1968) (en banc).
282. The qualification of appealability of orders stemming from discovery matters has
occurred in other areas. See Elderkin v. Sedney, - Pa. Super. - , 511 A.2d 858 (1986)
(commented upon supra in notes 208 and 269); see also supra note 280.
283. See PA. R. App. P. 311 (a)(2) (see supra note 271 for text).
284. See. e.g., Triflin v. Interstate Printing Co., - Pa. Super. - , 515 A.2d 956
(1986); Foulke v. Lavelle, 308 Pa. Super. 131, 454 A.2d 56 (1982); cf. Teradyne, Inc. v.
Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986).
285. See. e.g., United States Nat'l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 321 Pa. 352, 487
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concern this appealability issue sometimes do not discuss the specific
procedural rule.286
C. Orders Changing Criminal Venue
An interlocutory order which changes venue or venire in a crim-
inal case is appealable under the rules. 87 However, an order refusing
to change venue is not appealable under the rule.288
D. Injunctions
The appellate rules authorize an interlocutory appeal from an
order relating to the grant, dissolution, modification, continuation or
denial of injunctive relief.289 Presently, although the rule specifies
that it concerns interlocutory orders,290 there is some appellate disa-
greement whether the injunction provision concerns both preliminary
and final injunctions.2 91 In this regard, it is important perhaps to
note that the procedural rule is patterned after a federal statute.
292
A.2d 809 (1985) (order striking [is pendens is interlocutory and not appealable); cf. 6 & 8
Builders Supply, Inc. v. Buell, 292 Pa. Super. 307, 437 A.2d 58 (1981) (order striking lis
pendens did not put plaintiff out of court when cause of action was not concerned with title to
or sale of real estate); but see McCahill v. Roberts, 421 Pa. 233, 219 A.2d 306 (1966) (order,
in effect, striking lis pendens, was appealable and final since it effectively put plaintiffs out of
court on their claims for full and complete ownership of a building); see also Rappaport v.
Stein, 351 Pa. Super. 370, 506 A.2d 393 (1985) (quiet title action involving, inter alia, ap-
pointment of real estate management firm did not present an appealable order involving con-
trol or possession of property under PA. R. App. P. 311).
286. See Ziegler Lumber v. Golden Triangle Dev. Co., 320 Pa. Super. 557, 467 A.2d
853 (1983) (order setting aside writ of execution as to some property and permitting execution
as to other property not immediately appealable since there was no final determination yet
regarding specific property subject to mechanics lien); cf Rodgers v. Yodock, 309 Pa. Super.
154, 454 A.2d 1129 (1983) (temporary stay of writ of execution not final) (distinguishing
National Council of Junior Order v. Robertson), 214 Pa. Super. 9, 248 A.2d 861 (1969)).
287. See PA. R. App. P. 31 1(a)(3) (see supra note 271 for text).
288. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 312; Commonwealth v. Swanson, 424 Pa. 192, 225 A.2d 231
(1967). As to change of venire, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8702 (Purdon 1982).
289. See PA. R. App. P. 31 l(a)(4) (see supra note 271 for text); see also Temtex Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Kramer, 330 Pa. Super. 183, 190, 479 A.2d 500, 503 (1984).
290. Recognizably, an examination of Rule 311 indicates that technically not all of the
provisions concern interlocutory matters. Some orders under Rule 311 arguably put the liti-
gants out of court, if the rule is interpreted to include, for example, final injunction orders.
291. The significance of the distinction concerns the necessity of filing exceptions or
post-trial motions in the lower court preliminary to an appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel.
Lewis v. Allouwill Realty Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 32, 478 A.2d 1334 (1984); Humphreys v.
Cain, 84 Pa. Commw. 222, 474 A.2d 353 (1984) (exceptions required before appealing in
permanent injunction case) (disapproving of Agra Enterprises Inc. v. Brunozzi, 302 Pa. Super.
166, 448 A.2d 579 (1982)). The issue of exceptions and preservation of issues for appellate
review is not within the scope of this Article. See supra note 123.
292. See PA. R. App. P. 31 l(a)(4) comment, which refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See
Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986) (order enjoining defendant from
disposing or encumbering $4 million of its assets and directing it to set aside an amount in an
interest bearing account was appealable as a preliminary injunction, not as an unappealable
attachment order).
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Federal case law has noted that an interlocutory order granting, con-
tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving an injunction is one that
temporarily awards or refuses to award all or part of the injunctive
relief sought by a claimant. An order that merely continues the case
and does not reach the merits of the claim is nothing more than a
step in the processing of the case and does not come within the scope
of the federal injunction statute. 93 Thus, an order that restrains or
directs the conduct of the parties is not immediately appealable in
the federal courts under the statute unless the restraint or direction
is related to the substantive issues in the case. 9
Two aspects of the procedural rule on injunctions should be con-
sidered. First, an order appealable as an injunction under the appel-
late rule would arguably contemplate that the lower court's action
preceding the order was in conformity with the procedural require-
ments under the rules of civil procedure. 295 Second, it is correlatively
clear that the mere compelling of performance or refusing to grant
relief that is analogous to an injunction does not necessarily mean
that, for appellate jurisdiction purposes, the lower court's action
comes within the scope of the appellate rule. Care should be ob-
served in this regard. 6 One case, for example, has also stated that
293. See Rodger v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 160 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
294. See State of N.Y. v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 801 (3d Cir.
1985).
295. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1531 (special relief, injunctions); Beckman v. Abramovitz, 344
Pa. Super. 149, 496 A.2d 53 (1985) (appeal from order granting petition to freeze corporate
assets not appealable as a preliminary injunction under Rule 311 since lower court did not
follow procedural requirements for preliminary injunction and court itself characterized order
as relating to a petition to enforce a settlement agreement; Rule 311 is extraordinary in order
to prevent irreparable harm before ultimate decision); see also Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek
Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986) (order affecting and controlling ownership of property
treated as an appealable preliminary injunction since order was a significant restraint and
parties treated order as an injunction); but cf. Johnston v. Johnston, 346 Pa. Super. 427, 499
A.2d 1074 (1985) (order threatening contempt and directing defendants to execute trust
agreements characterized as "in nature of mandatory injunction"; no specific discussion, how-
ever, of appealability under Rule 311). As to contempt orders and appellate jurisdiction, see
supra notes 121, 128; Lehigh Township v. Tahos, 91 Pa. Commw. 568, 498 A.2d 30 (1985)
(appeal from order finding defendants in contempt for failure to raze or sell property quashed
as interlocutory until lower court follows necessary procedural steps).
296. Consider the following cases, which, one should note, do not directly address the
particular procedural rule of jurisdiction as to injunctions: In re Handwriting Exemplar of
Casale, 338 Pa. Super. 11I, 487 A.2d 877 (1985) (appeal from court's order requiring civilian
to submit copy of handwriting exemplar was not in nature of subpoena or final and had to
await possible final order of sentence should appellant be found in contempt); Gottschall v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 333 Pa. Super. 493, 482 A.2d 979 (1984) (protective order
restricting dissemination of information in shareholders' suit did not prevent litigation of ac-
tion and was not appealable as a final order).
As to lower court orders compelling one to submit to a medical examination, consider
Myers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 353 Pa. 523, 46 A.2d 224 (1946) (in assumpsit action to recover
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the filing of an appeal in injunction matters may await the subse-
quent final determination of the case.
2 97
E. New Trials
In civil cases, an interlocutory order awarding a new trial is im-
mediately appealable. 98 A denial of a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is reviewable when it is issued in conjunction
with an appealable order granting a new trial.2 99
In criminal cases, an order granting a new trial is appealable
when (1) the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the
matter would be an absolute discharge; or (2) the Commonwealth
claims that the lower court-committed an error of law. 300
F. Partition
An order directing partition is immediately appealable under
the procedural rule, 01 although case law has stated that the order
disability benefits, order making absolute a rule to show cause upon the plaintiff why proceed-
ings should not be stayed until plaintiff submits to a physical examination is a final, appealable
order since it precludes plaintiff from further action); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mor-
ris, 289 Pa. Super. 137, 432 A.2d 1089 (1981) (stating general rule that an order requiring a
party to submit to a medical examination is interlocutory because it does not preclude further
litigation; but when petition is not ancillary to any cause of action, such an order is appealable
since action is, in effect, terminated). Morris would seem to be in conformity with the federal
view, see supra notes 292-94, if one regards the order therein from the perspective of injunc-
tions rather than finality. As to federal practice, see also United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410
F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1969) (bill for specific performance lacks the elements of an action for
injunctive relief).
297. See Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Washington Memorial Chapel, 330 Pa. Super.
494, 502 n. 3, 479 A.2d 1011, 1016 n. 3 (1983); cf. Geyer v. Steinbronn, 351 Pa. Super. 536,
506 A.2d 901 (1986) (post-verdict appeal as to prior order opening non pros); Lombardo v.
DeMarco, 350 Pa. Super. 490, - n. 4, 504 A.2d 1256, 1258 n.4 (1985) (partition).
298. See PA. R. App. P. 311 (a)(5) and comments thereto (citing Hoban v. Conroy, 347
Pa. 487, 32 A.2d 769 (1943)).
299. See Buck v. Scott Township, 325 Pa. Super. 148, 472 A.2d 691 (1984); Schroeder
Bros. v. Sabelli, 156 Pa. Super. 267, 40 A.2d 170 (1944).
300. See Commonwealth v. White, 482 Pa. 197, 393 A.2d 447 (1978); Commonwealth
v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201, 58 A. 278 (1904); PA. R. App. P. 311 (a)(5) (see supra note 271 for
text); Commonwealth v. Williams, - Pa. Super. -, - A.2d - (1986) (appeal
from order denying defendant's motion for acquittal proper under Rule 31 l(a)(5) where order
results in new trial and defendant claims right to absolute discharge); see also Commonwealth
v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949) (Commowealth's right to appeal new
trial for defendant regarding the allegedly prejudicial admission of evidence), cited in Com-
monwealth v. Dinel, 311 Pa. Super. 470, 474-75 n.2, 457 A.2d 1278, 1280 n.2 (1983); cf.
Commonwealth v. Pollick, 420 Pa. 61, 215 A.2d 904 (1966) (defendant's appeal from order
refusing his motion for a discharge after jury deadlock quashed).
301. See PA. R. App. P. 31 1(a)(6) (see supra note 271 for text); PA. R. Civ. P. 1531-
1551; see also Zottola v. Venturino, 343 Pa. Super. 289, 494 A.2d 471 (1985); ef. Koba v.
Koba, 307 Pa. Super. 245, 453 A.2d 17 (1982) (appeal from order dismissing wife's exceptions
of master quashed as interlocutory) (citing Recktenwald v. Recktenwald, 284 Pa. Super. 185,
425 A.2d 765 (1981)).
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can be challenged later in an appeal from a final decree. 0 2
G. Orders Sustaining Jurisdiction or Venue in Civil Cases
Contrary to prior case law, 30 3 the general rule now is that an
order sustaining venue or jurisdiction, which is clearly interlocutory,
is not immediately appealable.30 ' The appellate rules, however, per-
mit the aggrieved party to file an immediate interlocutory appeal
from the order sustaining jurisdiction if (1) the plaintiff or nonag-
grieved party files of record within ten days after the entry of the
order an election that the order shall be deemed final; or (2) the
lower court states in the order30 5 that a substantial issue of jurisdic-
tion exists.306 The commentary to the rule notes that as to the first
condition, the party benefiting, which is presumably and usually the
plaintiff, is given the option to gamble that the venue of the matter
or jurisdiction will be sustained on appeal. It is important for the
defendant to note that, if the plaintiff timely elects final treatment,
the failure of the defendant to appeal the interlocutory order results
in a waiver of the issue in a later appeal.307 The commentary also
notes that presumably a plaintiff would file such an election when he
or she desires to force the defendant to decide quickly whether the
objection to venue or jurisdiction will be seriously pursued.
The applicable rule, one should note, is addressed to venue and
jurisdiction over the person, thing, or property. Thus, as one case has
noted, the appellate rule does not confer jurisdiction over interlocu-
tory orders sustaining subject matter jurisdiction.30 8 Also, if the
plaintiff elects to file an election within the ten day period, the time
in which to appeal for the defendant would ordinarily be at least
twenty days since the appeal period begins to run from the day that
302. See Lombardo v. DeMarco, 350 Pa. Super. 490, -. n.4, 504 A.2d 1256, 1256 n.4
(1985) (citing Grubb v. Dembec, 241 Pa. Super. 18, 359 A.2d 418 (1976)).
303. See. e.g., Grier v. Scientific Living, Inc., 253 Pa. Super. 113, 384 A.2d 1254 (1978)
(citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 672 (Purdon 1969) (repealed)).
304. See Centerre Bank v. Arthur Young & Co., 348 Pa. Super. 364, 502 A.2d 251
(1985) (order denying preliminary objections based on forum non conveniens not appealable or
final).
305. The rule specifies certification in the order. But see Temtex Products, Inc. v.
Kramer, 380 Pa. Super. 783, 479 A.2d 500 (1984) (belated certification by lower court three
months after appeal not fatal to appellate jurisdiction).
306. See PA. R. App. P. 311(b) (see supra note 271 for text); United Erectors v. Pratt &
Lambert Corp., 338 Pa. Super. 577, 488 A.2d 43 (1985) (appeal quashed because neither
condition was satisfied); see also Adkins v. Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc., 321 Pa. Super. 30,
467 A.2d 877 (1983).
307. See PA. R. App. P. 311 (d)(2) and comments thereto.
308. See Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. DiMassa, 296 Pa. Super.
529, 442 A.2d 1177 (1982).
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the order is entered.8 0 9
H. Orders Changing Venue in Civil Cases
An interlocutory order that (1) changes venue; (2) transfers a
matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction; or (3) refuses to
permit the action to proceed on the basis of forum non conveniens is
automatically appealable in civil cases under the appellate rules."' 0
Unlike the examples in the prior discussion on jurisdiction, these ap-
pealable orders represent either a jurisdictional change or a jurisdic-
tional stalemate. In such instances, there is no need to obtain an
opposing party's election on the record or a jurisdictional certifica-
tion by the lower court. As with the preceding section, however, the
comments to the rule indicate that there is no automatic right of
appeal from a transfer order based on improper subject matter
jurisdiction.311
I. Statutory and Common Law Arbitration Matters
Rule 311 contains a residual provision to permit interlocutory
appeals from orders that are made appealable by statute or general
rule.31 2 The Judicial Code, for example, addresses the appealability
of lower court orders relating to nonjudicial statutory13 and common
309. See PA. R. App. P. 311(b) commentary. As to when the lower court certifies a
substantial issue of jurisdiction in its order, see Martin v. Gerner, 332 Pa. Super. 507, 481
A.2d 903 (1984) (order dismissing defendant's preliminary objections, which were based on
lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, was appealable from the time that the lower court
amended its order, not from the time of the entry of the original order); see also PA. R. App. P
108 (date of entry of orders).
310. See PA. R. App. P. 311(c) (see supra note 271 for text); PA. R. Civ. P. 1006(d)
(venue, change of venue); Centerre Bank v. Arthur Young & Co., 348 Pa. Super. 365, 502
A.2d 251 (1985) (forum non conveniens, appeal quashed).
311. The commentary to Rule 311 also indicates that it does not relate to a transfer
under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 933(c)(1) (concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction), 5103
(transfer of erroneously filed matter), or under any other similar provision of law. The option
is to seek permission from the lower and appellate courts to appeal the interlocutory order. See
PA. R. App. P. 312, 1311, discussed infra notes 315-51 and accompanying text.
312. See PA. R. App. P. 31 l(a)(7) (see supra note 271 for text). The comment to Rule
311 advises that one should consult the criminal and civil procedural rules, for example, to
identify any avenues for interlocutory appeals.
313. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (Purdon 1982) (provides for the right of appeal
from the following orders relating to statutory arbitration:
(a) General rule. - An appeal may be taken from:
(I) A court order denying an application to compel arbitration made
under section 7304 (relating to proceedings to compel or stay arbitra-
tion). (2) A court order granting an application to stay arbitration made
under section 7304(b). (3) A court order confirming or denying confirma-
tion of an award. (4) A court order modifying or correcting an award. (5)
A court order vacating an award without directing a re-hearing. (6) A
final judgment or decree of a court entered pursuant to the provisions of
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law314 arbitration. The statutory provisions should be carefully ex-
amined to determine whether an appeal from orders concerning com-
mon law or statutory arbitration is permissible.
V. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Permission to Appeal Nonfinal
Orders
A. Generally
Unless a statute or rule of court provides otherwise, an ag-
grieved party cannot immediately appeal a nonfinal or interlocutory
order.3 15 Nevertheless, appellate review of an interlocutory order,
which is generally not immediately reviewable, can be obtained
through permission from both the lower and appellate courts. Both
the Judicial Code s" 6 and appellate rules31 7 provide this route of ac-
cess to the appellate forum. The applicable statute specifies the
following:
(b) Interlocutory appeals by permission. - When a court of
other government unit, in making an interlocutory order in a
matter in which its final order would be within the jurisdiction
of an appellate court, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the matter, it shall so state in such order. The appel-
late court may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to
be taken from such interlocutory order. 818
This procedure is known as the certification process of appellate
jurisdiction.
B. Procedural Requirements: Certification, Petition, Filing
Preliminarily, the aggrieved party must note that he or she must
this subchapter.
(b) Procedure. - The appeal shall be taken in the manner, within the time and
to the same extent as an appeal from a final order of court in a civil action.
314. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7342 (Purdon 1982) concerns common law arbitration
and now incorporates 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (see supra note 313 for text). For prior
caselaw, see, for example, Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 307 Pa.
Super. 288, 453 A.2d 356 (1982); Heller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 233 Pa. Super. 240, 446 A.2d
273 (1982). The statutory provisions are now controlling.
315. Of course, an aggrieved party can appeal an order that has been judicially con-
strued as "final."
316. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (Purdon 1981).
317. See PA. R. App. P. 312, 1311. Rule 1311(b) is substantially similar to 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 702(b). See infra text accompanying note 325.
318. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702(b).
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seek permission to appeal first from the lower court and then from
the appellate court. It is thus a double discretionary process. Certifi-
cation by the lower court alone does not automatically entitle one to
appeal the interlocutory order as certified; a direct appeal from the
certified order, without the condition precedent of specific appellate
approval, is fatal and will result in the dismissal of the appeal." '
As the Judicial Code's provision plainly indicates, the lower
court's certification must assure that three substantive conditions are
met: (1) existence of a controlling question of law; (2) which is sub-
ject to a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) the
immediate resolution of which may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the matter. If these conditions are met, then the ap-
pellate court may in its sound discretion grant a petition to permit
an interlocutory appeal from the certified order.
One should consider the potential dangers or inadvisability of a
pro forma, unexplanatory certification. Although there is no directly
relevant Pennsylvania case law on point, a federal court, addressing
similar statutory certification requirements, 2 0 stated that the rou-
tine, unexplained recitation of the statutory formula in the lower
court's certified order constituted an abuse-of discretion. Under such
nebulous circumstances, the appellate court stated that it was unable
to give deference to a conclusion totally devoid of merit.321 Aside
from questions as to such possible disadvantages, a generalized state-
ment from the lower court will likely be of little assistance initially
to the appellate court, especially if there is no lower court opinion.
319. See, e.g., In re Handwriting Exemplar of Casale, 338 Pa. Super. I1l, 487 A.2d 877
(1958), appeal granted, 508 Pa. 605, 499 A.2d 577 (1985); Commonwealth v. Wills, 328 Pa.
Super. 342, 476 A.2d 1362 (1984); Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. DiMassa,
296 Pa. Super. 529, 442 A.2d 1177 (1982) (lower court's opinion was not an adequate certifi-
cation and appellants failed to petition appellate court); Gellar v. Chambers, 292 Pa. Super.
324, 437 A.2d 406 (1981); cf. Commonwealth v. Pfender, 280 Pa. Super. 417, 421 A.2d 791
(1980) (failure to comply with certification requirements not fatal when order of suppression
was independently final and appealable).
320. The abusive certification, it should be noted, concerned FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), not
28 U.S.C.S. § 1292(b) (1984). See supra text accompanying note 219.
321. See Coalition for Equitable Minority Participation in Architectural Contract in
Tenn. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 786 F.2d 227
(6th Cir. 1986). In one critical commentary, for example, an author lamented that the applica-
tion of the criteria for review-by-certification is confusing and divergent. The author suggested
that the appellate courts should use short opinions setting forth reasons for acceptance or de-
nial of an application especially since more and more district courts have provided skeletal
certifications without any supporting rationale or analysis for the appellate courts. See Note,
Section 1292(b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 54 GEO. L.J. 940, 945, 961 (1966); see
also Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629-47 (1951), noting that the
certification procedure may be a useful vehicle in establishing a well-rounded jurisprudence at
the intermediate level; Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C.S.
.§ 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607 (1975).
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The petition32 2 in support of a petition to permit appeal, if suffi-
ciently particularized as to the previously stated three requirements,
is not only advisable but mandatory 28 under the procedural rules
and would obviously obviate the potential disadvantages resulting
from a generalized certification. Once the appellate court grants the
petition to appeal, the time limitations in filing an appeal are gov-
erned by the general rules or rules of court.3 24
The procedural requirements governing filing are specific. The
applicable procedural rules provides as follows:
322. The petition must be particularized; supporting briefs are not permitted from the
petitioner, although a brief in opposition to the petition is permitted. See PA. R. App. P.
1312(c), 1314.
323. PA. R. App. P. 1312 provides, in part as follows:
(a) General rule. The petition for permission to appeal need not be set forth in
numbered paragraphs in the manner of a pleading, and shall contain the follow-
ing (which shall, insofar as practicable, be set forth in the order stated):
( I ) A statement of the basis for the jurisdiction of the appellate court. (2)
The text of the order in question, or the portions thereof sought to be
reviewed (including the statement by the lower court or other government
unit that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the matter), and the date of its entry in the court or other government
unit below. If the order is voluminous, it may, if more convenient, be
appended to the petition. (3) A concise statement of the case containing
the facts necessary to an undertaking of the controlling questions of law
determined by the order of the lower court or other government unit. (4)
The controlling questions of law presented for review, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The
statement of questions presented will be deemed to include every subsidi-
ary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth in the
petition, or fairly comprised therein, will ordinarily be considered by the
court in the event permission to appeal is granted. (5) A concise state-
ment of the reasons why a substantial ground exists for a difference of
opinion on the questions and why an immediate appeal may materially
advance the termination of the matter. (6) There shall be appended to
the petition a copy of any opinions delivered relating to the order sought
to be reviewed, as well as all opinions of lower courts or other government
units in the case, and, if reference thereto is necessary to ascertain the
grounds of the order, opinions in companion cases. If whatever is required
by this paragraph to be appended to the petition is voluminous, it may, if
more convenient, be separately presented. (7) There shall be appended to
the petition the verbatim texts of the pertinent provisions of constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances, regulations or other similar enactments
which the case involves, and the citation to the volume and page where
they are published, including the official edition, if any.
(d) Essential requisites of petition. The failure of a petitioner to present with
accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready and adequate
understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for
denying the petition.
324. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5571(e) (Purdon 1981); PA. R. App. P. 903
and note thereto (time to appeal).
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(b) Petition for permission to appeal.
Permission to appeal from an interlocutory order containing the
statement prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S. Sec. 702(b) may be sought
by filing a petition for permission to appeal with the prothono-
tary of the appellate court within 30 days after entry of such
order in the lower court or other government unit with proof of
service on all other parties to the matter in the lower court or
other government unit and on the government unit or clerk of
the lower court, who shall file the petition of record in such
lower court. An order may be amended to include the prescribed
statement at any time, and permission to appeal may be sought
within 30 days after the entry of the order as amended.
3 25
Thus, the particularized petition to permit an interlocutory appeal
must be filed in the appellate court within 30 days of the entry of the
certified order. s26
C. Pennsylvania Cases
The difficulty in illustrating the three substantive requirements
of certification is that there is hardly any published case law specifi-
cally explaining the reasons supporting appellate review of a certified
interlocutory order. What is, for example, a "controlling question of
law"? What factors indicate a "substantial ground" for a "difference
of opinion"? How is the ultimate termination of a matter "materi-
ally advanced"?
In one published opinion, however, 27 the superior court vacated
its prior order permitting an appeal and quashed the appeal. The
appeal was taken from a certified order (striking a supplemental pre-
trial statement naming an expert witness to be called at trial) which
was clearly interlocutory. The purported effect of the order was to
325. PA. R. App. P. 1311(b). The rule states that the interlocutory order can be
amended at any time to include the prescribed statement. Cf 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5574
(Purdon 1981), which states as follows:
Effect of application for amendment to qualify for interlocutory appeal. If an
application is made to a tribunal within 30 days after the entry of an interlocu-
tory order not appealable as a matter of right for an amendment of such order to
set forth expressly the statement specified in section 702(b) (relating to interloc-
utory appeals by permission), the time for filing a petition for permission to ap-
peal from -such order shall run from the entry of the order denying the amend-
ment or amendment the order, as the case may be.
See also id. § 5571(a) (the time for filing a petition for permission to appeal shall be governed
by general rules).
326. See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5571(d) (Purdon 1981) (petition must be filed
within 30 days after its entry); PA. R. App. P. 108(a), 301 (entry of order).
327. Miller v. Krug, 255 Pa. Super. 39, 386 A.2d 124 (1978). Of the seven judges in the
case, two dissented and two did not participate.
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bar the appellant's expert from testifying. The court's opinion at-
tempted to provide some critical analysis to the issue of appellate
review of certified orders. Former President Judge Spaeth questioned
the propriety of such pro forma certification in terms of the three
substantive requirements. As to "material advancement," Judge
Spaeth noted that the mere saving of time was not enough; if the
order was reversed or affirmed, the case would still go to trial. As to
the "controlling question of law" criterion, Judge Spaeth was not
quite sure what the "question" was and, in any event, he said that
any question of abuse of discretion would not likely satisfy the con-
trolling question of law criterion.
Notwithstanding the dilemmas of definition and application, one
can try to identify in list form some of those cases in which the ap-
pellate courts reviewed certified, interlocutory orders. Appellate re-
view of certified orders has been exercised in both civil and criminal
cases.3 2 8 In civil cases, for example, interlocutory appellate review of
certified orders concerned the following general issues: a husband's
right in a divorce action to present evidence regarding his counter-
claim;3 29 the respective liabilities of an employer and employee in a
no fault automobile accident case of first impression;3 0 the produc-
tion of documents subject to prior sealing;331 propriety of the com-
monwealth court's certified order staying revocation of a lottery li-
cense;332 a litigant's right to proceed in forma pauperis;333 and
application of strict liability to a public utility. 34
Appellate review of certified interlocutory orders in criminal
cases, in which the concept of finality is said to be more onerous, has
involved some of the following issues: subject matter jurisdiction of
the lower court; 3 5 transfer of a juvenile to the criminal adult divi-
328. A federal court, however, has stated that the federal statutory counterpart, see 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1986) (see infra note 339 for text), is not applicable to criminal proceed-
ings. See United States v. Selby, 476 F.2d 965 (2nd Cir. 1973).
329. Restifo v. Restifo, 339 Pa. Super. 152, 489 A.2d 196 (1985) (counterclaim was
based on fault grounds; wife's action based on no fault).
330. Wozniak v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 347 Pa. Super. 356, 500 A.2d 872 (1985).
331. Jaden Elec. v. Wyoming Valley W. School Dist., 342 Pa. Super. 587, 493 A.2d 746
(1985).
332. Young J. Lee, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Revenue, 504 Pa. 367, 474 A.2d 266
(1983).
333. Selby v. Brown, 250 Pa. Super. 134, 437 A.2d 767 (1981); but see supra notes 226-
28.
334. Shriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 117, 501 A.2d 1128
(1985).
335. Commonwealth v. Boyle, 347 Pa. Super. 602, 500 A.2d 1221 (1985); Common-
wealth v. Diaz, 235 Pa. Super. 352, 340 A.2d 559 (1975), rev'd, 477 Pa. 122, 383 A.2d 852
(1978).
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sion for trial;38a refusal to quash subpoenas; 33 7 and violation of the
defendant's right to a speedy trial.338 Although Pennsylvania appel-
late cases generally do not elaborate upon the particular components
of the certification process, a litigant may wish to examine the afore-
mentioned cases to determine whether a proposed petition to permit
an appeal may present meritorious grounds for certified interlocutory
appellate review.
D. The Federal Approach
The federal system contains a certification statute that is sub-
stantially similar to the Pennsylvania statute. 39 The federal courts,
however, in applying the statute have provided more detail as to the
specific components of the certification process. Some of the federal
judicial comments may be instructive to a litigant who attempts to
bridge the lacunae between theory and practice in Pennsylvania. The
federal approach, however, is clearly not dispositive of state practice.
In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,840 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals initially noted that the satisfaction of the three statutory
criteria does not preclude a court from using its discretion in refus-
ing to certify. The court then considered the statutory element of a
"controlling question of law." In the court's view, this requirement
must encompass, at the very least, every order, which if erroneous,
336. Commonwealth v. Brown, 485 Pa. 368, 402 A.2d 1007 (1979) (review by supreme
court after denial of petition by superior court); but see Commonwealth v. Madden, 342 Pa.
Super. 120, 132. 492 A.2d 420, 426 (1985) (Beck, J., dissenting).
337. In re January, 1974 Special Grand Jury, 238 Pa. Super. 479, 357 A.2d 628 (1976);
f. Petition of Spector, 455 Pa. 518, 317 A.2d 289 (1974).
338. Commonwealth v. Mancuso, 247 Pa. Super. 266, 372 A.2d 454 (1977); cf. Com-
monwealth v. Bennett, 236 Pa. Super. 509, 345 A.2d 754 (1978).
339. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1986) provides as follows:
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involved a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or
a judge thereof shall so order.
Note also that PA. R. App. P. 131 1's comment adverts to the federal statute. The reference to
federal caselaw, however, should not be interpreted to mean that there is a uniformity of prac-
tice or application in the federal courts. There apparently is no elucidating uniformity, attribu-
table in part to the fact that Congress did not establish standards for the courts. See Note,
Section 1292(b): Eight years of Undefined Discretion, supra note 321.
340. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974).
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would be reversible error on final appeal.34' The order, however,
need not be determinative of any of the plaintiff's claims on the mer-
its. As to the issue of the "substantial ground" element, the court
noted that a question of first impression is not necessarily sufficient
to guarantee review.
In another case, involving a dismissal of negligence, strict liabil-
ity and breach of warranty portions of a complaint, a federal district
court denied certification with an accompanying opinion. In Oyster
v. Johns-Manville Corp.,342 the district court agreed with the Katz
analysis of a controlling question as one that would require reversal
on appeal if erroneously decided. In proceeding to the "substantial
ground" factor, the court stated that an inquiry into the merits may
be necessary. Conflicting or contradictory opinions of courts, which
have ruled on the issue, may satisfy the "substantial ground" re-
quirement. Not having found the second requirement satisfied, the
district court refused to certify. In another case from the same dis-
trict, the district court noted that the second factor is not necessarily
established by proof of a substantial numerical disparity of opinions
on an issue. 43 Thus, the substantial ground factor may involve an
examination of a case's possible merits and the existence of differ-
ences or numerical disparity of opinions among other courts and,
perhaps, professional commentators.
The material advancement element, the third factor, is often
difficult to assess and apply. As noted previously, Judge Spaeth at-
tempted a clarifying analysis in Miller.'4 " The court in Oyster sim-
341. Id. at 755-56; see also Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion,
supra note 321, at 947, which suggests that the undefined "controlling question of law" may
be a meaningless term. The commentator notes that the term may encompass various mean-
ings such as "serious to the conduct of the litigation," either practically or legally, and that
controlling is not necessarily tantamount to dispositive. Consider also Phelps, What Is A Ques-
tion of Law, 18 U. CINN. L. REv. 259 (1949).
342. 568 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Pa. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom., Bell Asbestos Mines
Ltd. v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 770 F.2d 1066, 1074 (3d Cir. 1985).
343. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 575 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1983); cf.
United States v. Smith, 793 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1986), in which, in the different context of
analyzing a defendant's right to be released on bail, the majority and dissenting opinions grap-
pled with the definitional dilemma of what is a "substantial question of law."
"Substantial grounds" might also involve questions that are novel or of first impression,
those that take a position contrary to the great weight of authority, and those that conform
with judicial authority but which are subject to a substantial ground for difference of opinion.
See In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959) (focusing on unsettled legal question);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1243-45 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (emphasizing novelty, complexity and facial uncertainty as to sixty-four year old statute
of first ipression); Seven Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (holding
that substantial ground synonymous with likelihood that appellant will prevail on appeal). See
Note, Section 1292(b), Eight years of Undefined Discretion, supra note 321, at 948.
344. See Miller v. Krug, 255 Pa. Super. 39, 386 A.2d 124 (1978); United States v.
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ply stated that the third factor was neutral. In Win. Passalacqua
Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc.,345 a district court
could not conclude that advancement was satisfied since the at-
tempted pretrial appeal came at a stage when the pretrial prepara-
tion was complete and the case was ready for trial.
In applying the statutory criteria, however, some of the federal
appellate courts have made clear that they will not be bound by the
controlling question of law as formulated or identified by the trial
courts. They have stated that their emphasis is primarily on the cer-
tified order of the lower court.34 Again, while these cases may pro-
vide some understanding of the certification process, they are not dis-
positive of what is required by the state appellate courts.
347
E. Lower Court's Refusal to Certify
The lower court's refusal to provide the requisite statutory certi-
fication is a severe, but not necessarily irremovable, obstacle to ob-
taining interlocutory appellate review. Nevertheless, a litigant who
has been denied certification must be rational and cognizant about
the realities of the situation. First, she is asking an appellate court to
create a special exception to the finality principle and snatch from
the lower court a case that, under ordinary and orderly procedures,
would proceed to litigation and judgment. Second, aside from the
possible impact or effect upon the lower court of having its case flow
disrupted, the litigant seeking appellate review is, in effect, attacking
the lower court's refusal to certify, that is, its refusal to have its
proceedings interrupted. Third, and perhaps most important, the pe-
titioner must demonstrate to the appellate court that the lower
court's refusal to certify indicates an egregious abuse of discretion.
The aggrieved party, faced with the lower court's refusal to cer-
tify, thus has the option under the rules to file a "petition for re-
view" 348 with the appellate court. The commentary to the appellate
rules notes:
9947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. 328 (D. Nev. 1963); Herschel v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (no advancement when case was already on court calen-
dar); see also Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, supra note 321, at
944 in which the author indicates that "materially advance" may vary from "probable termi-
nation of the action," to "controlling the result," or "prevention of reversible error."
345. 611 F. Supp. 281 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
346. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Johnson v. All-
dredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973).
347. See also Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A
Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1959).
348. See PA. R. App. P. 1511-1571 (petition for review) supra note 10.
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Where the administrative agency or lower court refuses to
amend its order to include the prescribed statement, a petition
for review under Chapter 15 of the unappealable order of denial
is the proper mode of determining whether the case is so egre-
gious as to justify prerogative appellate correction of the exer-
cise of discretion by the lower tribunal. If the petition for review
is granted in such a case, the effect (as in the Federal practice
under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B)) is the same as if a petition for
permission to appeal had been filed and granted, and no sepa-
rate petition for permission to appeal need be filed.
3 49
Thus, the petitioner would arguably have to show to the appellate
court not only how the three certification requirements are satisfied
but also whether the case presents egregious circumstances as to jus-
tify immediate interlocutory review. In some cases, perhaps, the
clear satisfaction of the three requirements may help to satisfy the
flagrant or egregious standard. Obviously, the burden is a difficult
one.
F. Discretionary Appeals Regarding Sentencing
Of peripheral relevance to the subject of appellate review by
permission is the Commonwealth's (or defendant's) apparently quali-
fied right to appeal the lower court's discretionary aspects of sen-
tencing. The obvious point of departure from the present topic is the
fact that such appeals. concern final, not interlocutory, orders. The
essential similarity, however, is that the appellant must seek appel-
late permission to appeal. The right to appeal is automatic but de-
feasible. The procedure is recognizably idiosyncratic: the aggrieved
party files a notice of appeal, not a petition. A comment to the appel-
late rules notes:
Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code (42 Pa.C.S. Sec.
9781) states that the defendant or the Commonwealth may "pe-
tition for allowance of appeal" of the discretionary aspects of a
sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor. The practice under
these rules is to file a notice of appeal. See note to Rule 902
(manner of taking appeal). If the defendant has a right to an
appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
the appellate court must, of course, entertain the appeal. Other-
wise, such an appeal may be entertained by an appellate court
if, but only if, it appears to the court that there is a substantial
349. See PA. R. App. P. 1311 comment supra note 325 and accompanying text; see also
Butler Educ. Ass'n v. Butler Area School Dist., 34 Pa. Commw. 143, 382 A.2d 1283 (1978).
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question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the
applicable guidelines.86 0
A subsequent comment to the appellate rules further notes the
proper procedure:
Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code (42 Pa.C.S. Sec.
9781) provides that the defendant or the Commonwealth may
file a "petition for allowance of appeal" of the discretionary as-
pects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor. The notice of
appeal under this chapter (See Rule 904 (content of the notice
of appeal)) operates as the "petition for allowance of appeal"
under the Sentencing Code. It automatically raises all possible
questions under 42 Pa.C.S. Sec. 9781 and is available and ap-
propriate even where no issue relating to guilt or the legality of
the sentence (in the sense that the sentence falls outside of the
range of discretion vested by law in the sentencing court) is
presented. No additional wording is required or appropriate in
the notice of appeal.
In effect, the filing of the "petition for allowance of appeal"
contemplated by the statute is deferred by these rules until the
briefing stage, where the question of the appropriateness of the
discretionary aspects of the sentence may be briefed and argued
in the usual manner. See Rule 2116 (statement of questions in-
volved) and Rule 2119 (argument)."6 1
VI. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - The Exceptional Circumstances
Doctrine
One of the great scientific writers of our time, Dr. Douglas R.
Hofstadter, has reflected on the dilemma of the relationship of two
words, "letter" and "spirit" in the legal context. As he points out,
these two words suggest a contrast between the "letter of the law"
and the "spirit of the law" in the mapping out of the legal system.
In law, extant rules, statutes, and so on, are never enough
to cover all possible cases (reminding us once again of the fact
that no fixed and rigid set of 'A'-defining rules can anticipate all
'A's). The legal system depends on the notion that people, whose
experience covers much more than the specific case and rules at
hand, will bring to bear their full range of experience not only
350. See PA. R. App. P. 341 and comment thereto. In Commonwealth v. Easterling,
- Pa. Super. -_, 509 A.2d 345 (1986), the court identified three circumstances which
may satisfy the substantial question requirement: erroneous application of guidelines, unrea-
sonable application of guidelines, and unreasonable sentence outside guidelines.
351. See PA. R. App. P. 902 and note thereto; see also supra note 73.
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with many categories but also with the whole process of catego-
rization and mapping. This allows them to transcend the spe-
cific, rigid, limited rules, and to operate according to more fluid,
imprecise, yet more powerful principles. Or, to revert to the
other vocabulary, this ability is what allows people to transcend
the letter of the law and to apply its spirit.
851
The problematic, and sometimes antagonistic, relationship be-
tween "letter" and "spirit" may be appropriate prologue to the pres-
entation of the final concept in the discussion of feasible jurisdic-
tional alternatives - the exceptional circumstances doctrine. Two
questions arise: (1) does this doctrine represent a viable, independent
jurisdictional base for interlocutory appeals?, and (2) is the sub-
stance of the doctrine one implicating "letter" or "spirit"?
These questions are not easy to answer, primarily because case
law is not clear as to the doctrine's present status or its source. To
paraphrase Dr. Hofstadter, it is not clear whether the jurisdictional
concept is one of rule or principle. For example, in 1954, the su-
preme court in Commonwealth v. Kilgallens5s quoted with apparent
approval the superior court's application of the "exceptional circum-
stances" doctrine to justify that court's exercising jurisdiction over a
defendant's appeal from the lower court's refusal to quash the indict-
ments. The court therein noted that the jurisdictional concept was
important to safeguard basic human rights and the public interest.
The 1977 seminal case of Commonwealth v. Bolden,"' which per-
mitted a defendant to appeal a pretrial order denying a claim of
double jeopardy, also spoke in terms of exceptional circumstances.
Although the jurisdictional basis for that appeal seems more appro-
priately now to have been the collateral order doctrine, 55 the case
noted that 'exceptional circumstances authorizing an appeal exist
when (1) the appeal is necessary to prevent great injustice to the
defendant; or (2) the issue of basic human rights is involved; or (3)
an issue of great public importance is involved. 836 Previously, in
Commonwealth v. Washington,85 7 the supreme court noted that the
352. D. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF MIND
AND PATTERN 287 (1985).
353. 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954).
354. 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977).
355. See supra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
356. 472 Pa. at 611, 373 A.2d at 94.
357. 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968); see also Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580,
414 A.2d 1043 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Bullock, 471 Pa. 292, 370 A.2d
309 (1977) (involving pre-trial review of propriety of lower court's order determining that
murder prosecution was not a capital case, since it involved serious public interest). The Bul-
lock opinion referred to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.501(b) (Supp. 1976-77) (appeals by
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exceptional circumstances doctrine had been limited to the post-
trial/presentence stage and was later expanded to apply to the pre-
trial stage.
The source and the viability of the doctrine may be easier to
resolve in terms of the supreme court's jurisdiction. The primary rea-
son for this observation is that, of the three appellate courts, the su-
preme court is the only one that possesses extraordinary powers of
review unencumbered by the principle of finality. Often, this ex-
traordinary aspect of judicial review is called the King's Bench
power. 85 8 More important, however, is the fact that the Judicial
Code contains a provision specifically entitling the supreme court to
exercise extraordinary or plenary jurisdiction in matters of "immedi-
ate public importance."35 Whether this statutory provision is the
functional equivalent of or broad enough to cover the three aspects
of the exceptional circumstances doctrine remains unclear. If there is
such equivalency, then one could maintain that the exercise of juris-
diction is in accordance with the "letter" of the law.
The application of the doctrine to the intermediate appellate
courts, however, is more troublesome. On occasion, the intermediate
appellate courts have disagreed whether exceptional circumstances is
a distinct basis for their jurisdiction."' The only plausible rationale
in favor of jurisdiction would arguably be that exceptional circum-
stances is an aspect of finality, the principle that statutorily empow-
ers and circumscribes the intermediate appellate courts. In a sense,
one might argue that exceptional circumstances is, like constructive
permission), now repealed.
358. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dincel, 311 Pa. Super. 479 n.6, 457 A.2d 1278, 1283
n. 6 (1983). The other courts, appellate and lower, do not possess King's Bench powers.
359. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (see infra note 387 for text); see also Silver v.
Downs, 493 Pa. 50, 425 A.2d 359 (1981); PA. R. App. P. 3309 (supreme court; extraordinary
relief), referred to infra note 388.
360. Some decisions have recognized such a basis for jurisdiction either explicitly or
implicitly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Donahue, - Pa. Super. -, - A.2d -
(1986) (appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief permissible under exceptional circum-
stances where denial of preliminary hearing claim required appellate court to safegurd basic
human rights); Commonwealth v. Burkett, - Pa. Super. -, 507 A.2d 1266 (1986) (cit-
ing Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 414 A.2d 1043); Commonwealth v. Reagan, 330 Pa.
Super. 417, 479 A.2d 621 (1984) (no exceptional circumstances found, however, with regard
to order finding defendant competent to stand trial in homicide prosecution); Commonwealth
v. Lindlsey, 241 Pa. Super. 522, 366 A.2d 310 (1976) (involving refusal to review denial of
defendant's habeas corpus petition). Other cases have rejected the doctrine. See Common-
wealth v. Wise, 328 Pa. Super. 491, 477 A.2d 552 (1984); Commonwealth v. Wills, 328 Pa.
Super. 342, 476 A.2d 1362 (1984); Toll v. Toll, 293 Pa. Super. 549, 439 A.2d 712 (1981)
(rejecting proposition that superior court has a broad discretionary power of review) (overrul-
ing Gurnick v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 278 Pa. Super. 437, 439-40 n.2, 420 A.2d
620, 621 n.2 (1980)) cf Commonwealth v. Billett, 294 Pa. Super. 612, 614 n.l, 440 A.2d 633,
634 n.1 (1982).
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finality, the spiritual aspect of the final order doctrine, although such
a version of finality would face obvious theoretical problems. There
are three observations, however, that suggest caution in recognizing
exceptional circumstances as a definite, independent jurisdictional
base for the intermediate appellate courts. First, aside from cases
maintaining that such jurisdiction is not authorized, commentary to
the appellate rules strongly indicates that such jurisdiction no longer
exists. 361 Second, the absence of appellate jurisdiction is no longer a
waivable defect.32 Third, in instances in which the intermediate ap-
pellate courts have attempted to exercise jurisdiction beyond tradi-
tional confines, the supreme court has firmly taken a conservative
approach in carefully limiting jurisdictional power. 38
The litigator, however, should be aware that what may be viable
in theory may be unavailing in practice. In a number of cases, the
exceptional circumstances doctrine, as applied, did not provide a ju-
risdictional alternative.3 "6 It is important to note that these opinions
361. The concluding comments to PA. R. App. P. 311 state as follows:
Formerly, there was case law to the effect that interlocutory appeals would
be considered in "exceptional circumstances." See. e.g., Commonwealth v.
Swanson, supra. Under these rules an appeal in exceptional circumstances from
an interlocutory order not covered by this rule is to be taken under Rule 312. In
appropriate circumstances relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition may
be available under Chapter 15 (judicial review of governmental determinations)
with respect to interlocutory action. In truly extraordinary cases relief may be
available by direct application to the Supreme Court under Rule 3309 (applica-
tions for extraordinary relief) (emphasis supplied).
362. See supra notes 78, 83 and accompanying text.
363. This restriction upon the intermediate appellate courts' powers has involved original
jurisdiction or mandamus. See Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Please of
Phila. County, 501 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985) (superior court had no jurisdiction to enter-
tain prohibition action when no appeal was pending in that court and superior court's jurisdic-
tion was not being infringed); Baker v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 325, 329 n.l, 489 A.2d 1354,
1356 n.l (1985) (commonwealth court's original jurisdiction in mandamus is extremely lim-
ited); Pennsylvania Dep't of Aging v. Lindberg, 503 Pa. 423, 430 n.5, 469 A.2d 1012, 1016 n.5
(1983) (resort to commonwealth's court's original jurisdiction not appropriate when an appeal
is an adequate available remedy); O'Brien v. Commonwealth State Employees' Retirement
System, 503 Pa. 414, 469 A.2d 1008 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 83 (1984) (original
jurisdiction of commonwealth court remains for addressing the very limited class of cases in
which appellate review of agency action is not provided by statute or statutory review would be
inadequate); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 471 (original jurisdiction of superior court),
761 (original jurisdiction of commonwealth court) (Purdon 1981).
364. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 500, 414 A.2d 1043 (1980) (appeal from
order denying defendant's motion to quash information); Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa.
317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974) (appeal from order denying pretrial motion alleging violation of
right to speedy trial); Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968) (ap-
peal from order denying defendant's motion to suppress); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 424 Pa.
96, 225 A.2d 241 (1967) (appeal from order regarding appointment of sanity commission to
determine defendant's competency); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 421 Pa. 513, 219 A.2d 293
(1966) (appeal from pretrial order granting the Commonwealth's petition for neuropsychiatric
examination of defendant); Commonweatlh v. Lindsley, 241 Pa. Super. 522, 366 A.2d 310
(1976) (appeal from denial of writ of habeas corpus).
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emanate primarily from the supreme court and concern criminal pre-
trial matters.
VII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: "Piggyback Jurisdiction"
Once the parties have gained access to the appellate forum by
presenting the court with an appealable order, there is often the
temptation to, in effect, bring with them excess baggage to the ap-
pellate court. The appellant, for example, may want to obtain appel-
late review of other contemporaneous orders or decisions that would
not be independently appealable. For example, a criminal defendant
who files an omnibus pretrial motions 5 might assert a double jeop-
ardy violation and other constitutional claims. In a single order, the
lower court may deny all of the defendant's claims. The defendant
might then attempt to appeal the order's dismissal of all such claims.
A similar situation may arise with the appellee. Once past the appel-
late threshold, the appellee might seek to "tack on" (in his brief) any
denials of relief to the appellant's appeal. These denials of relief may
have been separately entered by the lower courts6 or contained in
the appealed order. Both instances represent a situation that shall be
euphemistically referred to as "piggyback jurisdiction" - an attempt
by one of the parties to piggyback an independently unappealable
claim or order to a properly appealable order.
Piggyback jurisdiction is generally improper in the appellate
courts. Although the parties may argue that once an appeal is prop-
erly perfected, all claims disposed below should be resolved above,
appellate courts will not conduct wholesale appellate review. In such
circumstances, the appellate courts will interpret jurisdiction strictly
and review conservatively. An appellant cannot tack on unappealable
claims, decisions, or orders to the appeal; similarly, an aggrieved ap-
pellee cannot ask the appellate court to review nonappealable orders
or issues that were not the subject of a proper cross-appeal. 67
365. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 306 (omnibus pretrial motion).
366. In this regard, see PA. R. App. P. 301(b) (every order shall be set forth on a sepa-
rate document).
367. See PA. R. App. P. 511 and 903(b) (cross-appeals). For example, hypothetically, a
plaintiff who appeals a lower court order, entering an adverse judgment on one of her claims
(for example, strict liability), yet entering judgment in her favor on other claims, may appeal
the adverse judgment and challenge the adequacy of the verdict. The defendant, however, if he
wanted to contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment would necessarily
have to file a cross-appeal raising, for example, the lower court's refusal to grant its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
For example of situations generally involving cross appeals, see DeFazio v. Labe, - Pa.
Super. -, 507 A.2d 410 (1986); Keiper v. Keiper, 343 Pa. Super. 256, 494 A.2d 454
(1985) (petition for allowance of appeal granted); Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa. Super.
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The United States Supreme Court has refused to exercise such
wholesale appellate review of claims that are not independently ap-
pealable. In Abney v. United States s18 Chief Justice Burger refused
to review claims that the appellant tried to incorporate in his juris-
dictionally proper double jeopardy appeal. In limiting the scope of an
appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the Chief Justice stated:
In determining that the courts of appeals may exercise ju-
risdiction over an appeal from a pretrial order denying a motion
to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, we, of
course, do not hold that other claims contained in the motion to
dismiss are immediately appealable as well. . . . Our conclusion
that a defendant may seek immediate appellate review of a dis-
trict court's rejection of his double jeopardy claim is based on
the special considerations permeating claims of that nature
which justify a departure from the normal rule of finality. Quite
obviously, such considerations do not extend beyond the claim of
former jeopardy and encompass other claims presented to, and
rejected by, the district court in passing on the accused's motion
to dismiss. Rather, such claims are appealable if, and only if,
they too fall within Cohen's collateral-order exception to the fi-
nal-judgment rule. Any other rule would encourage criminal de-
fendants to seek review of, or assert frivolous double jeopardy
claims in order to being more serious, but otherwise nonappeala-
ble questions to the attention of the courts of appeals prior to
conviction and sentence.' "
In Pennsylvania, although appeals were properly perfected, ap-
pellate courts have refused to review companion interlocutory claims
that were not independently appealable. The refusal to exercise such
broad review has concerned those claims or portions of orders that
an appellant has tried, in effect, to tack onto his appeal, 370 as well as
185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985). The failure to file a cross appeal may result in serious adverse
consequences. See Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 233 n.4, 478
A.2d 800, 804 n.4 (1984) (failure to cross appeal in child custody case precluded non-appeal-
ing party from challenging separate issue); Commonweatlh v. Moser, 328 Pa. Super. 237, 476
A.2d 980 (1984); Appeal of Pesante, 82 Pa. Commw. 242, 476 A.2d 474 (1984) (without
taking cross appeal, appellee could not raise issues adversely decided). And see U.S. v. Amer.
R. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435-36 (1924); Cochran v. M & M Transp. Co., 110 F.2d 519
(Ist Cir. 1940) (if litigant fails to appeal or cross appeal from judgment granting him only
part of the relief sought and denying the rest, he can be heard only in support of such
judgment).
368. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
369. Id. at 662-63 (citing United States v. Barket, 530 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1975) cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976)).
370. See Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, 486 Pa. 241, 248 n.5, 405 A.2d 881, 884-85 n.5
(1979) (no appellate review of other interlocutory decisions in defendant's pretrial double jeop-
ardy appeal); Hudock v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 438 Pa. 272, 264 A.2d 668 (1970) (plaintiffs'
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those nonappealable interlocutory decisions or orders that an appel-
lee tried to piggyback on to an appellant's appeal. 1 In addition to
such jurisdictional infirmities, the appellate courts have refused to
review contemporaneous judgments of sentence when the notice of
appeal presented fatal procedural noncompliance, such as the failure
to specifically identify the specific indictment or information upon
which a specific sentence was imposed. 2
Therefore, in securing the jurisdictional propriety of an appeal,
appeal from order granting defendant adjustment companies' preliminary objections, which, in
effect, terminated plaintiffs' cause of action against them for breach of contract, was proper;
but other appeal by plaintiffs from order sustaining defendant insurance companies' demurrer
as to breach of contract claim was not proper since order did not effectively terminate that
cause of action); Brandywine Area Joint School Auth. v. Van Cor, Inc., 426 Pa. 448, 233 A.2d
240 (1967) (appellate review of interlocutory order, precluding evidence of an affirmative de-
fense, was proper; but defendant could not tack on interlocutory order, denying right to jury
trial, for appellate review even though there was partial compliance with the certification pro-
cedures) (Justice Pomeroy dissented in Brandywine Area, favoring instead judicial review of
the other claim for economy reasons); Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 642-
43, 241 A.2d 81, 89 (1968) (appeals from portions of interlocutory orders, deferring decision
on preliminary objections, quashed sua sponte). See also Commonwealth v. Perrin, 272 Pa.
Super. 24, 414 A.2d 650 (1979) (no appellate review of speedy trial claim in double jeopardy
appeal); Commonwealth v. Rende, 335 Pa. Super. 509, 485 A.2d 9 (1985) (defendant cannot
tack on other interlocutory issues in double jeopardy appeal); Pittsburgh Airport Motel v. Air-
port Asphalt, 322 Pa. Super. 149, 469 A.2d 226 (1983) (plaintiff's appeal from portion of
order dismissing complaint as to one defendant was proper; but plaintiff's appeal from that
portion of the order transferring the case to the law side of the court was quashed); Rappaport
v. Stein, 351 Pa. Super. 370, 506 A.2d 393 (1985) (appeal from practically final order deter-
mining rights in quiet title action proper but companion appeal from interlocutory order, not
covered by PA, R. App. P. 311, was quashed); but see Temtex Products, Inc. v. Kramer, 330
Pa. Super. 183, 479 A.2d 500 (1984) (in multi-issue appeal, review of interlocutory order of
lower court's jurisdiction permitted in interests of judicial economy and in view of lower
court's belated certification); Roman v. Pearlstein, 329 Pa.Super. 392, 478 A.2d 845 (1984)
(appellate review of portion of order imposing costs in appeal from sanction order precluding a
defense).
371. See Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 482 Pa. 615, 394
A.2d 615 (1978) (plaintiff's appeal from order granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, albeit partial, was proper; but defendant's cross-appeal for order denying its motion for
summary judgment quashed); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 471
A.2d 493 (1984) (defendants as appellees could not seek appellate review of interlocutory
order denying their motions for summary judgment and non pros in plaintiffs' appeal from
final orders granting summary judgment and non pros in favor of other defendants); but see
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa. Super. 143, 452 A.2d 1355 (1982) (defendant may file
cross-appeal from lower couri's order denying his motion to suppress when Commonwealth has
filed an appeal from order suppressing evidence) (citing Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa.
405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968)).
372. See Commonwealth v. Keys, 313 Pa. Super. 410, 460 A.2d 253 (1983) (defend-
ant's notice of appeal, having erroneously identified informations for which defendant was not
convicted, was fatal and compelled quashing of appeals); Commonwealth v. Hill, 267 Pa.
Super. 140, 142 n.l, 406 A.2d 558, 559 n.A (1979) (failure of appellant to specifically appeal
judgment of sentence imposed as to particular indictment was fatal notwithstanding fact that
appellate court would review other properly identified and appealable judgments of sentence
contained in the notice of appeals); but see Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. Super. 127, 127
n.l, 399 A.2d 699, 699 n.1 (1979) (erroneous identification of indictments in notice of appeal
viewed as clerical error and overlooked); see also PA. R. App. P. 301 (separate document
required), and 904 (content of the nature of appeal).
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it is essential to identify and segregate those orders or portions of an
order that are independently appealable. Furthermore, it is incum-
bent to carefully and specifically identify the particular order or de-
cision that is properly appealable in the notice of appeal.
VIII. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Locus of the Appeal
The focus of the discussion on subject matter jurisdiction has
been on the lower court's order. Once the aggrieved party has deter-
mined that the lower court's order is appealable the next inquiry
must concern the proper appellate court in which to appeal. This
inquiry is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. Whereas the prior
inquiry examined the particular lower court's order, the present
analysis must look to the broader aspect of the category of case in-
volved in the appeal. Once the litigant has identified the category of
case, he or she can then select the locus of appellate jurisdiction,
namely the proper appellate forum. Significantly, the litigant should
note that a mistake in selecting the proper appellate forum is not
fatal. As long as the lower court's order is appealable and an appeal
is properly and timely filed,373 jurisdiction is vested in the appellate
court. 87 4 If the wrong appellate forum is chosen, the appellate court,
on its own or pursuant to a party's motion, can transfer the appeal to
the proper appellate court.
875
A. Supreme Court
The appellate court system in Pennsylvania is three-tiered, and
373. See PA. R. App. P. 903 (time for appeal).
374. See, e.g, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon 1981), which states in part as
follows:
(a) General rule. - The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdic-
tion of an appellate court within such time as may be specified by general rule,
shall, unless the appellate court otherwise orders, operate to perfect the appellate
jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of this title, or
of any general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of
matters), vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court.
Id. § 704(b)(2) specifically provides that there can be no waiver of a jurisdictional defect
concerning a nonappealable interlocutory order. See also PA. R. App. P. 741 (waiver of objec-
tions to jurisdiction), which is section 704's procedural counterpart.
375. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 705 (Purdon 1981) provides as follows:
The Superior Court and the Commonwealth Court shall have power pursu-
ant to general rules, on their own motion or upon petition of any party, to trans-
fer any appeal to the other court for consideration and decision with any matter
pending in such other court involving the same or related questions of fact, law,
or discretion.
Section 705's counterpart is located in PA. R. App. P. 752. See also PA. R. App. P. 751 (trans-
fer of erroneously filed cases as to appeals mistakenly brought "in a court or magisterial dis-
trict which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal").
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it is comprised of the supreme, superior and commonwealth courts.
Each court has appellate jurisdiction over distinct categories of
cases. The highest and oldest appellate judicial tribunal87 6 is the su-
preme court, comprised of seven elected justices.17 7 The supreme
court exercises both original378 and appellate jurisdiction. Its appel-
late jurisdiction, furthermore, includes those cases that it reviews as
a matter of right and those that it hears as a matter of discretion.
There is a right of appeal, for example, in the supreme court
from final orders of the courts of common pleas87 9 in matters involv-
ing, inter alia, the right to hold public office, judicial tenure and
qualifications, imposition of the death penalty,3 80 unconstitutionality
of various laws and treaties as declared by the court of common
pleas, 881 and the right to practice law. 82 Another section of the Judi-
376. The supreme court was established in 1722 and is said to be the oldest appellate
court in the nation, predating the United States Supreme Court by sixty-seven years. See
DEPARTMENT OF GEN. SERVICES, 106 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 401-02 (1982-1983).
377. See PA. CONST., art. 5, § 2.
378. Original jurisdiction refers to cases heard in the first instance. The supreme court
has original jurisdiction in all cases of habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition to courts of
inferior jurisdiction, and quo warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 721 (Purdon 1981); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.201 (predeces-
sor of section 721); PA. R. APP. P. 3307 (application for leave to file original process).
An informative history of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicates that the court was
predominantly a trial court at first and that for a number of years it acted as a trial court for
Philadelphia county. From its trial court functions, the supreme court developed its power of
appellate review through three special procedural devices (writ of error, writ of appeal and
certiorari). In its early history, the High Court of Errors and Appeals, rather than the supreme
court, was the highest court in the state for corrections of errors of law. See Surrency, The
Development of the Appellate Function: The Pennsylvania Experience, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
173-91 (1976).
379. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1981) (definition of "court of common
pleas"). These courts generally exercise trial court functions.
380. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frederick, 508 Pa. 527, 498 A.2d 1322 (1985); Com-
monwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833 (1985); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer,
500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S.
1236 (1983).
381. But see Scott v. Adal Corp., - Pa. Super. - , 509 A.2d 1279 (1986) (lower
court's declaration of unconstitutionality of rules of court, even though they have force and
effect of statutes, is implicitly within superior court's jurisdiction); cf. Schreiber v. Republic
Intermodal Corp., 473 Pa. 614, 375 A.2d 1285 (1977) (supreme court accepts appeal without
resolving jurisdictional issue).
382. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722 (Purdon 1981) which states as follows:
Direct Appeals from Courts of Common Pleas The Supreme Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas
in the following classes of cases:
(I) Matters prescribed by general rule. (2) The right to public office. (3)
Matters where the qualifications, tenure or right to service, or the manner
of service, of any member of the judiciary is drawn in question. (4) Auto-
matic review of sentences as provided by 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 971 1(h) (relat-
ing to review of death sentence). (5) Supersession of a district attorney by
an Attorney General or by a court or where the matter relates to the
convening, supervision, administration, operation or discharge of an inves-
tigating grand jury or otherwise directly affects such a grand jury or any
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cial Code gives the supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction
from final orders of the commonwealth court when such actions were
originally commenced in the commonwealth court rather than com-
ing to that court as an appellate action. 83 These types of cases may
be appealed to the court as a matter of right. The supreme court also
possesses exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final orders of constitu-
tional and judicial agencies that concern peculiarly legislative, judi-
cial and professional (legal) matters. 84
The discretionary aspect of the supreme court's appellate juris-
diction represents a significant portion of the supreme court's oner-
ous reviewing function. Probably the most important or common-
place jurisdictional provision for the practitioner who wishes to
appeal to the supreme court is section 724 of the Judicial Code. 385
investigation conducted by it. (6) Matters where the right or power of the
Commonwealth or any political subdivision to create or issue indebted-
ness is drawn in direct question. (7) Matters where the court of common
pleas has held invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, or to the Constitution of this Commonwealth, any
treaty or law of the United States or any provision of the Constitution of,
or of any statute of, this Commonwealth, or any provision of any home
rule charter. (8) Matters where the right to practice law is drawn in di-
rect question.
383. See id. § 723 which states as follows:
Appeals from Commonewalth Court (a) General Rule. - The Supreme Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the Common-
wealth Court entered in any matter which was originally commenced in the
Commonwealth Court except an order entered in a matter which constitutes an
appeal to the Commonwealth Court from another court, a district justice or an-
other government unit. (b) Board of Finance and Revenue matters. - Any final
order of the Commonwealth Court entered in any appeal from a decision of the
Board of Finance and Revenue shall be appealable to the Supreme Court, as of
right, under this section.
384. See id. § 725, which states as follows:
Direct appeals from constitutional and judicial agencies The Supreme Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the following
constitutional and judicial agencies:
(I) Legislative Reapportionment Commission. (2) Judicial Inquiry and
Review Board. (3) The agency vested with the power to determine
whether those members of the minor judiciary required to do so have
completed a course of training and instruction in the duties of their re-
spective offices and passes an examination. (4) The agency vested with
the power to admit or recommend the admission of persons to the bar and
the practice of law. (5) The agency vested with the power to discipline or
recommend the discipline of attorneys at law.
385. See id. § 724, which provides in part as follows:
Allowance of appeals from Superior and Commonwealth Courts (a) General
rule. - Except as provided by Section 9781(f) (relating to limitation on addi-
tional appellate review), final orders of the Superior court and final orders of the
Commonwealth Court not appealable under section 723 (relating to appeals
from Commonwealth Court) may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon al-
lowance of appeal by any two justices of the Supreme Court upon petition of any
party to the matter. If the petition shall be granted, the Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction to review the order in the manner provided by section
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Under this broad provision of appellate review, the supreme court,
upon petition, 8  may permit an appeal from final orders of the supe-
rior and commonwealth courts. The provision does not specify partic-
ular classes of cases.
The supreme court also possesses a power unique to the appel-
late courts. It is the power of plenary review, unencumbered by prin-
ciples of finality, to assume jurisdiction in any matter "involving an
issue of immediate public importance. 38 7 This power of extraordi-
nary review is also referred to as the power of the King's Bench.388
B. Superior Court
For the non-specialist practitioner generally involved in non-spe-
cialized appeals, the major repository of appellate review is located
in the superior court which has been referred to as "one of the most
overworked appellate courts in America in terms of caseload and
number of written opinions per judge per year." ' 9 The superior
court is the second oldest appellate court in Pennsylvania and was
accorded constitutional status when it was incorporated into the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.390 The superior court presently
has fifteen judges, supplemented by senior judges.
Basically, the superior court has very limited original jurisdic-
tion.3 91 However, the Judicial Code gives the superior court a broad,
generic appellate jurisdiction over final orders of common pleas
courts in those matters that are not within the jurisdiction of either
5105(d)(1) (relating to scope of appeal).
386. The procedure is known as "Petition for Allowance of Appeal," often referred to as
a "Petition for Allocatur." See PA. R. APP. P. 1111-23.
387. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (Purdon 1981) provides as follows:
Extraordinary Jurisdiction Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Su-
preme Court may, on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any mat-
ter pending before any court or district justice of this Commonwealth involving
an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such
matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and
justice to be done.
See also supra notes 352-64 and accompanying text regarding jurisdiction based on "excep-
tional circumstances."
388. See, e.g., Bocchetta v. Bocchetta, 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982) (plenary
jurisdiction assumed in divorce case involving issue of equitable jurisdiction); see also PA. R.
APP. P. 3309; Surrency, supra note 378, at 176.
389. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 15.
390. The superior court was created in 1895. In 1980 an amendment was passed that
increased the number of judges from seven to fifteen. The superior court achieved constitu-
tional status by the constitutional amendments in 1968. See PA. CONST. art. 5, § 3 (superior
court); see also THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL, supra note 376, at 402; Surrency, supra note
378, at 189-90, (indicating that the superior court was created to ease the burdensome
caseload of the supreme court).
391. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741 (Purdon 1981); see also supra note 363.
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the supreme or commonwealth courts.3 92 A party, aggrieved by such
a final order, may appeal as of right to the superior court pursuant
to this specific statutory provision.
C. Commonwealth Court
The commonwealth court is the youngest and arguably most
specialized of Pennsylvania's appellate courts. Existing since 1970,
the commonwealth court, to a great degree, possesses jurisdiction
over actions by or against the Commonwealth, its officers and its
agencies.3 93 Although the American Judicature Society noted that
there is perhaps no logical or socioeconomic justification for the sep-
arateness of the commonwealth and superior courts, and that the
margins of their respective jurisdictions are sometimes inevitably
vague, a3 4 the practitioner must be aware of the commonwealth
court's distinct jurisdictional powers. Aside from its original jurisdic-
tion,3 95 the commonwealth court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction,
for example, of final orders of the courts of common pleas in (1) civil
actions to which the Commonwealth is a party; (2) criminal actions
arising from violations of regulatory statutes administered by a state
agency; and (3) civil and criminal actions involving local government
matters that draw into question the application, interpretation or en-
forcement of home rule charters, statutes relating to elections, and
statutes regulating the affairs of political subdivisions, municipalities,
local authorities or public corporations and their agents. 3 "0 The com-
392. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 742 (Purdon 1981) provides as follows:
Appeals from courts of common pleas The Superior Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common
pleas, regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount involved, except
such classes of appeals as are by any provision of this chapter within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.
The prior statute was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.302 (repealed).
393. See PA. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (commonwealth court); see also THE PENNSYLVANIA
MANUAL, supra note 376, at 402-03, which notes that previously, cases involving the Com-
monwealth had been heard by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, sitting in
Harrisburg.
394. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 32. The
study also noted that at that time, the commonwealth court, partly because of its newness, was
the most efficient and effective of the appellate courts. Id. at 33.
395. See 42 PA. CoNs, STAT. ANN. § 761 (Purdon 1981); see also supra note 363.
396. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 762 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1986), which provides
as follows:
Appeals from courts of common pleas (a) General Rule, - Except as provided
in subsection (b), the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following cases:
(I) Commonwealth civil cases. - All civil actions or proceedings:
(i) Original jurisdiction of which is vested in another tribunal by
virtue of any of the exceptions to section 761(a)(1) (relating to
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monwealth court is also empowered to hear direct appeals from final
orders of government agencies in particular categories of cases.
3 97
original jurisdiction), expect actions or proceedings in the nature
of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief
not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the
court. (ii) By the Commonwealth government, including any of-
ficer thereof acting in his official capacity.
(2) Governmental and Commonwealth regulatory criminal cases. - All
criminal actions or proceedings for the violation of any:
(i) Rule, regulation or order of any Commonwealth agency. (ii)
Regulatory statute administered by any Commonwealth agency
subject to Subchapter A of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to prac-
tice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies). The term "regu-
latory statute" as used in this subparagraph does not include any
provision of Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).
(3) Secondary review of certain appeals from Commonwealth agencies.
- All appeals from Commonwealth agencies which may be taken ini-
tially to the courts of common pleas under section 933 (relating to ap-
peals from government agencies)
(4) Local government civil and criminal matters.
(i) All actions or proceedings arising under any municipality, insti-
tution, district, public school, planning or zoning code or under
which a municipality or other political subdivision or municipality
authority may be formed or incorporated or where is drawn in
question the application, interpretation or enforcement of any:
(A) statute regulating the affairs of political subdivisions, munici-
pality and other local authorities or other public corporations or of
the officers, employees or agents thereof, acting in their official ca-
pacity; (B) home rule charter or local ordinance or resolution; or
(C) statute relating to elections, campaign financing or other elec-
tion procedures.
(iii) All appeals from government agencies other than Common-
wealth agencies decided under section 933 or otherwise.
(5) Certain private corporation matters. -
(i) All actions or proceedings relating to corporations not-for-profit
arising under Title 15 (relating to corporations and unincorporated
associations) or where is drawn in question the application, inter-
pretation or enforcement of any provision of the Constitution, trea-
ties or law of the United States, or the Constitution of Pennsylva-
nia or any statute, regulating in any such case the corporate
affairs of the members, security holders, directors, officers, em-
ployees or agents thereof, as such. (ii) All actions or proceedings
otherwise involving the corporate affairs of any corporation not-
for-profit subject to Title 15 or the affairs of the members, security
holders, directors, officers, or employees or agents thereof, as such.
(6) Eminent domain. - All eminent domain proceedings or where is
drawn in question the power or right of the acquiring agency to appropri-
ate the condemned property or to use it for the purpose condemned or
otherwise.
(7) Immunity waiver matters. - Matters conducted pursuant to Sub-
chapter C of Chapter 85 (relating to action against local parties).
397. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763 (Purdon 1981), which states as follows:
Direct appeals from government agencies (a) General rule. - Except as pro-
vided in subsection (c), the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of appeals from final orders of government agencies in the following cases:
(I) All appeals from Commonwealth agencies under Subchapter A of
Chapter 7 of Title 2 (relating to judicial review of Commonwealth agency
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There are presently nine elected judges on the court, supplemented
by senior judges.
IX. Conclusion
A New York Times correspondent, reporting on the 1986 Inter-
national Congress of Mathematicians, observed that the ideal mathe-
matics talk is said to consist of three parts. The first part should be
understood by most of the audience. The second part should be un-
derstood by a handful of specialists in the field. And the third part
should be understood by no one. Otherwise, how would people know
that the speaker is serious?398
It is with some trepidation and dismay that this writer appreci-
ates the possible relevance of the mathematicians' gibe to the present
discourse. The end of a discussion is usually reserved for a simplified
summarization of essential themes or concepts. Summarization, how-
ever, is often only meaningless trivialization. How, for example, does
one capsulize an idea such as standing? How can one tersely and
intelligently recapitulate finality's subtle variations - classical, con-
structive and collateral? There will be no such attempt here. Rather
this conclusion is simply intended to remind the reader that the pur-
pose of the preceding discussion was primarily to synthesize and elu-
cidate - not harmonize - complex material in the hope that the
topographical perspective will reveal a discernible and sensible mo-
saic of procedures. The preceding discussion may have startled the
reader that so many have labored, for example, on such a simple
dilemma as deciding whether one can decide. Although there may
action) or otherwise and including appeals from the Environmental Hear-
ing Board, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review and from any other Commonwealth
agency having Statewide jurisdiction. (2) All appeals jurisdiction of
which is vested in the Commonwealth Court by any statute hereafter
enacted.
(b) Awards of arbitrators. - The Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all petitions for review of an award of arbitrators appointed in
conformity with statute to arbitrate a dispute between the Commonwealth and
an employee of the Commonwealth. The petition for review shall be deemed an
appeal from a government unit for the purposes of section 723 (relating to ap-
peals from Commonwealth Court) and Chapter 55 (relating to limitation of
time). (c) Exceptions. - The Commonwealth Court shall not have jurisdiction
of such classes of appeals from government agencies as are:
(I) By section 725 (relating to direct appeals from constitutional and ju-
dicial agencies) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.(2) By section 933 (relating to appeals from government agencies)
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas.
398. Gleick, But Aren't Truth and Beauty Supposed to Be Enough?, N.Y. Times, Aug.
12, 1986, at C3, col. 5.
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inevitably be quibbles at times with a result reached or a road taken,
only the politically naive would argue that the elaborate edifice of
rules3 99 and precise judicial expositions on judicial power are nothing
more than semantic or scholastic gamesmanship. Thus, rather than
attempt to bestow quick and easy answers, this conclusion suggests
that in a future appeal, the reader should consider the following pre-
liminary "appellate checklist."
A. Standing and Justiciability
1. Does the appealing party, the appellant, have standing to
appeal ?400
2. Is the appellant adversely affected by the lower court's
order? 401
3. Is the appellant a party to the lower court's proceedings?
40
2
4. Does the appeal present a subsisting,, justiciable
controversy?4 °8
B. Appealability (Jurisdiction)
1. Is the lower court's order appealable as a "final" order? In
other words, is there appellate jurisdiction?
404
a. Is the litigation in the lower court completed? Are the
parties actually "out of court"?
40 5
b. If the litigation in the lower court is not formally and
actually terminated, is the appellant effectively or pragmatically
"out of court" and deprived of an opportunity for relief?4'
c. If the appellant is the plaintiff and the litigation below
is not terminated, has the lower court's order denied the plain-
tiff relief as to a "separate and distinct cause of action" as to
one or more of the parties?4
07
d. If the appellant is the defendant and the litigation be-
399. Americans may have a peculiar penchant for intricate rules and regulations, one
author noted in comparing the American and British addictions to football and soccer with the
different systems of government. For example, in contrast to the flexible, fast-moving and sim-
ple strategy of soccer, there is the "rougher American football, with its elaborate system of
rules, measurement of yardage, calculation of time-outs, and frequent substitution of players."
D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 74 (1983).
400. See generally supra notes 11-46 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 93-159 and accompanying text.
406. See generally supra notes 160-241 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text. Caution is advised here because
case law may be in a state of flux.
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low is not terminated, has the lower court's order effectively de-
prived the defendant of a special fact-based defense or a sepa-
rate claim for relief?
40 8
2. If the lower court's order does not actually terminate litiga-
tion or effectively deprive the parties of a cause of action, claim for
relief, or defense, does the order dispose of an important collateral
claim that may be irreparably lost if not immediately reviewed?40 1
3. If the answers to the above are negative, is the lower court's
order appealable because of a special statute, rule of court or
doctrine?
4 10
4. If the answers to the above are negative, has the appellant
properly asked the lower and appellate courts to certify the lower
court's nonfinal order for an immediate appeal?
411
5. If the appeal from the lower court's order is jurisdictionally
proper, has the appellant or appellee improperly attempted to seek
review of additional, nonappealable issues? (Often, this question can
be answered only after the briefs are filed.)
412
C. Jurisdictional Forum
If the appeal is jurisdictionally proper, is the appeal presented
to the proper appellate forum in accordance with the statutory allo-
cations of judicial power?
418
The answers to the checklist of questions require knowledge and
application of complex conceptual constructs, superimposed by man
on a reality that can be understood only in terms of human rational-
ity - and fallibility. The abstract constructs of the legal profession
are no more - or less - arcane or intelligible than, for example,
the equations of a mathematician or the theorems of a physicist. 4
The difference is nothing more than the conjugation of words as a
replacement for numbers, in a context impervious to meaningful
408. See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text. Caution is likewise advised here
because case law may be in a state of flux.
409. See supra notes 242-270 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 271-314, 352-64 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 315-51 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 365-72 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 373-97 and accompanying text.
414. One could easily, for example, translate the collateral order doctrine or the princi-
ple of. Praisner, supra notes 242-70, 174-94 and accompanying text, respectively, into more
abstract, sentence-less, arithmetical equations of appealability. The conversion, however, would
not necessarily guarantee any greater degree of intelligibility or infallibility. There is perhaps a
common perception that pure science is somehow more logical or rational than the social sci-
ences. That pure science has been a victim of its own incertitude and illogical and self-imposed
surreality is vividly demonstrated in a recent book about quantum mechanics written especially
for the layperson. See ZUKAV, THE DANCING Wu Li MASTERS (Bantam 1979).
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human visualization. Moreover, it is man's perception of a desired or
understood reality that frustratingly defies comfortable stasis. As the
reader wanders through the maze of appellate rules and opinions,
certainty becomes nothing more than a perishable commodity, a de-
lusion; the desuetude and obscurity of concepts being but an opinion
or statute away.
[W]hat we take to be reality can be meaningfully understood
only insofar as it is organized and described by language. From
this point of view, court opinions, like other forms of discourse,
can be understood as exercises in reality making. The legal rules
that an opinion promulgates derive from the assumptions that
the court makes about the nature, both actual and desired, of
reality. Any opinion, in short, encodes an entire world view, in
the service of which its rules operate. Like any set of world
views, those encoded in legal opinions are continually in the pro-
cess of being formed and reformed. . Each time a case is de-
cided and a new opinion is issued, the legal world view is re-
formed in varying degree, depending upon the outcome of the
case.""5
Thus, the ever changing nature of the legal universe can have a
value beyond its apparent mundane and perfunctory existence. For
with uncertainty comes excitement. "[W]hen your work seems to
present only mean details you may realize that every detail has the
mystery of the universe behind it and may keep up your heart with
an undying faith," said Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to a friend yet
youthful in his craft.41 Regardless of context, whether craft or pro-
fession, there will always be the ambiguity factor. All that one can
expect then is to wisely use one's intellectual gifts, learn and try to
benefit others. But in the endeavor, one can perhaps develop a world
view of the universe and its participants with a sense of wonderment.
The amalgam of practices and procedures have been the cooperative
creation of a vast human chain in a peculiar cosmic process - from
secretaries who typed, to law students who researched, to teachers
who taught, to legislators who promulgated, to lawyers who advo-
cated, to law clerks who assisted, to judges who pronounced, and to
the supporting staffs that communicated the system's message.
411
Of course, there are also the parties themselves, who presented
415. Michel, Hood v Dumond: A Study of the Supreme Court and the Ideology of
Capitalism, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 659-60 (1986).
416. See C. WYZANSKI. JR., WHEREAS - A JUDGE'S PREMISES 289-90 (1965).
417. Of course, one could also include in the scheme the electorate who chose the ones
who created and applied the law.
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their prosaic or monumental antagonisms for the courts to resolve.
Plaintiff's like Sol and Hannah Cohen, Bruce Praisner, and Robert
Fried, as well as defendants, such as Donald Abney, Billy Dugger,
and James Brady, may be all momentary, technical "losers" of the
vast legal system, names simply appended to historical case citations,
their individual publicized sagas long forgotten. Yet little did they
know that in their defeat would emerge a principle or concept that
would affect the lives and fortunes of others to follow. Little did they
know that, as a result of their internecine squabbles, the legal par-
ticipants would trod a path toward a new destination, a new idea, a
new reality. The New York Times correspondent, who attended the
mathematicians' conclave, shared a vision that may have meaning
for all of us. In lifting the curtain of the specialist's arcane and mi-
croscopic details, the reporter discovered a panoramic wonderland of
truth and beauty:
If the mathematicians were inclined toward parable and meta-
phor - and they most definitely are not - they might describe
a vast wilderness, and in it a small society of men and women
whose business it is to lay railroad track. This has become an
art, and they have become artists - artists of track, lovers of
track, connoisseurs of track. Almost perversely, they ignore the
landscape around them. A network of track may head to the
northeast for many years and then be abandoned. An old, nearly
forgotten line to the south may sprout new branches, heading
toward a horizon that the tracklayers seem unable or unwilling
to see. As long as each new piece of track is carefully joined to
the old, so that the progression is never broken, an odd thing
happens. People come along hoping to explore this forest or that
desert, and they find that a certain stretch of track takes them
exactly where they need to go. The tracklayers, for their part,
may have long since abandoned that place. But the track re-
mains, and track, of course, is the stuff on which the engines of
knowledge roll forward.' 18
418. See Glick, supra note 398, at C3, col. 6.

